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Surely several things are needed to deal with
terrorism. First of all: compassion for those
who have experienced the horror, the com-
forting of the relatives and friends of victims,
a return as quickly as possible to normality,
an alert refusal to allow innocents in America
– especially Muslim- and Arab-Americans –
to suffer fear, harassment and worse. Sec-
ond: we need greater security at home and
the pursuit of the international criminals
who have perpetrated this horror, but a pur-
suit that remains fundamentally within the
framework of international law, and that is
carried out with a concern that more inno-
cents don't suffer, and that our liberties
aren't curtailed. Surely, the international
character of the struggle against 'terrorism'
consists not merely in its being an alliance of
several countries to prevent further anti-
American injury from abroad. More than
America is at stake here: We need to prevent
'terror' from being a threat to the very con-
ception of a just and secure world.
It has recently been asserted that Ameri-
can intellectuals must not allow any justifi-
cation of the criminal acts of September 11
to go unchallenged. Of course nothing, ab-
solutely nothing, can excuse let alone justify
the massacres in New York and Washington.
But should that be the only concern of pub-
lic intellectuals? Must we not also reject the
terms in which the terrorists and their sym-
pathizers would have us discuss this crisis?
Whatever its origins, 'terrorism' is an abomi-
nation because it acts ruthlessly in a particu-
lar cause, it has contempt for the life of in-
nocents, and it is ready to create and coun-
tenance chaos in what is believed to be 'the
enemy's territory'. We must refuse to en-
courage the terrorist mindset. Thus while
we need to understand the spontaneous
anger and desire for revenge of those who
have directly lost a relative or friend, public
intellectuals themselves must be careful not
to fuel such emotions. In other words: All
talk of 'war against evil' tends to encourage
excess; measure and proportionality require
the language of 'law and justice'.
We have repeatedly been told that the
September 11 terrorists have attacked 'our
values'. But what values are these? Our con-
cern for the loss of innocent human life, our
compassion for those who have suffered,
our anxiety about innocents who may yet
suffer further violence. Our values are the
flourishing of life and the measure of law.
The terrorist mindset is found not only
among those (whether gangs or states) who
carry out acts of physical violence but also
incipiently among those who employ a par-
ticular public discourse – the discourse of
self-righteousness and revenge, of disre-
gard for proportionality, of insisting on the
immorality of self-criticism. And who are
'we' whose values terrorists violate? Con-
trary to the assertions emerging frequently
from our media, these values do not belong
exclusively to 'Western civilization' but to
decent, compassionate people who belong
to traditions throughout the world: Islamic,
Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh – or,
for that matter, atheist. The talk in our
media is of a war against the evil of 'Islamic
terrorists'. This already seems to me an ideo-
logical concession to terrorists, even if we
make the ritual qualification by saying that
most Muslims are 'moderate Muslims'. (I am
reminded of polite anti-Semites talking
about 'good Jews'.) The equation of Islam
with terrorism is already made in the popu-
lar mind and 'experts' have leapt in by the
score to explain or qualify it. We should not
be surprised at what is euphemistically
called the 'backlash'. The unfortunate con-
sequences of the talk about Islamic terror-
ism are the promotion of further antago-
nism against Muslim-Americans and Arab-
Americans, as well as further hostility to-
wards Muslims and Arabs worldwide. We
are in effect being urged to forget the range
of recent non-state terrorisms – in Northern
Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka (even within the US,
in Oklahoma and elsewhere) – which have
no connection with Muslims. The salience of
September 11 is that it was an attack by a
group of foreigners against the United
States – not against Britain or France or Ger-
many or Japan. That alone makes it an at-
tack 'against humanity', giving it a moral
and legal status that none of the other cases
of terrorism in our contemporary world has
ever been given.
A respected liberal daily carries an informa-
tive Special Report that explores wider ques-
tions. It is headed 'Why Do They Hate Us?'
(Christian Science Monitor, 27 September
2001) and accompanied by numerous pho-
tographs of Muslims, people from different
walks of life, young and old, men and
women. The title represents an unfortunate
but not atypical elision. Do 'They' (an indeter-
minate Muslim population) really 'Hate' (not
'criticize' or 'condemn' or 'feel bitterly about')
'Us' (not particular American foreign policies
but all Americans)? Intellectuals know the
danger of loaded questions that pollsters
sometimes employ: 'Why do you hate us?'
Speak. Tell us what you feel. We (a l l A m e r i-
cans, government and people alike) are lis-
tening. I am sure this was not deliberate on
the part of the M o n i t o r, which means that it is
part of the unconscious media culture.
My own experience is that most people in
the Muslim world are not consumed with
hatred towards Americans but are deeply
critical of the double standards used in for-
eign policy by US governments. Of course
there are many who do express hateful or
ignorant views about America and the West.
But even among these not many would
countenance, let alone do, what the terror-
ists did on September 11. Not every argued
criticism of US policy should be represented
as 'hate'. Not every emotional response
should be equated with a readiness to com-
mit acts of terrorism. The connection be-
tween what people say (or hear) and what
they do is often indirect.
The horror of death and destruction of innocents in
New York and Washington, the launching of an indefi-
nite 'war against terrorism', the harassment and worse
of those seen as Muslims and Arabs in America, the op-
portunistic attempts to equate the September disaster
with Israeli experience of terror (but not with that of
the Palestinians) or alternatively to divert attention al-
together from Israel's brutal occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza by denying it has any connection, the
absence of a real debate in our democracy. How to
think about such matters?
Some Thoughts on
the WTC Disaster
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The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing 'war against terrorism' constitute a
dramatic turn in the recent post-colonial conflicts. It is perhaps insensitive, in
particular with respect to those who have lost their lives or livelihood, relatives
and loved-ones, to point to the fact that the impact of the 9/11 catastrophes can
only partly be explained by the number of casualties or the magnitude of mate-
rial destruction. Symbolic location and modern, high-tech skills have catapulted
this latest tragic series of events into the public imagination. The attacks were
unique in their cynical use of commercial aviation. The targets were not entirely
new, but the images of the fatal impact of the two planes on the WTC constitute
a veritable landmark in media coverage of violence. Juxtaposed to the images of
destruction and despair in New York and Washington, the depiction of the hide-
out of the likely mastermind(s) of the attacks strengthened
the notion, all too common in the West, that Islam is a fossil
of sorts, not having evolved since the Middle Ages. Bearded
men in a ruined and barren land; the women veiled, the
men armed, except when they pray – but even then the
arms are within reach. The well-orchestrated video presen-
tation by Usama bin Laden – the first sight of him following the events – seemed
to play with these metaphors in its choice of location, language and dress. The
themes of the cave, the call for a holy war and other religious invocations rein-
forced many in their conviction that this movement was indeed rooted in me-
dieval religious hatred and obscurantism. Of course, the prime target audience
of the video messages were not the 'unbelievers' of the West, but the world
community of Muslims, the u m m a. Popular imaginaries of the Middle Ages in
the Muslim world differ markedly from those in the West. For many in the Mus-
lim world pre-modern times are equivalent to Muslim sovereignty, a time of cul-
tural, religious and political assertion of the u m m a, later to be unjustly sup-
pressed by colonial powers. A number of Western observers and politicians de-
duce from this favourable reading of the past that Muslims' present-day stances
towards the West should be understood as being rooted in a frustration that is
several centuries old; the loss of hegemony. Of course, this is an extremely com-
fortable position to take and dismisses the West from a serious reflection on the
modern conditions on which anti-Western feelings feed: the marked and in-
creasingly visible unequal distribution of material and political privileges. The
fact that some elites, more than others, in the Muslim world share in the inter-
national comforts while at the same time they fervently protect their national
privileges by undemocratic means, explains why many in the Muslim world con-
sider their present-day governments as the continuation of colonial regimes.
The way the 'war against terrorism' has evolved so far, with, for instance, contin-
uing US bombardments within hearing distance of Kabul and Islamabad long
after the Taliban defeat, with the rough treatment of the captured Al-Qacida mil-
itants excepting the one American from among them, confirm this view of a
Western-dominated world in which only the happy few elsewhere have a stake.
Very few, however, conclude from this that Muslims should rise in arms. 
Some have opted for a hate-campaign that they call 'jihad'. One of the most
perplexing features of this campaign is the ability to mobilize resources in the
West. The radicals meet, preach, and prepare for their war i n the West, in partic-
ular in the US – and attract youngsters from Arab families who have the means
to send their sons to the West. It is not manifest that Afghanistan, as a space
with facilities for militant volunteers during the last decade, constituted a vital
asset for those who carried out the suicide attacks. Some, if not most, may have
visited Al-Qacida strongholds, but the required instruction and preparation for
the attacks were situated in Europe and, above all, the US. It is difficult to imag-
ine, but the most deadly calls for holy war against the West were uttered in
meetings in towns in New Jersey, Kansas and Texas, where Muslim militants
from the Middle East convened. This frontier mysticism builds upon modern cur-
rents directed not only against the West but, more importantly, against – in the
words of Khomeyni, one of the main sources of inspiration for militants – '[…]
the Islam of compromise and ignobility, the Islam of the pain-free comfort-seek-
ers, […] in one word the American Islam' (Tavakoli-Targhi, p. 13). These currents
that, apparently, seek to exclude those who are not like-minded should be ad-
dressed in a serious manner, both in the West and the Muslim world. 
Media coverage of the events, in particular of the 'war against terrorism', was
highly unbalanced, which is common practice in cases of war and conflict. Most
Western media allowed very limited space for critical voices, though towards
the close of the year doubts about the course of events
began to find room for critical reflection. To date, the major-
ity of opinion makers assert that the war is not only appro-
priate but is also in just proportion to the carnage inflicted
by the terrorists, albeit this view may crumble under pres-
sure of the possible failure to establish a more solid political
structure in post-Taliban Afghanistan and the fiasco of capturing the Al-Qaci d a
leadership, the prime goal of the war. Non-Western media, of course, demon-
strate a more critical approach towards the inconsistencies in US policies, but
are reluctant to address the sensitive issue of the social and political settings in
the Muslim world in which Muslim militancy emerges (Hamzawy, p. 10). The role
of Al-Jazeera as both an alternative Arab and international news channel and
the angry reactions in the US to some of its coverage constituted the most re-
markable development in the field of media politics (Ahmad Kamel, p. 20, and
Naomi Sakr, p. 21).
This ISIM Newsletter opens with the reflections of a US citizen, Talal Asad, on
the earlier phases of events and their potentially lasting detrimental effects.
From a prison cell in Cairo, Saad Eddin Ibrahim (p. 11) comments on this latest
post-colonial conflict, pointing out that people in the Middle East harbour legit-
imate grievances towards the West, but that true democrats are needed to set-
tle the accounts. Responses to the events in various other countries, including
Yemen (François Burgat, p. 17) and the UK (Jorgen Nielsen, p. 16), show the in-
credible diversity of reactions, not only in global terms but, as in the British case,
also at the national level. 
In order to come to a better and less-politicized understanding of the complex
processes of inclusion and exclusion that accompany globalization, many arti-
cles in this issue shed light on local effects of global developments, ranging
from Muslim student activism in California (Nadine Naber, p. 19) to youth ac-
tivism in urban Java (Yatun Sastramidjaja, p. 15); from migrant networks of fi-
nancial transfers (Tall, p. 36) to the development of course materials for Muslims
in German schools (Irka-Christin Mohr, p. 29). 
Of special concern to the ISIM as an institution situated in the West is the
Western reception of the events. The suicide attacks and the resulting war
caused increased tension between non-Muslims and Muslim communities in
various Western countries, igniting existing debates and disputes. Dominant
voices urge Muslims to adapt to Western norms in a kind of 'package deal', how-
ever unclear and disputed some of these norms may be. Intellectuals, some of
them Muslim, call for drastic reforms within Islam and convey the message that
reforms should be initiated by Muslims in the West. Such hegemonic views im-
pede a more open examination of the relation between the West and Islam (see
for the Dutch case, Van der Veer, p. 7). In its programmes the ISIM, together with
its counterparts around the world, endeavours to contribute to more construc-
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ISIM Workshop
'Authority in Contemporary Shiism; Social Relations of
Hekmat, Falsafa, Tasavvof, Erfan, Feqh and Kalam in
Iran' is an ISIM workshop to be convened by Matthijs
van den Bos (ISIM). Participants presenting papers in-
clude Mahmoud Alijenad (IIAS), Said Amir Arjomand
(State University of New York), Forough Jahanbakhsh
(Queen's University), Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut (Univer-
sité de Paris VIII),Sajjad Rizvi (Institute of Ismaili Stud-
ies), and Farzin Vahdat (Tufts University).
The workshop addresses the social relations of the
intellectual subtraditions of Shiism: theosophy, phi-
losophy, Sufism, gnosis, jurisprudence, and theology.
Intellectuals and clerics in Iran have often framed
their arguments through generic conventions within
these disciplines. This, in turn, is reflected in their po-
sitions vis-à-vis the primary topic of religious debate:
spiritual authority in Shiism. In addition, intellectual
disciplines of Shiism often have divergent social and
political embeddings, which again affects their posi-
tions on authority. The scope of the workshop ranges
from the beginning of the 20th century to the present,
and includes overview analyses that also cover the
Pahlavi era in which clerics such as Morteza Motah-
hari and Mahmoud Taleqani (not to mention Ayatol-
lah Khomeyni) made fundamental contributions to
the debate on authority. Building on this, special ref-
erence will be made to developments surrounding
Iran's 'new religious intellectuals', such as Moham-
mad Mojtahed-Shabestari, Mohsen Kadivar, and Ab-
dolkarim Soroush. All of these thinkers have, in one
way or the other, defined the current directions of
Shiite jurisprudence as problematic. Their critical po-
sitions, in turn, are often based outside jurisprudence,
in gnosis, theology or philosophy. But the non-juristic
disciplines are not in themselves, of necessity, vehi-
cles for progressive readings of religion; the uses of
gnosis and theosophy in conservative arguments in
support of the '(absolute) rule of the jurist' will also be
addressed. The workshop aims at an understanding
of the discursive and institutional aspects of these de-
velopments within the context of Khatami's Iran, but
also in the light of older, ongoing debates within
Iran's religious sphere.   
For further information please contact the ISIM secretariat.
ISIM Annual Lecture
On 23 November 2001, Professor Barbara Metcalf
(University of California, Davies) delivered the third
ISIM Annual Lecture: 'Piety and Persuasion in the
Modern Islamic World'. She critiqued the common
notion that Islamic movements in fact invariably seek
to implement 'a complete way of life', engaging not
only matters of doctrine, worship, and sacred author-
ity, but all aspects of political, social, and economic
activities. She explored various movements rooted in
the Deoband, including the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, the
Tablighi Jamacat, and the Taliban, demonstrating that
Deobandi movements deploy an extraordinary range
of strategies for operating in the shifting contexts of
modern South Asia. The range is vast: the piety of the
apolitical madrasa-based teachers; the piety and per-
suasion of the itinerant preachers; the politics that
range from collaboration with non-Muslims, to op-
portunistic alliances in the Realpolitik world of con-
temporary Pakistan, to the militia-enforced Islam of
the Taliban, to the withdrawal to an essentially pri-
vate sphere of correct worship and behaviour as with
the Tablighi Jamacat.
The lecture will be published in the ISIM Papers series.
ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM welcomes the following new fellows:
– Dr Christèle-Claude Dedebant: The Formation of
South Asian Civil Society Networks outside South Asia
– Dr Yoginder Singh Sikand: Islamic Responses to the
Challenge of Religious Pluralism in Post-1947 India
– Mohammad Amer: Revivalism as Empowerment:
A Comparative Study of the Minhaj Movement among
the South Asian Youth in Europe
The ISIM invites applications and research proposals
for various programmes. Applications from candi-
dates in the social sciences, humanities, and religious
studies will be considered. Applicants should be com-
petent in academic English. The ISIM fellowships and
their respective application deadlines include the fol-
lowing:
– Ph.D. fellowships (1 Mar 2002 and 1 Sept 2002)
– Post-doctoral fellowships (1 Mar 2002 and 1 Sept
2002)
– Visiting fellowships (1 Mar 2002 and 1 Sept 2002)
– Sabbatical fellowships (1 Mar 2002 and 1 Sept 2002)
For more information on the various fellowships, please consult
the ISIM website: http://www.isim.nl/isim/fellowships/
Application forms may be downloaded from the website or
obtained upon request from the ISIM secretariat.
C o nfe re nce  Rep o r t
BIRGIT MEYER & ANNELIES MOORS Religion, Media and
the Public Sphere
Taking as a point of departure that the na-
tion-state no longer features as the privi-
leged space for the imagination of commu-
nity and identity, the conveners, Birgit
Meyer (ASSR) and Annelies Moors (ISIM),
proposed to focus on the ways in which reli-
gious groups make use of electronic media,
thereby creating new intra- and transna-
tional links between people, new expres-
sions of public culture and new forms of
publicness and publicity. Bringing together
around twenty-five scholars (paper presen-
ters and discussants) working on Islam, Ju-
daism, Hinduism, Christianity, and 'indige-
nous religion', the conference addressed
the articulated presence of religion in public
on both an empirical and conceptual level.
The central focus of debate comprised the
transformations in the public sphere and
the ways in which these relate to the prolif-
eration of mass media and the liberalization
of media policies, the upsurge of religion,
and the crisis of the postcolonial state.
Right from the outset it became clear that
while there is need for a conceptual space
like the public sphere in order to grasp the
marked articulation of religion in public,
Habermas's notion of the public sphere is
unsuited to capture the very complexity
that was the theme of our conference. The
need for a notion like the public sphere ap-
peared to stem right from what participants
encounter in their research practice: new
ways of bringing about links between peo-
ple, of creating notions of self and Other, of
imagining community. These are processes
in which mass media appear to have crucial
importance, because around them evolve
alternative notions and possibilities of pub-
licity and being a public or audience. Yet,
certainly it is not useful to study, for in-
stance, political Islam or Hindu nationalism
from a perspective of Western, normative
concepts, that is, from a view which regards
the public presence of religion as a sign of
the non-modern. Such a theoretical view
fails to address the apparent messiness of
the public sphere, the emergence of new
forms of secrecy, the occurrence of violence,
the politics of access and the ways in which
this impinges on gender, or the crucial im-
portance of capitalism and commercializa-
tion as a condition of the possibility for the
public sphere. If anything, Habermas's model
of shifting relations between economy, state
and society at a certain point in European his-
tory is 'good to think with' in that it may help
generate useful questions that ultimately
lead beyond the model itself.
The conference was organized into seven
sessions (publics and publicness; TV, con-
sumption and religion; film, religion and the
nation; media and religious authority; reli-
gion, politics and spectacle; media, religion
and the politics of difference; and media, re-
ligion and morality). In order to get beyond
existing universes of discourse and broaden
discussions, all sessions brought together
scholars working on different regions or reli-
gious traditions. Some papers looked close-
ly at how religions transform through
adopting media, others investigated how
media allow for the publication of religion
outside the confines of churches, mosques,
or cults, how religion merges with the forces
of commercialization and is recast in terms
of entertainment, or how the state (often
vainly) seeks to control both media and reli-
gion. An important issue of debate per-
tained to the nexus of religion and media
with respect to the relations between reli-
gious authority and believers. How do par-
ticular media technologies, such as radio or
TV, impinge on the ways in which religions
shape believers' bodies and senses? In how
far does mediation threaten or change ex-
isting forms of religious authority? How do
religious constructions of the subject rub
against or clash with new ways of being an
audience? What does this mean for gender
relations? Another important theme con-
cerned the complicated relationship be-
tween the state, citizenship and global dis-
courses on human rights and related issues
in the field of gender, religion and identity.
Central issues of debate here were the poli-
tics of mediations and the ways in which
processes of inclusion and exclusion work in
both secular and religious discourses. As the
conference was extremely stimulating, the
conveners will work on publishing a selec-
tion of the papers in an edited volume. 
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The ISIM commenced the project 'Rights at Home: An
Approach to the Internalization of Human Rights in
Family Relations in Islamic Communities' on 1 Octo-
ber 2001. This project seeks to promote respect for
human rights within the family and community in dif-
ferent parts of the Muslim world, particularly with re-
spect to the rights of women and children.
Rights at Home
Focusing on selected communities within
the Islamic world, 'Rights at Home' intends
to supplement current legalistic approaches
to human rights with a broader analysis and
action at the societal level in order to medi-
ate the dichotomy between the public and
private spheres, and between modernized
and traditional segments of society, in
favour of greater respect of human rights
within an Islamic framework.
This approach is premised on the view
that the private domain of the family in its
communal context is a primary location for
the internalization of human rights norms
as a value system, yet is simultaneously a
site for their endemic violation. As this inti-
mate sphere is inaccessible to readily avail-
able methods for the implementation of
rights by the state and other external actors,
this project proposes to supplement – not
replace – this 'state-centric approach' by in-
forming and supporting i n t e r n a l, communi-
ty-level initiatives for social change through
local actors who combine a commitment to
human rights with the ability to effectively
advocate the underlying values of these
rights within their own communities. These
actors, referred to as 'advocates of social
change', are the primary target group of the
p r o j e c t .
The ultimate beneficiaries of 'Rights at
Home' are women and children in Islamic
societies, whose rights will be addressed
under two main themes: the socialization of
children at home and the personal autono-
my of women. The socialization of children
comprises the values and norms instilled
and legitimized by the ways children are
perceived and treated by all other members
of the family and community. The personal
autonomy of women is understood here to
mean their ability to achieve substantive so-
cial mobility by effectively pursuing possi-
bilities of education, employment, and gen-
eral participation in the public affairs of
their communities.
More concretely, the project aims at build-
ing capacity for women to demand their
rights, especially in the field of economic,
social, and cultural rights. This requires criti-
cally addressing questions of Islamic family
law, which continues to be applied by Islam-
ic communities throughout the world even
where it is not formally enforced by the
state, as well as customary practices and do-
mestic power relations as the necessary
basis to deal with actual human rights issues
such as gender equality, domestic violence,
restriction of mobility, denial of access to
work and political participation.
Children's rights are also closely related to
the domestic sphere covered by family law
– whether based on state, Islamic, or cus-
tomary norms – which regulates matters of
guardianship, adoption, legitimacy, parent-
hood, and custody. At the same time, chil-
dren's rights are also directly related to the
social and economic development of the
community at large. This induces taking up
themes such as child labour and other forms
of abuse, and how to socialize boys and girls
into equal and fair gender relations.
As it is clear that this approach has to
overcome some serious theoretical and
practical difficulties, this project will devote
a sufficient initial period to identifying sig-
nificant advocates of social change in se-
lected communities, and finding out about
their communal power bases and networks
in order to fully appreciate their contextual
circumstances. To this purpose, the project
will convene three Sounding Board Meet-
ings in the selected regions – Islamic Africa,
the Arab world (North Africa and West Asia)
and South and Southeast Asia – and con-
duct local field research, in addition to de-
veloping relevant networks of scholars, re-
search institutes, NGOs, human rights ac-
tivists, and resource persons.
Subsequently, the project will conduct in-
teractive workshops to provide the identi-
fied actors with theological, jurisprudential,
and other social science resources for devel-
oping their own capacity to raise issues im-
portant for their respective communities on
the basis of the insights gained. These ses-
sions will offer a platform for a combined in-
tellectual-pragmatic dialogue related to the
project's themes and approach in which the
candidates also have the opportunity to
learn from each other's experiences and
specific local constraints or commonalities.
Furthermore, the project will provide con-
tinued support for these human rights ad-
vocates in implementing their own plans for
cultural transformation upon return to their
countries. In addition, workable models will
be developed for usage in wider settings,
such as training manuals (in written, audio
and visual formats), advocacy guidebooks,
and media packages. In this way, the need
to limit initial implementation of the pro-
ject's methodology to certain local commu-
nities will be compensated for by the subse-
quent wider use of these materials and skills
in other Islamic communities around the
world. 
The Project Team consists of Abdullahi A. An-Nacim
(Emory University School of Law, USA, and Visiting
Professor ISIM), Nasr Abu Zaid (ISIM/Leiden University)
and Laila al-Zwaini (ISIM). The faculty of the ISIM
serves as academic resource persons for the project as
a whole. The duration of the project is three years.
C o n v e n e r s :
– Birgit Meyer (University of Amsterdam)
– Annelies Moors ( I S I M )
P a r t i c i p a n t s :
– Rachel Dwyer (University of London)
– Walter Armbrust (Oxford University)
– David Morgan (Valparaiso University)
– Jeremy Stolow (Cambridge University)
– Dale F. Eickelman (Dartmouth College)
– Faye Ginsburg (New York University)
– Patricia Spyer (Leiden University)
– Charles Hirschkind (New York University)
– Rosalind I. J. Hackett (University of
T e n n e s s e e )
– Ayse Öncü (Bogazici University)
– David Lehman (Cambridge University)
– Patricia Birman (State University of Rio de
J a n e i r o )
– Dorothea Schulz (University of Chicago)
– Batia Siebzehner (Hebrew University)
– Sudeep Dasgupta (University of Amsterdam)
– Brian Larkin (University of Amsterdam)
– Meg McLagan (University of Amsterdam)
– Rafael Sánchez (University of Amsterdam)
– Peter van der Veer (ISIM/University of
A m s t e r d a m )
– Oskar Verkaaik (University of Amsterdam)
– Peter van Rooden (University of Amsterdam)
– Michael Gilsenan (New York University/
I S I M )
– Mona Abaza (American University of Cairo/
I I A S )
– Mattijs van de Port (University of
A m s t e r d a m )
The international conference, jointly hosted by the
ISIM and the Research Centre Religion and Society
(ASSR), on 'Religion, Media and the Public Sphere'
was held from 6 to 8 December 2001 at the Universi-
ty of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The theme of the
conference evolved out of three prominent debates
in the 1990s: the crisis of the post-colonial nation-
state, the increasing global proliferation of electron-
ic media, and the rise of religious movements.
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The AKMI1/ISIM Summer Academy brought together
20 nationalities at the Yildiz Technical University in
Istanbul. For eleven days and nights, from early
morning until late evening, the core of this group –
the invited participants (pre-doctoral candidates and
recent Ph.D.s),2 and tutors, together with several of
the locally invited lecturers – listened to and com-
mented on lectures, presented and discussed one an-




V i e wThe Summer Academy blocked out sessionsfor thematic discussions generated by theparticipants and tutors. 'Recreation' was
also project related: a brilliantly managed
walking tour of old Istanbul with Turkish in-
tellectual Murat Belge, a visit to Bursa, and a
visit to an Alevi Cem on the outskirts of Is-
tanbul. In the old Soviet Union, the organiz-
ers and participants would have been called
Stakhanovites, workers who vastly exceed-
ed production quotas. In this case, however,
the pace was mostly voluntary.
F o r e r u n n e r s
Today such summer academies are taken
for granted, but they are a recent – and sig-
nificant – contribution to academic global-
ization. The first one took place in June 1987
in Tangier, Morocco, under the auspices of
the now-defunct Joint Committee for the
Comparative Study of Muslim Societies of
the Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
and the American Council of Learned Soci-
eties. Then called a 'dissertation workshop',
this first 'summer academy' had the explicit
goal of encouraging new scholars to build
into their first publications the sort of inter-
disciplinary perspectives and comparative
experiences normally achieved only mid-ca-
reer. They also acquired a better sense of
how to write for wider audiences interested
in studies of the Muslim-majority world –
and Muslim communities elsewhere – as
well as firsthand experience in a Muslim-
majority society other than their country or
region of direct scholarly concern. In some
privileged fields, such as mathematics and
physics, seasonal academic gatherings,
begun in the late 1940s, took place in such
locales as Swiss resorts and attracted mainly
scholars at the summit of their careers, to-
gether with their chosen graduate protégés.
The Tangier venue in 1987 was the Tangier-
American Legation Museum, located in the
old medina – a down-at-the-heels former
diplomatic establishment. Participants stayed
at the crumbling Grand Hotel Villa de France,
best known for its gardens, already revert-
ing to jungle, and for Room 35, in which
Henri Matisse produced many of his paint-
ings. A local journalist was proud to show us
everything from the main border smuggling
routes near Ceuta, the Spanish enclave, to
the homes and quarters of Tangier's rich
and famous.
Soon after 1987, other SSRC committees
followed the example of the Comparative
Muslim Societies committee, creating sum-
mer workshops and institutes of their own,
and other foundations also soon got into
the act. The criss-crossing of workshops and
summer academies available since the late
1980s have enabled a succession of doctor-
al candidates and recent graduates to situ-
ate their work in wider contexts and to offer
comparisons that might otherwise have not
been possible until much later in their ca-
reers. It also made communication among
peers and faculty from throughout the
world as easy (or in some cases perhaps eas-
ier) as communication with thesis advisers.
The Istanbul Summer
A c a d e m y
The Istanbul Summer Academy was light
years away from its predecessor in Tangier.
Preparations were considerably more elabo-
rate, including, for example, a 400-page
reader containing not only Islam-related
readings, but also representative selections
from the mainstream sociology of knowl-
edge. Even if not always thoroughly read or
assimilated, the document showed a work-
ing consensus on the range of relevant
readings. The tone and style of the various
sessions were collegial, with tutors also
making original presentations. There were
four types of sessions: lecture presentations
by tutors, project presentations in three par-
allel working groups, thematic discussions
(usually divided into three groups), and pre-
sentations by outside speakers.
Tutors and participants developed infor-
mal mechanisms to share perspectives and
information. The working relations devel-
oped early in the programme meant that
comments and criticisms flowed from the
outset and without personal frictions. The
'tutorial' lectures were generally short and
informal, leaving lots of time for discussion.
The same was the case for project presenta-
tions, ranging from dream interpretation in
contemporary Muslim contexts (Knut Graw)
– interesting to rethink in context of the
dreams in the Bin Laden video released on
December 13 – to Alevi ideas of tradition in
Turkey and Europe (Elise Massicard) and the
educational networks of Fethullah G ü l e n i n
the different national contexts of Turkey, Al-
bania, and Germany (Bekim Agai). My open-
ing presentation, 'Twenty Years Later: The
Study of Islam in Local Contexts', took off
from where my 1982 article stopped and
was intended to frame changes in intellec-
tual approaches since then.
Because of the parallel working groups,
each participant heard only seven other
presentations. Our schedule also included
working sessions at both Turkish and for-
eign research centres and meetings with
both secular and religious-minded intellec-
tuals in a variety of settings.
The ties that bind
The second week opened with two stun-
ning reminders of how fragile are the bonds
of civility and trust, on which we base our
work and lives. The first intrusion of the
world beyond scholarship occurred on
Monday, September 10. Some of us, walking
through Taksim Square on our way to the
Swedish Research Institute on Istiklal Cad-
desi, heard a loud explosion on the other
side of the square. A suicide bomber – a sec-
ular leftist recently released from prison –
had blown himself up together with several
policemen, and injured many others to
protest the treatment of political prisoners.
The news of the bombing was rapidly re-
ported on Turkish radio and television and
in the next morning's press, but attracted
little attention in the mainstream media
outside of Turkey. In retrospect, it was a
grim prelude to Tuesday's 'September 11'
news, which reached us as we returned from
Yildiz Technical University to our hotel.
By consensus – not by formal meeting –
tutors and participants decided to carry on
with our Summer Institute tasks. That
evening Orhan Silier, director of the Tarih
Vakfi, explained the foundation's work. Later
we learned that all commercial US air traffic
was grounded, the White House evacuated,
and the President removed to an undis-
closed location. Then the massive scope of
what had happened began to sink in. None
of us slept uninterrupted over the remaining
days, but we shared our anxieties only at the
edges of our scheduled main concern, the
discussion of participant projects. On our
last working day, Thursday, September 13,
we devoted another session to the public re-
sponsibilities of scholars. Some French par-
ticipants expressed their misgivings about l a
littérature grise – government-requested pol-
i c y reports. Some European participants felt
that participation in these should be avoid-
ed at all costs, because one never knew the
uses to which they would be put. Another
view was that such writing and discussions,
whether in a time of crisis or in 'normal'
times, should be open and never secret – at
least for university-based scholars with a
commitment to the open communication of
scholarship. The issue was not about refrain-
ing from contributing to policy discussions
and debates, but rather how such communi-
cations should occur. Speaking to the press
and public might take time, but is an obliga-
tion as we engage our various publics in the
classroom, in print, and elsewhere. As with
any activity, too much of such activities can
circumscribe scholarly potential. So can too
little. The Summer Academy achieved its pri-
mary goals. The main vehicle of communica-
tion was peer learning, both for the tutors
and the participants. Everyone gained a bet-
ter sense of how to sustain – and benefit
from – international scholarly communica-
tion. One of our major challenges in the
years ahead will be to maintain the fragile
ties of scholarship and intellectual discourse
with the Middle East and with Muslim com-
munities elsewhere. The 'public sphere' of
international scholarship, like all other 'glob-
al' ties, will endure especially harsh chal-
lenges in the months and years ahead. The
Summer Academy served as a poignant re-
minder that ties of civility and communica-
tion cannot be taken for granted, but must
be actively sustained both in our immediate
spheres of activity, and in wider and less pre-
dictable spaces. The 'local production of Is-
lamic knowledge' is not just the theme of an
academic meeting; it addresses immediate
and long-term issues vitally affecting the
wider societies in which we take part.
Directors:
– Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM) and Altan
Gokalp (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin)
Tutors and Istanbul faculty:
– Fulya Atacan (Yildiz Technical): 'Changing
Patterns of Islamic Groupings in Modern
Turkey'
– John Bowen (Washington University in
St. Louis): 'What is "Local" about Paris Islam?'
– Ayse Çaglar (Freie Universität Berlin): 'The
Concept of Hybridity and its Discontents'
– Dale Eickelman (Dartmouth College): 'Twen-
ty Years Later: The Study of Islam in Local
Contexts'
– Anke von Kügelgen (Universität Bern):
'The Production of Local History in Bukhara
at the Turn of the 19th Century'
– Ayse Öncü (Bogazici University): 'Negotiat-
ing the Boundaries between Religious and
Secular on Commercial Television in Turkey'
– Jorgen Nielsen (University of Birmingham):
'The Human Rights Discourse and the Reli-
gious Rights of Muslims in Europe'
– Kemali Saybasili (Yildiz Technical):
'Nation and Citizenship'
– Günter Seufert (Orient-Institut): 'The Nation-
al Attribute in the Turkish Republic's Teach-
ing of Islam'
Other lectures and presentations were orga-
nized by the Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoli-
ennes, Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgen-
ländischen Gesellschaft, Swedish Research In-
stitute, the Tarih Vakfi, and the Türkiye
Diyanet Vakfi.
The lecturers included: Meropi Anastassi-
adou (IFEA), Murat Çizakça, Stoyanka
Kenderova (National Library, Sofia), Jean-
François Perouse (IFEA), Tord Olsson (Lund
University), Leif Stenberg (Lund University),
and Johann Strauss (Strassbourg University).
Coordination: 
– Georges Khalil (AKMI) and
Dick Douwes (ISIM)
Dale Eickelman
o n strategies of
oral and written
s c h o l a r l y
c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
N o t e s
1 . Berlin-based Working Group Islam and Modernity,
Institute for Advanced Study Berlin.
2 . Published in Istanbuler Almanach 5 (2001),
a n d also found on the ISIM website
( w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s ) .
Dale F. Eickelman is Ralph and Richard Lazarus
Professor of Anthropology and Human Relations at
Dartmouth College, USA, and member of the ISIM
Academic Committee.
E-mail: dale.f.eickelman@dartmouth.edu
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C o nfe re nce  Rep o r t
M U H A M M AD  K H A L I D  M AS U D
From 26 to 28 October 2001, the ISIM, in collabora-
tion with the University of Amsterdam and Cornell
University, held an international conference in Lei-
den on the 'Application of Islamic Law in Courts'. The
conference conveners, Muhammad Khalid Masud,
Rudolph Peters and David Powers, invited historians,
lawyers, anthropologists and sociologists to come to
Leiden to engage in a discussion on the manner in
which Islamic legal doctrine (f i q h) has manifested it-
self in daily practice as reflected in the activity of the
q a d i, or Muslim judge.
A p p l i c a t i o n
o f Islamic Law
i n C o u r t s
and pious endowments, as well as civil,
criminal, and administrative affairs. A ten-
sion between central and provincial courts
reflected the shifting political framework of
the empire. As R. Gradeva observed, Ot-
toman jurists instructed q a d is to disregard
the command of the Sultan if it was not in
conformity with the s h a r ica. The local court
played a crucial role in the transformation of
the legal system into an instrument of impe-
rial rule. Writing about Gaziantep, L. Pierce
argued that the sovereign and his subjects
sometimes had different views on law and
society, and that the local q a d i court was the
arena in which their differing claims were
negotiated. And as A. Rafeq explained, f i q h
was sometimes used to serve the interests
of influential groups, including the military,
notables, and foreign nationals. The system-
atic recording of court documents and the
pluralistic structure of the judicial system
added to the complexity of the Ottoman
legal system.
During the colonial period, foreign legal
concepts were often superimposed upon
local laws. Tahir Mahmood noted that in the
early colonial period, Indian judges deter-
mined facts from the perspective of foreign
law and issued their judgments on the basis
of local law. Rudolph Peters observed that in
Nigeria, colonial rulers allowed s h a r ica c r i m-
inal law to be applied, thereby creating a di-
chotomy between federal and area courts;
the latter often being called 's h a r ica c o u r t s ' .
In the early 19t h century the jurisdiction of
s h a rica courts was reduced to the law of per-
sonal status. In the 20t h century, those
s h a rica courts that continued to function
had an increasingly narrow jurisdiction.
Writing about contemporary Yemen, B.
Messick described the s h a r ica courts that
operate today as 'hybrids' that combine Is-
lamic legal categories and methods with im-
ported legal forms, as spelled out in codes
issued by nation-states. Mahmood noted
that in East India s h a r ica courts have operat-
ed since 1917 as private institutions that
enjoy the respect of the Indian government
for their work as alternate institutions of dis-
pute resolution and arbitration.
S h a r ica courts also contribute to the polit-
ical objective of nation building, even if only
as a formal constitutional requirement. A.
Layish described how s h a r ica courts in mod-
ern Libya play an important role in integrat-
ing Bedouins, who are undergoing a
process of sedentarization, into normative
Islam. In Nigeria, Rudolph Peters noted, the
constitution calls for the application of a re-
cently enacted (s h a r ica) penal legislation,
but many legislators and judges treat this
requirement as a legal formality.
C o u r t s
The application of penal law poses prob-
lems relating, on the one hand, to the intri-
cacies of Islamic procedural law and, on the
other, to restrictions and special rules that
govern the criminal process. The testimony
of upright witnesses, which is the lynchpin
of Islamic court procedure, is closely associ-
ated with notions of social integrity. Q a d is
understood 'p r o of' in a broad sense. The
term t h u b u t (literally 'proof'), which in some
court records signifies a q a d i's certification
of a legal act, must be differentiated from a
h u k m, or formal q a d i judgment, as M ü l l e r
demonstrated. Although it is often asserted
that f i q h does not attach any validity to writ-
ten documents, Powers and Layish drew at-
tention to authorized written documents,
known as rasm istir'a and shahadat al-naql,
that were commonly submitted as evidence
in North African courts; in fact, these docu-
ments are discussed at great length in Mali-
ki legal texts. In some settings q a d is and
muftis worked closely with one another; in
others, q a d is seem to have done their work
without the assistance of muftis. As A. Chris-
telow explained, a special tribunal known as
the m a j l i s was established in Algeria in the
early 20t h century to assist q a d is and emirs,
but was later abolished.
Several authors explored the manner in
which the social and legal perceptions of
the q a d i affect his handling of a litigation
(k h u s u m a) and issuance of a judgment
(h u k m). In Indonesia, J. Bowen observed,
judges invoke broad social norms when is-
suing their judgments. Similarly, as L.
Welchman wrote in her paper, in divorce
disputes Palestinian judges balance their
knowledge of f i q h by exercising judicial dis-
cretion on the basis of their perceptions of
what constitutes acceptable or unaccept-
able behaviour on the part of the wife; these
perceptions are gendered (q a d is invariably
being men) and may vary across time and
s p a c e .
According to Islamic legal doctrine, a
h u k m is 'a text that contains a record of a lit-
igation together with the final ruling by the
judge'. It is 'a final judgment that concludes
a claim'. As noted, the Mamluk documents
demonstrate that 'there is a clear legal dis-
tinction between an order (a m r) or action
(f icl) of a q a d i, on the one hand, and his judg-
ment (h u k m), on the other. It is possible for a
q a d i to issue a court decision without issu-
ing a binding judgment. A judgment comes
into existence and acquires its binding na-
ture only when the q a d i explicitly states
'hakamtu bi kadha' (I have issued a h u k m
about this matter). According to Messick,
'[t]he Yemeni h u k m has features that are dis-
tinctive with respect to what we know of
s h a r ica court judgments elsewhere prior to
the advent of modern jurisdiction.'
Court records
Although we possess a wealth of historical
and doctrinal sources for the period be-
tween the 9t h and 16t h centuries, we have
virtually no court records for this period,
with the exception of the Haram al-Sharif
documents (14 t h century) and transcriptions
of court decisions in literary sources. S i j i l l a t
only begin to appear in the 16t h c e n t u r y .
Several explanations were offered for this
puzzling riddle: a h u k m is only valid for the
specific case about which it was issued; it
does not create a legal precedent; jurists
were critical of the activity of q a d is and
therefore did not record and transmit their
judgments; jurists were concerned with the
systematic integrity of the legal system, not
with the facts of a particular case; and the
judgment of a q a d i was intimately linked to
the legal facts established by witness testi-
mony. Authors used fatwas and biographi-
cal literature to reconstruct q a d i j u d g m e n t s .
K. Masud spoke about the early Umayyad
q a d i judgments on alimony payment to the
wife in divorce cases. 
The conference papers are not available for public
distribution at this time. Authors may be contacted
through the ISIM. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph
Peters and David Powers will edit the papers as an
ISIM publication, which is expected to appear in 2003.
For further information, please contact the ISIM:




c o n f e r e n c e .
Is the s h a r ica merely a system of ethical rules
and recommendations, as many have ar-
gued, or is it a legal system properly speak-
ing? What is the nature of the relationship
between legal doctrine and actual court
practice? Is Islamic law an unchanging
essence or has there been diversity in its in-
terpretation and dynamism in its develop-
ment and application? These are some of
the broad questions that were discussed
over the course of the three-day confer-
ence. The 23 presented papers addressed Is-
lamic law from the 8t h century to modern
times in areas including Bulgaria, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Libya, North Africa,
Syria and Zanzibar. Six general themes
emerged: modern judicial systems and Mus-
lim courts, s h a r ica courts in modern Muslim
nation-states, historical perspectives, court
documents, judicial practice, and legal plu-
r a l i s m .
Historical perspectives
Most of the authors examined the activity
of the q a d i by analysing a specific court doc-
ument or set of documents. A common
theme was the diversity and changing na-
ture of q a d i courts. One frequently raised
question was whether local practices of
judges necessarily qualify as 'Islamic law'. As
Islamic legal norms were translated into
local practices, there emerged a wide range
of court structures, procedures, documents
and judicial reasoning. As Erin Stiles noted,
the Muslim court in Zanzibar constitutes a
public space where people negotiate their
rights within the framework of f i q h. Refer-
ring to contemporary Syrian courts, Taima
Jayoush observed that the courtroom is a
site of negotiation where the judge is guid-
ed by both cultural and legal norms. Similar-
ly, Najwa Qattan concluded that the q a d i
judgment constitutes a site where Islamic
legal theory finds its embodiment in local
practices that vary across time and space.
Drawing on biographical literature, fat-
was, and f i q h texts, several authors exam-
ined q a d i courts in different periods of Is-
lamic history. Although it is generally held
that court records from the period prior to
the 16t h century are not available, the Mam-
luk documents analysed by M ü l l e r d a t e
from the 14t h c e n t u r y .
During the Ottoman period, which figured
prominently at the conference, s h a r ica
courts had jurisdiction over personal status
Conference participants:
– Camilla Adang (Tel Aviv University)
– Ahmad Akgündüz (Islamic University,
R o t t e r d a m )
– John Bowen (Washington University,
S t .L o u i s )
– Léon Buskens (Leiden University)
– Baudouin Dupret (CNRS/CEDEJ, Cairo)
– Allan Christelow (Idaho State University,
P o c a t e l l o )
– Rossitsa Gradeva (Institute of Balkan Studies,
Sofia)
– Taima Jayoush (Lawyer in Damascus, Syria)
– Baber Johansen (EHESS, Paris)
– Stefan Knost (Orient Institute, Beirut)
– Remke Kruk (Leiden University)
– Aharon Layish (Hebrew University of
J e r u s a l e m )
– Tahir Mahmood (University of Delhi)
– Muhammad Khalid Masud ( I S I M )
– Brinkley Messick (Columbia University,
N e wY o r k )
– Christian Müller (CNRS – IHRT, Paris)
– Leslie Peirce (University of California at
B e r k e l e y )
– Rudolph Peters (University of Amsterdam)
– David S. Powers (Cornell University, Ithaca)
– Najwa al-Qattan (Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles)
– Abdul-Karim Rafeq (College of William and
Mary, Williamsburg)
– Delfina Serrano Ruano ( G e r m a n y )
– Ron Shaham (Hebrew University of
J e r u s a l e m )
– Erin Stiles (Washington University in St. Louis)
– Frank Vogel ( H a r v a r d )
– Lynn Welchman (SOAS, London)
– Amalia Zomeno (CSIC, Escuela de Estudios
Á r a b e s, Granada)
– Laila al-Zwaini ( I S I M )
– Sami Zubaida (University of London,
B i r k b e c k )
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MA R T I N  V AN  B R U I N E S S E N
The ISIM workshop on 'Islam, Women's Rights, and Is-
lamic Feminism: Making Connections between Dif-
ferent Perspectives' (9–11 November 2001) took
place under the shadow of the looming confronta-
tion between the West and the Muslim world, at a
time when public interest was focused on the Ameri-
can offensive in Afghanistan and anti-American re-
sponses in countries as diverse as Pakistan, Egypt
and Indonesia. Most of the participants felt that pre-
cisely at this time one should not allow the agenda of
intellectual debate to be completely determined by




F e m i n i s m
A few of those invited to the conference
were not able to attend because of the in-
ternational situation: some faced travel re-
strictions or feared for their security; irra-
tional consular regulations made it impossi-
ble for our participant from Pakistan, Profes-
sor Arfa Sayeda Zehra, to acquire a visa, and
another prospective participant, Dr Lo'lo'
Ghazali from Malaysia, went to lead a med-
ical team working among the new wave of
Afghan refugees.
Fifteen scholars and activists, representing
a broad range of women's engagement with
Islamic issues, and coming from eight differ-
ent Muslim countries, from Indonesia to
Nigeria, actually did take part in the work-
shop. Participants had been invited because
of their contributions to public discourse or
concrete experience in defending women's
rights and women's points of view. It was
hoped that a heterogeneous composition in
terms of background, experience and con-
cerns might lead to a stimulating exchange
of views, and this proved to be the case. The
participants presented papers on what they
considered as a major issue in their respec-
tive situations and in which they had been in-
tensively engaged. The discussions that fol-
lowed offered up comparative perspectives,
contrasting views, and food for reflection.
The contributions
The experience of Iran since the Islamic
revolution has been one of the most fasci-
nating developments in the Muslim world,
producing some of the most important con-
tributions to contemporary Muslim dis-
course. Many secular feminists left the coun-
try after the revolution, but in due course a
strong women's movement emerged pre-
cisely in the circles that had supported the
revolution. Four of the participants were
from Iran; two of them are based in the West
but are deeply involved in developments in-
side Iran. Mahboobeh Abbasgholizadeh, the
editor of the women's studies journal
F a r z a n e h, exemplifies perhaps most clearly
the development of Muslim women's dis-
course in Iran. She had been actively in-
volved in the revolution, gradually adopted
a feminist perspective and was among the
first women in Iran to plead for an Islamic
feminism. She spoke about the impact of the
political reform movement and the 'new reli-
gious thought' (of such authors as Soroush
and Shabestari) on the women's movement.
In her view the movement is entering a new
phase in which there is the possibility of a
convergence between secular and Islamic
feminism and, more importantly, a post-
modern acceptance of plurality.
Nahid Motie, a feminist and sociologist af-
filiated with the Azad University, surveyed
the debates around the very term 'Islamic
feminism' and gave overviews of the various,
often conflicting ideological positions
adopted by women thinkers and activists in
Iran. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, known for her book
on Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in
Contemporary Iran and her film Divorce Iran-
ian Style, gave a similar overview, focusing
on the individual trajectories of leading
women's intellectual development. Ziba also
showed the participants her new film, R u n-
a w a y, shot in a shelter for runaway girls in
Tehran (the film was to win a nomination at
the International Documentary Film Festival
in Amsterdam, see page 23). Sussan Tah-
masebi, a US-trained political scientist and
NGO activist, spoke of the various types of
women's NGOs existing in Iran. Some of
these are modern organizations, established
in response to global trends and President
Khatami's call for strengthening civil society
as a step in democratization. Sussan empha-
sized the potential of the less publicized, tra-
ditional community-based organizations,
which are much closer to the grassroots.
The participants from Turkey, Cihan Aktas
and Hidayet Tuksal, described conditions
that were almost the mirror image of those in
Iran. The h i j a b is a major political issue; fight-
ing for women's rights to wear the h i j a b i n
Turkey is a struggle against men's control of
women's bodies and very similar to women's
resistance against its imposition by the state
in Iran. Cihan Aktas, a popular Islamist essay-
ist and author of short stories, told how for Is-
lamist women it was the veil that has made
their participation in public life possible but
that its official ban in schools and govern-
ment offices prevented these women from
getting an education and a job.
Hidayet Tuksal, a doctor in Islamic theology
and the author of a critical study of the gen-
der bias in h a d i t h, sketched the history of the
Islamist women's movement in Turkey and
the dual struggle of women in the move-
ment for their rights as committed Muslims
and as women. In efforts to develop an Islam-
ic discourse that is liberating, they are up
against the state as well as Muslim men, con-
servative or Islamist. There is no convergence
between secular and Islamic feminism in
Turkey as Abbasgholizadeh claimed was the
case in Iran. Secular feminists are rarely inter-
ested in their Islamist sisters' struggles for
rights, and when they do support a case it is
usually presented as proving the essentially
oppressive nature of Islam.
Actually working within an Islamist move-
ment, the women's wing of Malaysia's JIM
(Jemaah Islah Malaysia), Suriya Osman gave
an account of work at the grassroots level –
she is a medical practitioner as well as a
women's organizer. Faced with the difficult
tasks of raising women's gender awareness
and confronting conservative cu l a m a, she
found support in the search for more en-
lightened and woman-friendly interpreta-
tions of Islam in a nationwide network of
women's activists.
Two of the participants are presently affil-
iated with Women Living Under Muslim
Laws (WLUML), an international organiza-
tion defending women's rights. Cassandra
Balchin, the programme co-ordinator for
Asia, who has extensive experience as a
journalist and women's rights activist in
Pakistan, explained the work of her organi-
zation, which addresses secular feminists as
well as those working within an Islamic per-
spective. She called for a renewed debate on
secularism and religious pluralism, referring
to women's protest movements against the
Islamization campaign in Pakistan (under
Ziaul Haq) and in Bangladesh. Asma'u Joda,
who founded a centre for women's empower-
ment in northeastern Nigeria and is presently
at the WLUML office in London, discussed the
impact of sharica movements in West Africa
on women's lives, focusing especially on the
impact of the sharica legislation in Nigeria in
1999.
The other activists included Raufah Hasan,
who was the director of the Women's Stud-
ies Centre in Sanaa until this was closed
under pressure from Islamist circles. She
spoke on the dynamics of Islam, democracy
and women's rights in Yemen, where the
North and the South, only recently reunited,
are very different with respect to the accep-
tance of women's public roles. Official en-
dorsement of women's participation, a rem-
nant from the South's socialist past, has reg-
ularly been overruled due to pressure from
conservatives and Islamists alike.
Debates on women's political participa-
tion were also central to the two Indonesian
contributions. Lies Mustafsirah Marcoes
analysed the positions adopted by major In-
donesian Muslim associations on the matter
of female political leadership (which be-
came relevant when Suharto appeared to
be grooming his eldest daughter Tutut for
succession, and again when Megawati be-
came a presidential candidate). Not surpris-
ingly, the 'religious' arguments used for or
against female leadership at different points
in time appear to vary in accordance with
the political situation and with mundane in-
t e r e s t s .
Chusnul Mar'iyah discussed the situation
in Aceh, which had recently been granted a
considerable degree of autonomy (in the
hope of appeasing the separatist Free Aceh
Movement) and where the s h a r ica has been
proclaimed. Women's groups here are mak-
ing efforts to take part in drafting the con-
crete regulations in which the s h a r ica will be
operationalized. Several of the other partici-
pants commented on the importance for
women to be actively involved in legal
drafting (and therefore the necessity of de-
veloping the relevant expertise).
Zainah Anwar of the Malaysian NGO, Sis-
ters in Islam, brought up a number of other
themes. One of the objectives of her organi-
zation is to give women a more active role in
developing Muslim discourse, so that this
will not remain a monopoly of men unsym-
pathetic to women's concerns. This raises
important questions of authority and legit-
imization. The standard response of conser-
vatives when women join the debate is to
delegitimatize them for not having the
'right' expertise – something that is not de-
manded from men who support conserva-
tive interpretations. The Sisters have, on the
one hand, made efforts to strengthen the
traditional legitimacy of their arguments in
favour of liberal and pluralist understand-
ings through study and consultation with
sympathetic theologians and jurists. On the
other hand, they have developed an effec-
tive lobby pressuring the government with
memoranda and keeping a steady presence
in the media through letters to the editor.
Special guests
Two special guests added further dimen-
sions to the discussions. Nasr Abu Zaid spoke
on Qur'anic hermeneutics and women's
rights, giving a sophisticated analysis of key
verses in their context and in the light of the
non-chronological organization of the entire
text of the Qur'an. His work on hermeneutics
was felt to be of great importance to the par-
ticipants' concerns.
Mona Abaza made some critical com-
ments on the search for an Islamic feminism
by Western scholars and its emergence as a
particular form of middle class discourse in
Egypt. She also made a comparison with the
emergence of a feminist theology in Ger-
man Protestantism in the 1960s, which, un-
like later liberation theology, never drew
much attention in the Muslim world. 
Revised versions of the papers and an analytical
summary of the discussions of this workshop will be
posted on the ISIM website. One can also find there
papers and the report of the previous workshop in
this series, 'Muslim Intellectuals and Modern
C h a l l e n g e s '
( h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s / c o n f e r e n c e s /
i n t e l l e c t u a l s / i n d e x . h t m l ) .
A scene from the
c o n f e r e n c e .
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P E T E R  V AN  D E R  VE E R
In the Netherlands and in other Western countries
one finds a hostile image of Islam. Only recently we
saw this image influencing the panicky reactions to
the terrorist attacks on the USA by Arab Muslims.
With great speed this attack was connected to state-
ments of a general nature on the essence of Islam and
of Muslims. Dutch politicians and Islam scholars
spoke in public about the age-old frustration of Mus-
lims that was presumed to be the background of this
attack. Almost immediately the question of the loyal-
ty of Muslim immigrants to the Dutch state and to
Dutch norms and values emerged in public debate.
Opinion polls showed quickly how fickle that loyalty
is and how methodologically shaky opinion polls are.
This was followed by attacks on mosques and Islamic
schools. The urgency of a more sophisticated analy-
sis of the relationship between the Netherlands and
Islam is self-evident.
The general view is that Islam in the Nether-
lands is a very recent phenomenon. That is
certainly true if one only looks at the
Netherlands on the North Sea and at the im-
migrants from Turkey and Morocco. Howev-
er, if one takes a historically and geographi-
cally more extended perspective, the Dutch
state, like other European states such as
England and France, can be seen to have
been dealing with Muslim subjects already
for a long period of time. I am referring to
the overseas colonies, Indonesia and Suri-
nam, whose decolonization is as much part
of the emergence of a postcolonial world as
the new forms of labour migration to West-
ern Europe and to other regions in the
world. A nationalist perspective in which
the Netherlands on the North Sea forms the
frame for the understanding of social cohe-
sion in a multicultural society can never pro-
vide an understanding of processes of glob-
alization, the rise of the network-society, or
the North-South problematic, which are es-
sential to the problems that the Nether-
lands is facing. The simple fact that only
now does the Dutch government acknowl-
edge that the Netherlands has become an
immigration country demonstrates the
long-term nationalist denial of global
processes. In the English literature on multi-
cultural society is what I state here, ex-
pressed in the slogan 'The Empire strikes
back'. In the case of England and France this
seems more evident, since many immi-
grants come from former colonies, but in
fact this is part of the same historical transi-
tion. In short: West European states have
colonized peoples and territories overseas
and have modernized themselves and their
colonies, a process resulting in a world-sys-
tem of independent nation-states. In the
final stages of this process a reversed migra-
tion from the South to the North has
emerged in which, in principle, indepen-
dent nation-states attempt to control the
flow of people.
The Netherlands is at present a postcolo-
nial society, an immigration country with a
relatively large number of immigrants
whose religion is Islam. Not so long ago the
Netherlands was a colonial society in which
a majority of the population was Muslim. In
my view the 'question of Islam' in the
colonies can, in a number of aspects, fruit-
fully be compared with the current prob-
lematic of the integration of Muslims in the
Netherlands. The present postcolonial gov-
ernment, as did the colonial government,
tries to make Muslims into modern citizens,
but it is hard to combine this policy with the
principle of the separation of church and
s t a t e .
The colonial state
According to influential, liberal policy
makers in the early 20t h century, such as
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, the task of the
colonial state is to make Islam into a modern
religion. This means secularization, that is to
say a separation of church and state and,
furthermore, an opposition to militant
Islam. It does not mean that the govern-
ment should interfere with the religious
character of Islam. In the liberal view the
principle of freedom of religion is to be
maintained. Freedom of religion, however,
does not imply cultural relativism. It is seen
as the task of the colonial government to ef-
fect a change in the backwardness of Mus-
lims, but the government should do so
slowly and prudently. On the other hand,
however, the state has to repress the mix-
ture of religion and politics in Islam, be-
cause it obstructs progress.
In short, Indonesians were allowed to be
Muslim, but should not organize themselves
on the basis of Islam. Education was seen as
the instrument for modernizing Muslim so-
ciety. Muslims had to be educated in Dutch
(secularized) culture in order to get past the
political and social significance of religious
difference. It is interesting that these policy
views were articulated in a period in which
the political organization of the metropolis
was still largely based on religious differ-
ence. In the Indies, however, subjects still
had to be educated to become citizens.
We know now that the secularization of
the Indies has not been successful. Islamic
organizations are crucial in the political con-
stellation of postcolonial Indonesia. As in
many societies it is the army that tries to
control these organizations and sometimes
this is successful for a period, as in Suharto's
New Order. These Islamic organizations do
not want to connect politics and religion in
a medieval fashion, but want to formulate a
modern Islam. They do not aim at the estab-
lishment of an original k h a l i f a t, but are in-
spired by modern ideas about democracy
and nationalism. As in Tocqueville's descrip-
tion of Christian organizations as the basis
of democratic America, in Indonesia too Is-
lamic organizations can constitute the basis
for a democratic nation-state. In Western so-
cieties such as the Netherlands and Eng-
land, religious organization has been foun-
dational in the formation of the nation-
state. In contrast to the views of liberal
thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Snouck
Hurgronje, there is no inherent opposition
between religion and democratic freedom.
In fact religious mass movements such as
the 19t h-century anti-slavery movement
have played a significant role in the creation
of public opinion and a public sphere. The
colonial notion that the state has to repress
the combination of religion and politics in
Islam emerges in fact from the desire to con-
trol society without being legitimated by
the population. In the liberal view religion
has to be transferred from the public do-
main to the private domain, but the state is
not willing to leave the private domain
alone. In postcolonial societies such as In-
donesia there is a struggle between central-
izing state institutions and more localized
Islamic organizations to control daily life.
Education is the focus of that struggle. In
the end the struggle is about conflicting
perspectives on civilization and political
participation. Such perspectives are not sta-
tic and cannot be summarized in easy di-
chotomies. The Indonesian case shows
clearly that religious organizations can play
an important role in the furthering of politi-
cal participation of citizens. There is no in-
herent opposition between Islam and
democracy. The concept of democracy,
however, is far from simple and has to be
understood in a comparative-historical man-
ner. In Indonesia one finds a growing politi-
cal participation, while in the West one finds
a declining participation. Should we now in-
troduce formal, quantifiable criteria to es-
tablish whether Indonesia becomes more
democratic and the Netherlands less? It is
more fruitful to analyse changing power
configurations less ideologically and to at-
tempt an interpretation of the effects of
growing or declining participation of citi-
zens on regional and global political process-
e s .
Dilemmas of modern states
In my view modern states, colonial and
postcolonial, share a number of fundamen-
tal objectives. The historical analysis of the
colonial period provides some insight into
the dilemmas of modern states. In the first
place modern states have to make individu-
als national citizens. That is to say that edu-
cated subjects have to be made loyal to the
nation-state. Secondly, the state derives its
legitimacy from a process of political partic-
ipation of citizens. A public sphere in which
social movements and voluntary organiza-
tions operate is essential to that purpose.
Thirdly, the modern state needs to protect
the liberty and equality of all citizens. At
least this is the enlightened ideal, however
much historical reality may differ from it.
The first element then is that of citizen-
ship and loyalty to the nation-state. From
the Reformation there has been a problem
concerning the political loyalty of religious
groups that did not belong to the state
church. This problem is for a large part
solved in the modern nation-state, in which
national identity and not religious identity is
the basis of political loyalty. Secularization
theories have assumed that this would also
imply the privatization of religion, but that
is not true. Religion remained significant as
a foundation for social and political organi-
zation. In the Dutch case of 'pillarization' we
find a pacification of religious and ideologi-
cal oppositions, but also a model for partici-
pation in a plural society. The first social sci-
ence theory of plural society, formulated by
Furnivall, is based on Indonesia, and indeed
the postcolonial p a n c a s i l a concept has
been inspired by Dutch pillarization. The
idea is that religious identity is the channel
through which one arrives at national iden-
tity and the two remain connected. The
colonial distrust of political Islam was fed by
the idea that this kind of religious mobiliza-
tion might bring an end to colonial domina-
tion. In contemporary Dutch society, Mus-
lim citizens are in more ways than one still
connected to their countries of origin.
Moreover, their religious identity is (not yet)
connected to Dutch national identity. Their
connection with Mecca can perhaps be
compared to the earlier anti-national loyalty
to Rome of Dutch Catholics that was as-
sumed by anti-papist groups – with the dif-
ference that religious identity is now but-
tressed by ethnic identity. The state at-
tempts to use education to integrate Mus-
lims in Dutch society, but one must realize
that the possibilities of the state to national-
ize citizens have declined. In other words,
homogeneity cannot be reached as easily as
in the 1950s. Like Indonesia, the Nether-
lands is a plural society in which individual-
ism and group identities make national
identity of only relative importance. This is a
process that seems inescapable. It has been
analysed as the emergence of the network-
society or the post–national state. If net-
works that are based on group mobilization
are indeed becoming more important this
would mean a bright future for religions like
Islam. The little-centralized Islamic forms of
organization with their shifting sites and
sources of authority are pre-eminently suit-
ed for such a society.
The second important element in the de-
velopment of modern society is political
participation. On the basis of race, sex, and
class the modern state has long excluded
subjects from the democratic process. Slow-
ly general suffrage has emerged, although
an age criteria has been maintained. The
most important justification for excluding
The Netherlands
and Islam
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the colonized peoples from the political
process can be found in John Stuart Mill's
and Snouck Hurgronje's idea that these
peoples should be considered as 'children'.
This 19t h-century liberal notion remained in
force until nationalist movements put an
end to colonial domination. The Indies were
governed through indirect rule. The elite
was identified and used as brokers between
government and society. The colonial soci-
ety was prevented from self-organization.
This procedure resembles the way in which
the postcolonial government tries to find
brokers in its dealings with ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. As such one can under-
stand the sometimes comical discussion
about imams in the Netherlands. The gov-
ernment feels a strong need to speak to
Muslims via their leaders. The problem is
that these hardly exist, since imams are
often poorly educated prayer leaders who
have some influence, but one that is not to
be over-estimated. Some universities in the
Netherlands that have little-attended theo-
logical seminaries have proposed that they
could give these imams a thorough theo-
logical and pastoral education. This is a per-
fect example of indirect rule, according to
which groups do not organize themselves
but are represented by leaders created by
the government. The latter not only creates
leaders, but also forces people to make use
of ethnic and religious channels to voice
their views vis-à-vis the government. The
problem here is that one wants to have peo-
ple participate in the political process in
ways they have not chosen. At present polit-
ical participation in the Netherlands and in
other Western countries has declined con-
siderably and it is not to be expected that
newcomers expend much energy in this do-
main. It is more likely that people will be
mobilized around certain issues, such as the
environment, traffic and spatial mobility,
and education; and that also religious issues
will be introduced. When there is a public
debate about, for example, headscarves in
schools, people are mobilized around the
issue and their religious organizations are
happy to step in. In this way, Muslims follow
the pattern of involvement of their non-
Muslim co-citizens.
The neutral state
The last element is that of freedom and
equality as the ideals of the modern nation-
state. An important element here is the sep-
aration of church and state. Neutrality of the
state in matters of religious choice has to be
guaranteed as a political principle, although
one has to observe that there are vast differ-
ences between the USA, the Netherlands,
France, Turkey, India, Indonesia and other
modern nation-states in the implementa-
tion of this principle. The US was the first
state in which the separation of church and
state was rigorously applied with the para-
doxical effect that public religion is of great
political importance there. In the Nether-
lands there is, among others, the Free Uni-
versity (which is Protestant) and the
Catholic University of Nijmegen, both of
which count few Protestant or Catholic stu-
dents, but nonetheless have religious foun-
dations and full government financing. An
old problem is the definition of freedom
and the fact that procedures of freedom can
be used to promote un-freedom. Everyone
will be convinced of the liberating effects of
modern science. The biological theory of
evolution is science and creationism is a be-
lief. In the USA religious activists try to intro-
duce creationism in the curriculum of public
schools, because they are of the opinion
that evolutionism and creationism are equal
sets of belief. The polemic between these
positions exists already since the famous
debate between the scientist Thomas Hux-
ley and the Anglican Bishop Wilberforce in
Oxford in 1860. The term 'fundamentalism'
originates from the important Scopes trial in
the US in 1925 where the bible was pitched,
as it were, against Darwin. The problem of
the modern state is that good education,
based on scientific knowledge and a partic-
ular form of rationality, is essential to its de-
velopment, and that the government has to
be neutral towards religious opinions in so-
ciety. The introduction of Hindu, Muslim,
and Christian curricula is thus only accept-
able when they do not conflict with scientif-
ic knowledge. For such conflict-ridden de-
bates there are no simple solutions and,
again, people can be mobilized around is-
sues, such as creationism.
Network society
Thus far I have emphasized the role of the
nation-state, but can the postcolonial state
still be called a national state in the present
era? In social science debates about global-
ization it is sometimes argued that the 19t h-
century nation-state is on its way out and is
succeeded by global actors, such as the UN
and the World Bank. Such a position goes
too far in my opinion, but what we do see is
a transformation of the national state and
the rise of what the sociologist Manuel
Castells has called 'the Network Society'. In
his argument emphasis is given to the de-
clining capacity of the state to satisfy the
demands and requirements of citizens, but
he forgets that this capacity has only been
available to the welfare states of the West.
In most other regions of the world welfare
has never existed. The decolonized areas
that Clifford Geertz in the 1960s called 'new
states in old societies' have never seen an
effective battle against poverty and illitera-
cy. In those areas one finds a general disillu-
sionment with respect to the powers that
be, which have promised so much and de-
livered so little. What seems to connect the
entire world, from the US to India, is the no-
tion that the state does not offer the solu-
tion for problems but is itself the problem.
Migrants try to avoid the state in building
transnational networks. This is obviously
true for large-scale illegal migration, but it is
also true for legal migration. An important
indication is the fact that money transfers of
transnational migrants in 1995 were esti-
mated to exceed 70 billion dollars according
to the IMF. National governments try to con-
trol these transfers, but are not capable of
doing so. It is important to see that this kind
of large-scale monetary traffic enables
transnational entrepreneurship. Integration
in a nation-state is not the aim of these en-
trepreneurs, although they may well be citi-
zens of the states of immigration. They want
to be flexible, to be able to respond quickly
to changes in political and financial circum-
stances. They constitute transnational net-
works with junctions in a number of nation-
s t a t e s .
In cultural and religious aspects these net-
works are supported by transnational
movements, such as the Pentecostals in
Christianity, the World Council of Hindus in
the case of Hinduism and the many mission-
ary movements in the case of Islam. These
movements are crucial in the creation of
transnational identities that connect to the
universal message of these religions. While
most of them are quietist and expect salva-
tion from the ultimate conversion of all the
citizens of the world to the universal Truth,
there are also extremist and violent move-
ments among them that aim at more direct
political goals. Already in the colonial peri-
od these movements were feared by the
Western governments. Especially the so-
called pan-Islamism was closely watched.
For instance, Snouck Hurgronje's stay in
Mecca was subsidized by the Ministry for
the Colonies since it wanted to have infor-
mation on the Indonesians who were living
in Jeddah and Mecca. With the rise of inde-
pendent states in Africa and Asia the politi-
cal mobilization of Muslims seemed to be
channelled into nationalist movements and
focused on the national arena. In that way
the danger of pan-Islamism seemed to have
disappeared, but if we ever harboured such
an illusion, it will have dissipated after the
events of 11 September in the US. That this
was indeed an illusion should not surprise
us since local, regional, and national con-
flicts constantly have international and
transnational effects. Not only nation-states
are crucial in military conflicts but also
transnational networks of militant groups.
This was true for the Comintern and it is also
true for the pan-Islamist groups which have
been fighting in several conflicts in Bosnia,
Egypt, Afghanistan or the Moluccas. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union – partly by
their own doing – they are constantly con-
fronted with the US and its allies. When one
takes into account the role of the US and the
West in supporting the repressive regime of
Israel, some anti-Western and anti-Ameri-
can feelings might be expected. The terror-
ist attack has suddenly made us much more
aware of the negative effects of postcolonial
globalization on the Western world. One
can no longer assume that conflicts in the
South, in which the North, particularly the
US, is involved will be contained there.
Moreover, with the rise of the network-soci-
ety the possibilities of states to guarantee
security within territorial borders have de-
clined. Responses to this situation cannot
be limited to conventional military and po-
litical options, but have to emerge from
clear-minded analyses of the transforma-
tion of the national state. To transnational
challenges one has to give transnational an-
swers. The demonizing of Muslim immi-
grants who are perceived as symbols of the
large-scale upheavals of today's world is the
opposite of such an answer. It brings us
back to old nationalist reflexes that want to
bring back that which has already disap-
peared: the homogenous nation-state. 
Peter van der Veer is director of the Research Center
Religion and Society (University of Amsterdam) and co-
director of the ISIM.
Lifecycle rituals
o f Muslims in
t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
Nathal Dessing, ISIM Educational Coordi-
nator, defended her Ph.D. dissertation
entitled Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Mar-
riage, and Death among Muslims in the
N e t h e r l a n d s at Leiden University on
1 9 September 2001. In her dissertation,
now published by Uitgeverij Peeters,
Dessing examines the effects of migra-
tion on the lifecycle rituals of Moroccan,
Turkish, and Surinamese Muslims in the
Netherlands. She explores how Islamic
rituals marking birth, circumcision, mar-
riage, and death have responded and ac-
commodated to the Dutch legal and so-
cial context. After setting out the relevant
Islamic prescriptions, Dessing draws on
her fieldwork in Rotterdam, The Hague,
and Utrecht to chart how each ritual has
evolved through migration, and com-
pares the ritual practice in the Nether-
lands and the countries of origin. Dessing
thereby sheds light on the meaning, ex-
perience, and organization of lifecycle rit-
uals in the migration setting. 
Nathal M. Dessing, Rituals of Birth, Circumcision,
Marriage, and Death among Muslims in the
Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001).
ISBN 90-429-1059-3
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For the 2002–2003 academic year, the Working Group
Modernity and Islam (AKMI) of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu
Berlin invites applications for three post-doctoral fellowships
for the project entitled ‘Jewish and Islamic Hermeneutics as
Cultural Critique’. Directed by Almut Sh. Bruckstein (Freie
Universität Berlin/Hebrew University Jerusalem) and Navid
Kermani (Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin), the project intends
t o develop formats for the comparative hermeneutics of
Muslim and Jewish traditions. Addressed are phenomena
a n d practices in which the script comes alive, such as the
recitation of the word, oral and musical traditions, the
aesthetics and iconography of texts, and the genres and
structures of traditional exegesis. 
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Ri ghts  Ac t iv i sm
A T E F S H A H A T S AI D
'The accused persons have practised sodomy. Orien-
tal society criminalizes homosexuality and delin-
quency, which are condemned by Islam and all divine
religions. This practice, if spread, will destroy the
whole society.' The state security prosecutor's report
contained these words regarding the case of the 52
Egyptians accused of sodomy, who were arrested on
11 May 2001 on the tourist Queen Boat. On 14 No-
vember, 23 of them were found guilty. The main two
accusations were obscenity (in Egyptian criminal law,
obscenity means sodomy) and contempt of religion.
H o m o s e x u a l i t y
a n d Human Rights
in Egypt
An analysis of this case file within the con-
text of the human rights movement in
Egypt and within the broader political and
legal environment indicates three main
paradoxes. The case raises the question of
the universality and specificity of the human
rights agenda; it highlights the controver-
sial area of the rule of law and Egypt's legal
structure; and it also emphasizes the effects
of the political atmosphere on issues of
human rights in Egypt.
Human rights and sexual
m i n o r i t i e s
Some contradictions within the human
rights movement and its agenda in Egypt
have arisen from this case and its ramifica-
tions. For instance, only one out of 17
human rights organizations – among the six
that work in legal aid – has offered legal ser-
vices to the accused. Since most of these or-
ganizations have not explicitly declared
their opinion on the case, it can be inferred
that they are not willing to take a clear
stance on this issue. This reticence stems
from the fact that homosexuality is frowned
upon in Egyptian society. Supporting those
accused of homosexuality would put these
already peripheral organizations in an even
more delicate position vis-à-vis the rest of
society. The fine line between the universal
and the relative in human rights standards
has come to the fore in this case. The issues
that raise the most controversy in this bor-
derline area, even among human rights ac-
tivists in Egypt, are the limits of freedom of
expression when it comes to religion,
women's rights, and the rights of minorities,
specifically Copts. This case, however, in-
volves a new minority.
Because human rights groups are accused
by the state of pursuing a Western agenda,
they are sometimes more anxious to take up
controversial rights cases.1 It is true that this
agenda may be inspired, practically speak-
ing at least, and because of insufficient local
resources, by a generalized 'Western' agen-
d a .2 For example, political and civil rights
often take precedence over social, econom-
ic and cultural rights due to these agenda
considerations. However, it is not complete-
ly true that a 'Western' agenda is used in
supporting the rights of sexual minorities.
The UN human rights committee issued the
first international case that highlighted the
protection of sexual minorities in 1994.
Human Rights Watch maintains that only by
the beginning of the 1980s was protection
for homosexuals embodied in a human
rights agenda, to the extent that only in
1981 was the so-called AIMGLC (Amnesty
International Members for Gay and Lesbian
Concerns) established in the USA.3
In addition to the controversial human
rights scene in Egypt, both the legal struc-
ture and the partial rule of law have affected
the outcome of the case. The legal structure
in Egypt is a complex mixture of modern
laws that guarantee human rights, and oth-
ers which do not. In some cases, the penal
code (which is not linked to the foundations
of Islamic law) itself is discriminatory. For ex-
ample, in cases of adultery, the penal code's
structure of punishment is very severe and
discriminates between the penalties re-
ceived based on gender. This suppressive
nature of the criminal code, in some cases,
has forced the Egyptian Supreme Constitu-
tional Court to affirm the unconstitutionali-
ty of a particular law (ruling no. 49, for the
constitutional year 17, issued on 15 June
1996) and to call for criminal codes to be
written more clearly. It has stated that the
legislature should not issue laws that can be
used to entrap citizens, who should be as-
sured of their security and privacy. The am-
biguous definition of obscenity made it easy
for the government to accuse the men in
this case. Since the definitions of pornogra-
phy and obscenity have evolved over the
y e a r s4 the legislative authority should con-
sider changing the laws that deal with these
issues. The Egyptian gays were sentenced
according to Egyptian Criminal Law, article
98 (on establishing an illegal association)
and in this context more importantly to law
no. 10 for the year 1960 which deals with
prostitution. In the explanatory regulations
of the latter, while prostitution is defined as
being committed by females, obscenity is
described as committing sodomy with more
than one person with the intent of prostitu-
tion when it concerns males. Even so, it can
be argued that most human rights abuses in
Egypt do not exist as a result of the suppres-
sive or ambiguous laws, but because of the
partial respect of the rule of law. This disre-
spect transforms laws into a means within
the jurisdiction of the executive authorities
at any particular moment.
The political shadow
The political environment has also affect-
ed the final outcome of this case. Four issues
make it clear that we can not understand
the case without linking it to the broader
political theatre in Egypt, and in particular
the struggle between the government and
the Islamists. In this regard, the political
game between the government and the Is-
lamists is setting the agenda for intellectual
discussion in Egypt.5 In this case, the gov-
ernment wants to appear as religiously
credible to counter the Islamists. There are
several examples that prove this argument,
among which is the contradictory manner in
which the government behaves towards
civil freedoms and human rights – in favour
or against according to its interests at spe-
cific times. One example is its role in defend-
ing its publishing of the novel entitled W a l y-
eema Li A'ashaab Al-Bahr (A Banquet for Sea-
weed) in spring 2000, while banning three
novels published by the ministry of culture
in early 2001.
The government also fears that the elec-
tion of 17 members of the Muslim Brother-
hood in November 2000 to the Peoples As-
sembly (PA) might generate a more Islamist
discourse within the PA. Moreover, there is
no reasonable or legal justification for the
use of the state security court, which is
purely an exceptional court, in this case. The
ruling tried to justify the use of a state secu-
rity court by claiming that contempt of reli-
gion is a matter of state security. Finally, ac-
cording to Ahmed Saif,6 director of the
Hisham Moubarak Law Center, the only
human rights organization that offered its
legal aid services to the accused, '[t]here are
several grave errors that cannot be justified
legally in the court's ruling. The ruling, for
instance, has no concrete evidence except
for medical reports for each of the accused
and their confessions. Both are inadequate
as evidence: the former is ambiguous and
some of the confessions referred to commit-
ting sodomy more than 5 years prior to the
arrests. The statute of limitations for misde-
meanour suits in Egyptian law is only 5
years. An additional grave mistake is that
there is no real evidence of sodomy having
been committed with several persons.' If
there is no evidence of sodomy committed
with more than one person, then the judge
has criminalized homosexuality per se, as
was indeed the case for some of the ac-
cused. An additional problem within the
state security court is that the accused have
no right to appeal. These legal errors and
details probably indicate the political shad-
ow over the case. The above-mentioned
'game' forces the government's hand to act
sometimes, as it is the paramount protector
of Islamic and religious values in general.
If the previous information shows that the
legal, political and human rights environ-
ment affected the case, societal pressures
also played their part. Those accused were
not only deprived of their right to privacy,
they were portrayed in a very negative light
by all the Egyptian media. Just a week after
the rulings, the government arrested more
homosexuals. Other cases concerning (dif-
ferent) moral issues include that of Shohdy
Naguib Sorour, web-designer at the A h r a m
W e e k l y newspaper. Sorour was arrested by
the government on 22 November for having
published on the web his father's poetry
(Naguib Sorour is a former controversial
playwright and poet), considered indecent
and even pornographic. In fact, the govern-
ment has established a new Internet crime
unit at the Ministry of Interior, which might
be the cause of these recent arrests.
I agree with El Amrani (Cairo Times, 22–28
November 2001) when he argues that this
was not a criminal and legal case but a case
on morality. Sociologists and human rights
activists need to study the government's
change of heart regarding issues of morali-
ty. Taking into consideration Foucault's ar-
gument (i.e. the linkage between power, re-
pression and the evolvement of the dis-
course on sexuality in modern bourgeoisie
s o c i e t y ) ,7 different channels of repression,
including economic ones, should be studied
with respect to the Egyptian case.
It is clear that human rights activism in
Egypt has not developed to the point of
being able to defend issues involving sever-
al controversial freedoms. This can only
occur if the social and political atmosphere
in the country begins to change. 
F i f t y - t w o
s u s p e c t e d
E g y p t i a n
h o m o s e x u a l s
arrive at a Cairo
c o u r t .
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The printed Arabic media offer hardly any critical re-
view of the social and political settings in the Arab
world that may help to explain the emergence of vio-
lent Islamist groups. Standard newspaper articles
and comments on the post–September 11 events
vary from elaborations of the marked inconsisten-
cies in US foreign policies to the popular conspiracy
theories in which 'international Zionism' is blown up
to mythical proportions. A few intellectuals, howev-
er, opt for a more open and frank approach to the is-
sues involved, including some who had been accused




Just before the American-British retaliation
against Afghanistan, the Arab daily A l - H a y a t
published a series of articles on Usama bin
Laden and his A l - Q aci d a network. Based on
interviews and statements made by former
members of A l - Q aci d a, the author, Kamil at-
Tawil, a Lebanese journalist living in Lon-
don, offers an in-depth discussion of the de-
velopment of A l - Q aci d a in Afghanistan and
beyond from 1988 onwards. He explains
that the organization did not begin its fight
as a jihad against Western influence in the
Arab world, but rather as one against the
'unjust Arab rulers'; anti-Americanism was a
later consequence of the Second Gulf War.
Bin Laden's failure to establish an Islamist
network operating from the Gulf region,
specifically Saudi Arabia, led him to Af-
ghanistan in 1990, to the Sudan from 1991
to 1996, and then back to Afghanistan
where he remained until the September 11
a t t a c k s .
At-Tawil argues that the radicalization of
the A l - Q aci d a was the result of a new leader-
ship within the network, headed by two for-
mer members of the Egyptian Jihad – Ay-
man az-Zawahiri and Abu Hifs al-Misri. The
goals now included the expulsion of the US
troops from the Arab Peninsula and the lib-
eration of Jerusalem. The new direction
taken by the A l - Q aci d a network was illustrat-
ed by its official declaration of war against
the US in 1996, and the enactment of a
fatwa to legitimize the suicide-attacks
against the American and Israeli armies and
c i v i l i a n s .1
Unfortunately, the frankness of these A l -
Hayat articles is not representative of the
Arab press reporting on the September 11
attacks and their underlying causes. Readers
of Arab newspapers are either confronted
with articles which abound in stereotypes of
and ideological remarks on Islamism and
the relationship between the Arab world
and the West, usually accentuating the US
support of radical Islamist groups in the
1980s and 1990s and criticizing Western
policy regarding the Arab-Islamic world.
Other articles emphasize the peaceful na-
ture of Islam and the faultiness of the Hunt-
ington thesis. The internal and regional fac-
tors causing the emergence of radical Is-
lamist movements are rarely discussed. Crit-
icism of the West is so frequent and in such
obvious disregard of the context that one
may conclude that despite the prevailing
condemnation of the September 11 attacks,
there is an implicit justification. Bin Laden's
popularity among the Arab peoples is be-
lieved to stem from his willingness to deal
with significant problems (e.g. Palestine)
and his ability to teach the 'arrogant Ameri-
cans' a lesson.
The conspiracy
Conspiracy theories, of which there are
three basic patterns, comprise another com-
ponent of common argumentation. The first
asserts that American intelligence orches-
trated the September 11 attacks, with the
intention of justifying an already planned
attack on the Arab and Islamic u m m a. The
second claims that the Christian Occident
orchestrated the attacks to create a pretext
for cleansing the West from its Muslim resi-
dents. This theory is further supported by
the apparent smear campaigns against
Islam in parts of the Western media and by
the first legal steps taken against Islamist
groups in Europe. The third mostly appears
in Arab media and is based on the assump-
tion that the West is dominated by interna-
tional Zionism. It is claimed that the attacks
were carried out by Israeli intelligence in
order to justify the brutal behaviour of the
Israeli administration against Palestinians in
the occupied territories. To this effect, a ru-
mour circulated that all Jewish employees
of the World Trade Center were mysterious-
ly absent on September 11. This theory rep-
resents a return to the Arab public's most
frequently used explanation for any crisis
situation: 'it's the Jews' fault'. Whether it be
the spread of the HIV-virus in the Arab re-
gion (allegedly by female Israeli HIV-posi-
tive intelligence agents who consciously se-
duce Arab men in order to infect them), or
the poor cotton harvest in Egypt (due to
manipulated seeds given by the Israeli gov-
ernment), Israel is always the culprit.
A clear example of how these different
conspiracy theories are not mutually exclu-
sive, is demonstrated by Mustafa Mahmud
in the Egyptian daily A l - A h r a m ( N o v e m b e r
3). In his essay Mahmud accuses the West of
having been planning its crusade against
Islam already for several decades. The Sep-
tember 11 attacks which, according to Mah-
mud, were carried out by American groups,
served as justification for attacking the Is-
lamic u m m a. In his opinion, the increasing
brutality of the Israeli army against Pales-
tinians is not only an expression of the cur-
rent anti-Islamic attitude of the Jewish state,
but also proof of Israel's participation in the
attacks. In an apocalyptic manner, the war in
Afghanistan is claimed to be the final battle
between true Islam and the materialistic civ-
ilization of the West. Martyrdom will relieve
the Islamic community from its continual
anguish, and cause the definite downfall of
the West. This line of argumentation does
not only elucidate a radical Islamist inter-
pretation of 'the end of history'. It rather
completes the last circle of an Islamist varia-
tion of messianic thought, in which the
good and its hero (in this case Bin Laden) ul-
timately prevail.2
Critical thoughts
Although simplified and ambiguous expla-
nations are clearly predominant in the Arab
press, a small number of critical articles repre-
sent important, though not necessarily new,
ideas. For example, the Lebanese philosopher
Ridwan as-Sayyid links his defence of 'true
Islam' to a critique of radical Islamism. He con-
demns the simplified depiction of Islamic pol-
itics as merely an implementation of the shar-
ica and the readiness to use force as a means
of Islamizing contemporary Arab societies. He
also refuses to legitimize the terrorist attacks
as a response to the American foreign policy
of the last decades regarding the Middle
East.3
The significance of this rather marginal po-
sition lies in the fact that As-Sayyid is known
as a prominent representative of moderate Is-
lamism whose advocates have been previ-
ously accused of quietly supporting the use of
violence by radical religious movements. This
clear turning away from militant Islamism re-
flects the recent rediscovery of the moral and
peaceful roots of Islamism, as articulated by
the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood, Hassan al-Banna, in the 1920s and
1930s. The Tunisian thinker Abu Yacrib al-
Marzuqi asserts that this turn-away entails a
distancing from the politicization of Islam
once put forth by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb
(1906–1966).4
A number of secular thinkers and authors
are shifting their focus within the Arab debate
since September 11 and openly discuss inter-
nal and regional factors. For example, the
Lebanese sociologists Waddah Sharara and
Salim Nasar argue that the rise of radical Is-
lamism was not so much a product of anti-
Americanism, but of societal crises in the Arab
world where ruling elites used religion as an
instrument to divert attention from their poli-
cy failures and the deficient legitimacy of the
political system. Therefore, Arabs should real-
ize the implications of the lack of foundations
to support democracy in their own societies,
before unilaterally expecting the West to deal
with the consequences of Arab politics. Both
Sharara and Nasar condemn the use of the
Arab-Israeli conflict as sufficient justification
of religiously-motivated acts of violence
against the West. They both hold that Bin
Laden's motive is much less the liberation of
Palestine, than it is the establishment of a re-
gressive Islamic state within the Arab world,
in which universally accepted principles such
as human rights would bear no meaning.5
The personage of Usama bin Laden and its
current use in the Arab public sphere re-
ceived some critical review. The Egyptian po-
litical scientist Wahid cAbdulmajid interprets
the portrayal of Bin Laden's character in the
media as a reflection of modern Arab hero-
legends. His being depicted as a lonely war-
rior against the arrogant powers of the West-
ern world is analogous to the construction of
the character of Adham as-Sharqawi, a leg-
endary fighter against the British occupation
of Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century.
Additionally, Bin Laden's hiding in the deso-
late mountains of Afghanistan reminds one of
the prophet Muhammad, who hid in the cave
of Hira' when leaving Mecca for Medina. This
particular legendary aspect seems to have
been consciously adopted by the Al-Qacida,
as reflected by their self-portrayal in the
video-messages broadcasted following the
first retaliation strikes by the US. According to
cAbdulmajid, the emphasis on Bin Laden's
eloquent yet matter-of-fact style of speaking
fulfil a double function: firstly, elating him to
the position of sole representative of self-con-
fident Muslims and, secondly, transfiguring
the lacking realism contained in his political
objectives.6
Even though these critical ideas do not oc-
cupy a central position in the Arab media's re-
porting on the September 11 events and their
consequences, they bear great potential for
the future. The possible intellectual isolation
of radical Islamism, on the one hand, and the
public discussion of the normative underpin-
nings of modern Arab societies, on the other,
are significant departures from the dominant
discourse. It seems to be increasingly difficult
to explain crises in the Arab world by pointing
to the West as the cause of all harms, and thus
divert attention from our own failures. Ironi-
cally, this change might be a significant step
forward in the dialogue between the Orient
and the Occident. 
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The carnage which started with the suicidal bombing
of New York's World Trade Center (WTC) on Septem-
ber 11 has resumed with massive American bombing
of Afghanistan on the evening of 7 October 2001. It is
the first war of the 21s t century, pitting the world's
strongest, richest, most technologically advanced
country against a country that is among the poorest
and least developed. It also happens to be between a
Western, predominately Christian country and a
Muslim, Middle Eastern country; between a secular
democracy and an avowed theocracy. The list of con-
trasts probably contains many more dichotomies –
making the Huntingtonians applaud the seeming ful-
filment of their 'clash of civilizations' prophecy.
A Note from Prison
L e g i t i m a t e
Accounts, Wrong
A c c o u n t a n t s
I am writing from my Egyptian prison cell in
the fourth week of the American air cam-
paign against Afghanistan. By the time
these reflections are published, the present
battle may be over, but not the war itself.
The next battles of this war are bound to
break out and could be anywhere in what
Zbignew Brzezinski aptly called the 'arch of
crisis'. Just over ten years ago, a similar bat-
tle involving the US and another Middle
Eastern country – Iraq – broke out and has
never been completely ended. Before Iraq
and Afghanistan, the US became militarily
involved with ground forces and/or air
power in Lebanon (1982/83), Iran (1980/81),
Libya (1980s), Somalia and the Sudan
(1990s). No other world region has experi-
enced as many active American military in-
tentions in the last three decades.
The fact that America is part of 'the West'
and that the Middle East is part of 'the Rest'
may or may not be a coincidence. Intellectu-
als are forcefully taking sides, but the empir-
ical evidence is still insufficient for testing
Huntington's 'grand theory' of the late 20t h
century. My reflections here do not address
that grand theorizing; not for lack of temp-
tation to do so, but for lack of references at
hand and diminished margins of freedom in
a Middle Eastern prison.
Instead, I will address far more modest
questions. Why does our part of the world
generate these frequent battles with the
West, specifically the US? And why do the
Middle Eastern antagonists keep losing the
battles, with no apparent end to the war
with the West? The brief answer to the first
question is that peoples of the Middle East
have truly legitimate accounts to settle with
the West; and to the second question is that
wrong accountants impose themselves on
our people to settle those accounts. Proper
accountants are yet to emerge – true Arab-
Muslim democrats. But this is another story,
for a future set of reflections, hopefully from
the freedom beyond this prison.
G r i e v a n c e s
The accounts to be settled, as perceived by
the Arab-Muslim world, abound. The list of
grievances would vary somewhat from one
Arab-Muslim country to another, and from
one specific constituency to another within
each country. The list would include diverse
and even contradictory items – such as re-
strictive migration measures against Turks
and North Africans into Western Europe,
American military presence in the Gulf, the
frequent US congressional threat of with-
drawing American units from the multina-
tional forces in Egyptian Sinai, one-sided sup-
port for Israel, MacDonald's, Coca-Cola, deca-
dent Hollywood movies, excessive Western
corporate presence, too little Western invest-
ment in the Arab-Muslim Middle East, and
enforced values like consumerism and family
planning. It all depends on who you talk to, in
which country, and at which point in time.
But there is a core of common grievances
that nearly all Arabs and Muslims deeply
hold against 'the West'. These include mili-
tary humiliation, colonial occupation, pillag-
ing of resources, political domination, cul-
tural subjugation, and territorial fragmenta-
tion of the Homeland. Half a century ago,
'the West' was concretely the Dutch to In-
donesians at one end of the 'arch of crises',
and the French to Algerians and Morocco at
the other end of the arch. In the middle, it
was the British to peoples and cultures –
Malaysians, Bengalis, Urdus, Afghanis, Per-
sians, Mashreq Arabs, and Egyptians. More
recently, the West has become condensed
and symbolized by America.
Ironically the US was never a colonial
power in the classical imperial sense – at
least not in the Arab-Muslim world. But
there are symbolic and instrumental rea-
sons for this collective perception, and it is
more than an implication by kinship with
the old colonial powers of Europe. This will
become more evident shortly.
At the very epicentre of Arab-Muslim core
grievances towards the West is Palestine. It
has been an open wound in the most sensi-
tive spot at nearly the exact midpoint. The
pains of that open wound may have been
felt less by those far away – say, the peoples
of Indonesia and Morocco at the two pe-
ripheral ends of the arch. But thanks to the
electronic media, scenes of brutalization of
Palestinians have become daily news on
television screens in the most isolated ham-
lets of Java and Agadir. How else could any
fair observer account for the post-Septem-
ber 11 demonstrations witnessed in some of
these countries – albeit to the embarrass-
ment of their own official leadership, which
dutifully paid homage to the victims of the
American tragedy. For sizeable segments,
though by no means all of the public opin-
ion in the arch, it was divine justice at work –
retribution for all the injustices perpetrated
by the West upon 'us' in Palestine, Iraq, and
elsewhere for so long. America is perceived
to be the permanent supporter of the Zion-
ist Israeli state, while keeping the Arab-Is-
lamic world 'divided, sapped, weak, domi-
nated, exploited and humiliated'. Some may
add that all of this is really about protecting
oil interests in the Gulf, and now in the
Caspian Sea.
Responses to the war
For most Arabs and Muslims, arguments
about defeating the terrorists responsible
for innocent victims of the WTC and the
Pentagon may have been sympathetically
listened to between September 11 and Oc-
tober 7, though with the caveat 'and what
about the innocent Palestinians and Iraqis?'
– in an obvious reference to the fact that
they have been killed or bombed by Ameri-
can weapons either directly or at the hands
of their 'Israeli clients'. After October 7, the
American bombing of targets in Afghan-
istan was labelled by the leading main-
stream Al-Ahram al-Arabi weekly (3 Novem-
ber 2001) as outright barbarism. In this view,
no excuse or pretext justifies American air
raids, which could never avoid victimizing
innocent Afghan civilians.
By November 7, one month after the start
of the bombing, one could hardly find an
Arab columnist of any note who would justi-
fy the American war against Afghanistan. It
was no longer a 'war against terrorism' as
sanctioned by the UN Security Council for
legitimate action in self-defence. In the heat
of battle all such legalisms are pushed to the
margins. By now, the approximately 3,000
innocent American civilians killed by a pre-
meditated act of terrorism seem to have
been forgotten or deeply pushed into the
Arab-Muslim collective subconscious. Now,
it is only the moving picture of Afghanis
–starving children in refugee camps on the
border with Pakistan – or the mutilated bod-
ies in the aftermath of American bombs,
some of which invariably fall on civilian tar-
gets. These media images compete with
similar ones from Palestine which have
been displayed throughout the 13 months
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. A cartoon on the
front page of the most secular liberal A l -
Wafd daily (1 November 2001) summed it
up: American President Bush and Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon standing in two adja-
cent, but obviously competing, butcher
shops, each busily slaughtering children –
'Afghani flavour' and 'Palestinian flavour' re-
spectively – with a big sign advertising dis-
count prices for Muslim meat.
Combat statistics, in view of images and
cartoons like these, lose their relevance over
time. Thus to say that the US lost in one hour
three times more than the combined losses
of Palestinians in one year (700) and Afgha-
nis in one month (2,000) seems irrelevant to
an average citizen in Pakistan, Egypt, or Mo-
rocco. It is what social psychologists call the
'immediacy effect' – American victims were
killed two months earlier, but Afghanis and
Palestinians are 'being slaughtered right
now, now, as we speak, do something about
it!'. It is this immediacy effect, thanks again
to satellite communications displaying the
maimed and displaced, which accounts for
the anti-American demonstrations in Arab-
Muslim capitals.
But there are other effects which play in
favour of Taliban Afghanistan in fuelling
similar demonstrations in other countries
far beyond the Arab-Muslim World – e.g.
Korea, Japan and several Latin American
countries. Among these other effects is a
David vs. Goliath syndrome (Bin Laden vs.
Bush), or the Taliban as a 'Cinderella hero'.
There is no doubt of the presence of a quota
of envy among the poor and marginal vis-à-
vis US power, wealth, and hegemony in a
unipolar world system. Among a limited
sample of fellow prison inmates (both polit-
ical and criminal), I have detected satisfac-
tion, if not outright delight, in observing
American humiliation and widespread fear
because of the suicide bombings and subse-
quent Anthrax panic. This degree of spite,
coming at a moment of a colossal human
tragedy, could only be a function of deep
bitterness, un-redressed historical griev-
ances, and contemporary open wounds.
Usama Bin Laden is fast emerging as a folk
hero to millions of the angry and frustrated
in the Arab-Muslim world. To them, he has
eluded and frightened the sole superpower
and its other Western allies. He and his mod-
est Taliban allies with minimal weapons,
primitive technology, access to one regional
television channel (Al-Jazeera) and a tiny re-
source base have already stood up and re-
sisted the firepower of the strongest coun-
try in history for four weeks – i.e. longer than
Saddam Hussein with his one million-strong
army in the 1991 Gulf War; and five times
longer than Egypt, Syria, and Jordan stood
up to much less Israeli firepower in the 1967
Six Day War. By these standards, Arab-Mus-
lim youngsters may be justified in their ad-
miration of Bin Laden's defiance. He has
largely won the current battle over the
hearts, if not the minds, of the Arab-Muslim
w o r l d .
Legitimate accounts
But will Bin Laden and his Taliban brothers
win the war against the West?
From the humble view of an Arab prisoner
of conscience, the answer is a big 'NO'. Bin
Laden is one in a chain of Arab-Muslim lead-
ers who defied, challenged, and engaged
the West in grand battles. But in the end,
they have all lost their wars against the
West. This all started with Egypt's Nasser
half a century ago, and continued with
Libya's Qaddafi, Syria's Assad, Iraq's Sad-
dam, and now Saudi-Afghani Bin Laden. The
initial battle cry of each one of these chal-
lengers resonated deeply and widely with
the Arab-Muslim masses. Some cried out
under the banner of Arab Nationalism, oth-
ers under the banner of Islam. All of them in-
voked the cause of Palestine and specifically
the liberation of Jerusalem. These two caus-
es have tremendous emotive power. How-
ever, each of the above challengers tagged
Palestine and Jerusalem on to his own per-
sonal ambitions for power and his ideologi-
cal hopes for remaking the world.
Initial successes in overpowering local foes
or bleeding external enemies, using zealous
true believers, whipping up the cheers of
spectators – all are tempting, and always de-
ceiving. Sheer grand vision and scores of
zealots have never alone been sufficient, in
our region or elsewhere in the world, in sus-
taining a credible challenge, much less in
achieving ultimate victory. History is a vast
graveyard of the likes of Bin Laden and his
pan-Islamic A l - Q aci d a network, the Taliban
movement and millions of distant admiring
but powerless masses. All we need to antici-
pate the unfolding of events in this particu-
lar drama is to look back to Egypt's Nasser in
the 1960s. As then, Bin Laden made a thun-
derous entrance onto the world stage. He
may very well end the same – i.e. withering
away after a resounding defeat, or getting
Continued on page 38
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A f g h a n i s t a n
C O N R A D S C H E T T E R
After the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Chech-
nya, the war in Afghanistan is being explained in
terms of the supremacy of ethnicity. The solution,
the UN is aspiring, seems plausible: if representa-
tives of all ethnic groups can be brought together
into one government, the 23-year war in Afghanistan
will end. But such a solution bears the danger that by
linking political office and ethnicity the conflict in
Afghanistan will be stabilized and even intensified.
M i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
E t h n i c i t y
in the Afghan Conflict
Policy-makers and the media tend to narrow
the conflict in Afghanistan to the ethnic di-
mension. They hold that a government in
which all ethnic groups are represented
would reflect all facets of the Afghan popu-
lation. They often make the mistake of see-
ing ethnic groups as uniform bodies acting
in accord and equating the ethnic groups
with the political movements. What is ig-
nored in the present debate is the fact that,
despite the ethnicization of the war, the eth-
nicization of the Afghan masses failed. Most
Afghans hate all the parties to the conflict
equally. Nor is the problem of ethnicity of
much significance to them. Largely forgot-
ten is that, to the Afghans, it is not the ethnic
group, but rather family, clan and village
which provide the major hallmarks of action
and identity. Even the relevance of ethnicity
as a factor of military and political cohesion
remained limited in the Afghan war: count-
less commanders and combat units changed
their allegiance several times out of political
opportunism and economic incentive – in-
dependent of their ethnic affiliation.
What is an ethnic group?
The dilemma with raising ethnicity to the
basis of conflict-resolution begins with the
question of what constitutes an ethnic
group. Despite the widely held view that
ethnic groups have existed since time im-
memorial, most of those in Afghanistan
were 'created' in the course of the 20t h c e n-
tury. Driven by the scientific endeavour to
classify people according to cultural cus-
toms, ethnologists invented an entire series
of ethnic groups: Nuristani, Pashai, Aimaq,
Tajik or Farsiwan. The segments of the pop-
ulace for whom they were invented are
often not even familiar with such labels,
much less aware of any common identity. In
addition there is a lack of viable criteria to
determine who is Uzbek, Hazara or Pashtun.
For example, those who maintain that Pash-
tuns speak Pashtu and are Sunni Muslims
err, since there are also Shiite Pashtuns in
the Qandahar region and Pashtuns from
Kabul often do not speak a word of Pashtu.
A good example for the aforementioned is
the former king, Zahir Shah. The difficulties
with differentiating are being aggravated
by the fact that many Afghans – if they mas-
ter the cultural patterns – in different situa-
tions claim to be of different ethnicity. The
former Afghan president Babrak Karmal
used to emphasize his Pashtun origin,
whereas many Afghans considered him to
be a Tajik or an immigrated Kashmiri. Ismail
Khan, one of the most important comman-
ders of the Northern Alliance, is sometimes
considered to be a Tadjik, a Pashtun or a Far-
siwan. He himself steadily refuses to be as-
signed to a certain ethnic group.
Because of differing scientific approaches,
it is unclear just how many ethnic groups
exist in Afghanistan and how large they ac-
tually are. A German survey concludes there
are about 50,1 while a Russian study claims
there are 200.2 Also it is impossible to say
how many Pashtuns or Tajiks are living in
Afghanistan. Thus emerges the problem of
which ethnic groups are to be taken (and to
what extent) into consideration in an 'ethni-
cal solution', as promoted by the UN.
Nation building of
A f g h a n i s t a n
The question of why ethnic groups rose to
political relevance in Afghanistan comes to
mind. To answer this question one has to
look back into history. The Afghan state was
created by the rivalling colonial powers, Eng-
land and Russia, at the end of the 19t h c e n t u-
ry. The ruling family of the Pashtuns, en-
throned by England, favoured Pashtun ele-
ments in their concept of the nation-state.
That is why 'Afghan' is the Persian synonym
for Pashtun, Pashtu was always the Afghan
national language, and the Afghan history
was written from a Pashtun point of view.
The politics of the ruling family employed the
ethnic patterns that came into existence in
order to regulate access to public goods and
offices. Pashtuns were privileged in all areas
and dominated the military. Tajiks were left
with the economic sector and the education-
al institutions, whereas the Hazara were mar-
ginalized. The differential treatment of peo-
ple went along with the forming of ethnic
stereotypes: Pashtuns were considered 'belli-
cose', Tajiks were said to be 'thrifty', Uzbeks
were known as 'brutal' and the Hazara as 'illit-
erate' and 'poor'. Despite the politics of the
nation-state having created an ethnic hierar-
chy, there were surprisingly few ethnic con-
flicts. The main reason for this was the enor-
mous contrast between the rural and urban
areas. Politics in Kabul was of little interest to
the people in rural Afghanistan. Afghans saw
the nation-state as a hostile factor and not as
a key to accessing resources (such as offices
or land rights) which they should take control
of. Accordingly they did not articulate a polit-
ical will to overcome the ethnic hierarchy
stipulated by the state.
Ethnicity in the war
Ethnicity became a political-military force
to reckon with when the Afghan war broke
out in 1979. Even though the war was domi-
nated by the antagonism of communism vs.
Islam regarding the paradigms of the Cold
War, the belligerent parties increasingly en-
hanced the ethnic momentum to strength-
en their positions. The communist rulers
hoped to bring certain ethnic groups closer
by raising them to the status of nationalities.
Even more important was the creation of
militias that relied on ethnic affiliation; well
known is the Uzbek militia of Rashid Dos-
tum. Also Pakistan and Iran used the ethnic
potential for conflicts. On the grounds of
Shiite loyalties, Iran established the Hizb-i
wahdat, which was strong among the Shiite
Hazara. During the 1980s the Jamiat-i islami,
the oldest resistance movement, developed
into a representation for the Tajiks. Pakistan
supported the Taliban, which followed a rad-
ical Islam but was also Pashtun dominated.
But the ethnicization of the conflict was re-
stricted with regard to one important aspect:
the ethnic card was never played openly, but
remained covert. Thus one can find very little
proof of ethnocentrism among any of the po-
litical movements involved. The published
speeches of leaders such as Ahmad Shah
Massud, Burhanuddin Rabbani or Mullah
Omar, are imbued with Islamic rhetoric, but
all of them vehemently denied any ethnic di-
mension of the war. Politicians never tire of
declaring their respective parties as being
multi-ethnic. The underlying reason is that
Afghans refrain from picking ethnicity out as
a central theme. There is a wide-ranging con-
sensus among Afghans that to bring forward
arguments along ethnic lines will threaten
the continued existence of the Afghan na-
tion-state. Whoever claims rights in the name
of an ethnic group is quickly considered a
traitor. In addition to this, many Afghans con-
sider the accentuation of ethnicity as un-Is-
lamic, as it questions the u m m a, the all-inclu-
sive Islamic community.
Prospects for the future
If an attempt is being made to implement
the UN-sponsored 'ethnical solution', the
explosiveness of this proposal will become
evident, for it can only be achieved through
a quota approach. Recently, Pakistani Presi-
dent Musharaf called for the Pashtuns to
hold 60% of the offices in a future Afghan
government. But setting quotas for govern-
ment posts harbours the danger of perma-
nently fixing the importance of ethnicity,
thus setting the stage for a juggling of num-
bers at the filling of every official position.
The lessons from Sri Lanka and Malaysia
should have taught that setting ethnic quo-
tas is not a suitable formula for settling an
'ethnic' conflict, partly because it prepares
the ground for the kind of patronage that is
diametrically opposed to the concepts of a
civil society propagated by the West.
There has been much discussion of estab-
lishing an ethnic federalism as a way of doing
justice to ethnic demands. But that ap-
proach, too, would prove counterproductive,
since Afghanistan is not ethnically homoge-
nous and the various population groups are
very difficult to delineate geographically.
Often enough there are villages in which a
whole range of ethnic groups reside. The im-
plementation of federalism would also har-
bour the danger of 'ethnic cleansing', since
ideas of homogenization could easily be pro-
jected onto the territory as highlighted by
the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Against
this background the suggestion to separate
Afghanistan into a northern Tajik zone and a
southern Pashtun one, does not only seem
naïve but highly dangerous.3
Also the raising of ethnic representation
will have dire consequences. In that case
ethnicity could not be neglected in the polit-
ical context and would turn into the bedrock
of all political action. The still minor impor-
tance that ethnicity has among the Afghan
populace should be harnessed for political
reconstruction, rather than being enforced
by an 'ethnical solution'. Any new regime
must underline that government appoint-
ments and political decisions will be guided
by professional competence and not by eth-
nic considerations. A new Afghan constitu-
tion should likewise keep clear of ethnic fac-
tors as much as possible. It would be devas-
tating to establish Sunni Islam as the state
religion, for that would shut the Shiites out.
As to language policy, Farsi – Afghanistan's
lingua franca – and Pashtu should be given
coequal status, while such languages as
Uzbeki, Turkmeni or Baluchi could be grant-
ed the status of province languages.
In Afghanistan, the international commu-
nity is once again faced with the challenge
of dealing with a conflict that is interpreted
as an ethnic one. The architects of a future
Afghanistan would be well advised to work
against the ethnic polarization of the coun-
try. Ethnicity is not the cause of the conflict,
but the consequence of political and mili-
tary mobilization. Hence acceding to ethnic
demands will not contribute toward the res-
olution of conflict, but will only strengthen
those who – as has happened before in the
Balkans – use ethnicity as an instrument for
promoting their own interests. 
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I r an a nd  Be yo nd
M O H A MA D  TA V A K O L I - T A R G H I
Love mysticism, long viewed as the finest expression
of religious experience in Islam, has been displaced
in the past two decades with 'frontline/hate mysti-
cism'. This militarized spirituality was nurtured in the
1980s by Iranian theologues, who during the war
with Iraq promised prospective teenage martyrs 'as-
cendance' to heaven. Soon adopted by Islamist ac-
tivists in other parts of the world, this vengeful
modality of piety was an extension of a politicized
spirituality that emerged in the aftermath of World
War I by redefining the East as spiritual.
Frontline Mysticism
and Eastern Spirituality
The first part of the following retrospective
essay examines the particularity of hate
mysticism; the second identifies the founda-
tional assumptions concerning the Orient
and the Occident that allowed for the politi-
cization of spirituality in the 20t h c e n t u r y .
Hate mysticism
The tragic events of September 11 were
products of a militarized religious subjectivi-
ty, a subjectivity that was labelled as 'front-
line Gnosticism' (ci r f a n - i j a b h a h y i ) by the
Iranian-Islamist art ideologue Murtiza Avini.1
Avini articulated this concept in a commen-
tary on Ayatullah Khumayni's September
1988 letter to Islamic revolutionary artists.
In his letter Khumayni radically redefined
'artists' as those 'wise' individuals who shed
their 'pure blood' on 'the front-line of love
and martyrdom'. Turning to the convention-
al notion of art, Khumayni asserted that
'[b]eautiful and pure art is one that clashes
with modern capitalism and with the blood-
sucking communism and destroys the Islam
of comfort and luxury, the eclectic Islam, the
Islam of compromise and ignobility, the
Islam of the pain-free comfort-seekers, and
in one word the American Islam [Islam-i Am-
r i k a y i].' Khumayni advised artists 'to engage
only in an art that teaches the path of clash-
ing with the globe-mongers of the East and
the West who are headed by the [United
States of] America and the Soviet [Union].'2
By denouncing non-combative piety and re-
ligiosity as 'American Islam' in the course of
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, Khumayni
and other Iranian theologues established a
distinctive paradigm of militarized spirituali-
t y. While claiming to represent 'the pure
Muhammadan Islam' (Islam-i nab-i Muham-
m a d i ), this modality of piety negated the
most cherished aspect of Islamic religious
experience that has been historically exem-
plified by love mysticism.
With the intensification of the Iran-Iraq
war in the 1980s, Iranian war theologues
promoted the themes of resistance, self-sac-
rifice and martyrdom. During that period,
'martyrdom-seeking' was promoted as a
fundamental distinction of the Islamic Revo-
l u t i o n .3 By sacrificing oneself for the Islamic
nation and the revolution, which were
under assault by Iraq, the martyrs were
guaranteed ascendance (cu r u j), a vertical
movement toward heaven and God. Replac-
ing the linear and temporal concept of
'progress' as the organizing element of po-
litical discourse, the concept of 'ascen-
dance' promoted a directional shift from a
horizontal movement towards a desirable
future to a vertical movement to a heavenly
afterlife. Whereas Iranian revolutionary dis-
course promoted a collective march to-
wards 'freedom' and the Islamic Republic,
the war discourse publicized the individual-
ized heavenward ascendance of the
'avenger of God' and the 'revolutionary
g u a r d s ' .
While this vertical ascendance had affinity
with the medieval Gnostic concepts of per-
fection ( k a m a l ) and union ( v a s l ), it rested
upon a radically different form of subjectivi-
ty. In its medieval articulation, ascendance
was viewed as attainable only through soli-
tude, asceticism, and the rejection of the
material world. But the ascendance that was
promised to the martyrs during the Iran-Iraq
war was indeed a displacement of the patri-
otic willingness to die and to kill for one's
own homeland. This theological 'insurance'
for well being in the afterlife of the martyrs
was also deployed by the Afghani Mu-
jahidin, the Pakistani Sipah-i Sahaba, the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizb
Allah, and the Palestinian Hamas sodalities.
Thus 'martyrdom' and 'ascendance' became
significant components of nationalized reli-
gious rhetoric. This new military rhetoric
was sanctified by resorting to the Qur'an
and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad.
But the architects of this rhetoric conve-
niently forget to explain that the Prophet
Muhammad and early Muslim warriors
never referred to their military endeavours
as jihad and did not hail a comrade who
died on the warfront as a martyr. By de-his-
toricizing and naturalizing jihad and martyr-
dom, in the past two decades these varie-
gated concepts have been utilized for the
purpose of endowing religious sanctity on
combative subjectivity. It was such a com-
bative subjectivity that was hailed as 'front-
line mysticism' by the Iranian ideologue
Murtiza Avini.
Unlike historical Islamic love mysticism,
which has been predominantly apolitical
and introspective, frontline mysticism is
consciously political and vengeful. Instead
of meditation and solitary contemplation
for the purpose of annihilating the ego-cen-
tred self (an endeavour which was called
'the greater jihad'), frontline religious ac-
tivists publicly propagate their will through
physical self-annihilation. Unlike the love-
mystics who encouraged ascetic endeav-
ours for the goal of unity with the Other,
contemporary religious activists are im-
pelled to violently eliminate the Other
through physical self-annihilation.
In contradistinction to the solitary and pri-
vatized subjectivity of medieval mystics
who sought to obliterate the Satan within
themselves, the religiously inspired activists
of our time are informed by a globalized vi-
sion of oppression, injustice, inequality and
tyranny, all construed as the material mani-
festations of the Great Satan. Often identi-
fied with the United States and its foreign
policies, this externalized, politicized, and
territorialized Satan is considered as arro-
gant as the biblical Satan who refused to
obey the divine command of bowing down
to Adam. The physical identification of
Satan with the United States has radically al-
tered the notion of mystical journey. Where-
as the mystical journey of the earlier times
involved ascetic passages of self-discovery,
in the militarized piety of our time 'the jour-
ney' is defined as a suicidal mission for the
obliteration of the Other through physical
s e l f - a n n i h i l a t i o n .
The approaching self-annihilation was an-
ticipated in a note found in the handbag of
Muhammad cA t t a, a commander of the Sep-
tember 11 attack on the World Trade Cen-
ter: 'The time of judgement has arrived.
Hence we need to utilize those few hours to
ask God for forgiveness. You have to be con-
vinced that those few hours that are left you
in your life are very few. From there you will
begin to live the happy life, the infinite par-
adise.' Prepared for the tragic events of Sep-
tember 11, the suicidal journeymen were
admonished to '[k]eep a very open mind,
keep a very open heart of what you are to
face.' Mentally prepared for the journey, the
note promised: 'You will be entering par-
adise. You will be entering the happiest life,
everlasting life.'
Contrary to conventional Islam, here the
day of judgement is equated with the suc-
cessful execution of the hateful mission.
Consequently, a revengeful destruction of
the Other is conceived as the ultimate
judgement of God. 'The day of judgement'
and 'eternal afterlife', which are convention-
ally postponed to the end of time, are
viewed as contemporaneous with physical
self-annihilation and the destruction of the
Satanized Other. This vengeful piety is a rad-
ical negation of a conventional view of spir-
ituality as composed of compassionate and
merciful acts, the kind of intentional acts
that are identified with God in the Qur'anic
formula of initiation, 'in the name of God the
Compassionate and Merciful'.
The spiritual East
The rhetorical significance of Islam in
modern national-political discourses in the
Middle East and South Asia is foundationally
grounded in an Orientalist epistemological
distinction between the East and the West.
The architects of 19t h- and early 20t h- c e n t u r y
modern political discourses in these two re-
gions accepted the Orientalist postulate of
the non-contemporaneity of Occidental and
Oriental societies. In this 'time-distancing'
postulate, Europe was viewed as modern
and dynamic and the Orient as pre-modern
and static. Both Orientalist and nationalist
discourses attributed the backwardness of
the Muslim Orient to Islam.4 But this as-
sumption was refigured in the aftermath of
WWI. The destructions of WWI prompted
the development of vernacular political
strategies that defined the national selves in
contradistinction to the European Other,
which was increasingly defined as material-
istic. Thus a new generation of European-
educated intellectuals sought to distance
themselves from the assumed materiality of
the West by turning to the contingently
fashioned 'spiritual East'. This counter-Euro-
pean self-recognition as 'spiritual' provided
the epistemological foundation for the in-
creased significance of religion in the na-
tionalist political discourses of South Asia
and the Middle East.
Informed by German New Romanticism
and Oswald Spengler's 'The Decline of the
West', for instance, the post-WWI Iranian in-
telligentsia developed a critical approach to
European civilization by articulating a ver-
nacular modernity, a modernity that was
grounded in the spiritual rejuvenation of
Iran and Islam. In 1924, for instance, Murtiza
Mushfiq Kazimi proposed that Iran needed a
'clerical modernity' (tajadud-i akhund).5 A
year later Habib Allah Pur-i Riza suggested
that what was needed was a 'sacred revolu-
t i o n ' (inqilab-i muqaddas) with 'thinkers like
Luther and Calvin'. Criticizing westerniza-
tion as 'borrowed civilization'6 in 1926, Tuti
Maraghah'i instead called for the develop-
ment of a distinctly Iranian civilization that
could harmonize the antagonistic relations
of the European-mannered intelligentsia
and the Muslim clerisy.7 Husayn Kazimzadah
likewise called for an 'intellectual and reli-
gious revolution', a revolution for 'the purg-
ing of superstitions and superfluities' from
S h ici s m. Kazimzadah argued that the mater-
ial progress of the West should be synthe-
sized with the spirituality of the East. He
thus prescribed a synthetic modernity that
sought the concordance of 'science with re-
ligion, materiality with spirituality, life with
action, and action with nobility'. Reconfigur-
ing the role of Islam in comprehension of
modernity, in this scenario '[a] modern per-
son must be religious and religious person
must be modern.'8 These ideas informed
Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946) who viewed
the notion of 'European superiority' as a de-
ceptive device for the promotion of colo-
nialism and capitalism.
In his E t h o s ( A y i n ), which was published in
1932, Kasravi offered a comprehensive cri-
tique of European civilization and the mimet-
ic project of 'Europism' ( u r u p a y i g a r a y i ), a fu-
turist project that viewed the present of the
West as the future of the Rest. Believing that
'Europe faced a dreadful future', Kasravi
called for the purging of the 'malady of Eu-
ropism' and for returning to the noble values
that were trampled upon by the Iranian en-
thusiasts of European ways. In this counter-
European project, religion was to play a piv-
otal role as the foundation for a compassion-
ate, rational and ethical life, which was
viewed as an alternative path of progress and
development that could detour the social
and economic problems of Europe.9 W i t h
varying degrees of sophistication, similar
ideas were articulated by the Indian Muham-
mad Iqbal (1875–1938) and Abu a l -cA l aM a w-
dudi (1903–1979) and the Egyptian Rashid
Riza (1865–1935) and Hasan al-Banna (1906–
1949). By turning to Islam, these and other
publicists sought to supply the content of
the discursively spirtualized Orient, a turn
that hindered the development of a civil and
Kazim Chalipa,
'Isar' (Self-
S a c r i f i c e )
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South As i a
Y O G I N DE R  S I K A N D
One of the leading Islamist groups active in Pakistan
and Kashmir today is the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba, or 'The
Army of the Pure'. Founded in 1993 and banned in
early 2002, the Lashkar comprises largely Pakistani
militants who had immersed themselves in the jihad
in Afghanistan. After the expulsion of the Soviets,
these m u j a h i ds turned their attention to fresh pas-
tures, Kashmir being one of them. The Lashkar's ide-
ology bears close resemblance to that of the A l - Q aci-
d a and preaches a large-scale jihad against the 'ene-
mies of Islam' in order to establish a unified Islamic
s t a t e .
Islamist Militancy
The Lashkar-i-T a y y e b a
sion in the number of Islamic seminaries in
the country, many of which are sponsored by
the Saudis and preach a conservative yet mil-
itant form of Islam, and the active sponsor-
ship of such madrasas by the Pakistani state,
under and after General Zia-ul Haq (d. 1988).
Most importantly, however, the Afghan jihad
against the Soviets saw a great expansion of
resources for groups such as the Ahl-i-Ha-
dith, with massive amounts of aid, in the
form of money and arms, pouring in from
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Many
Ahl-i-Hadith and other Sunni madrasas
emerged at this time as training grounds for
militants. From being a relatively minor
group in Pakistan's Islamic landscape, the
Ahl-i-Hadith grew, by the end of the 1980s,
into a major force, with scores of madrasas all
over the country, and several newspapers
and journals articulating its vision of an Is-
lamic revolution. With new 'enemies' to tar-
get – the Russians in Afghanistan and the In-
dians in Kashmir – the Ahl-i-Hadith, hitherto
marginalized and shunned by most Hanafi
Muslims, now began carefully expanding its
own support base in the country.
In 1986 the Ahl-i-Hadith set up the Markaz
Dacw a t wa'l Irshad, based in a sprawling 160-
acre campus at Muridke, a town some 30
kilometres from Lahore, to train m u j a h i d i n t o
fight the Soviets. Money for the establish-
ment of the centre is alleged to have been
received from among other sources, from
the Saudi dissident Usama bin Laden. As the
Markaz's activities rapidly grew, it was decid-
ed to divide its work into two separate but
related sections: the educational and the ji-
hadist. Thus, in 1993, the Markaz established
its separate military wing, the Lashkar. The
Lashkar later set up four training centres in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Markaz authori-
ties claim that the militants produced at
these centres have played a leading role in
armed struggles, first in Afghanistan, and
then in countries as far afield as Bosnia,
Chechenya, Kosovo, the southern Philip-
pines, Kashmir and 'in other areas where
Muslims are fighting for freedom'.*
According to one report, in recent years
the spread of the Markaz/Lashkar in Pakistan
has been phenomenal, and today it has
some five hundred offices all over the coun-
try, most of them in Punjab, which operate
as recruitment centres for would-be m u-
j a h i d i n. At its Muridke headquarters, the
Markaz runs an Islamic school and university,
most of whose students are local Pakistanis,
with some Kashmiris from the Indian-ruled
part of the state, and several Afghans and
Arabs. Established in 1994, several hundred
students have already graduated from the
school. Scores of smaller schools run on the
same lines have been set up in various other
parts of Pakistan, and by mid-2001 their
number was said to be almost 130, with
some 15,000 students and 800 teachers on
their rolls.
Lashkar ideology
The Lashkar sees Islam as a perfect, all-em-
bracing system. For establishing an Islamic
system, an Islamic state, which will impose
the s h a r ica as the law of the land, is neces-
sary. If such a state were to be set up and all
Muslims were to live strictly according to
'the laws that Allah has laid down', then, it is
believed, 'they would be able to control the
whole world and exercise their supremacy'.
Since Islam is seen as the very antithesis of
nationalism, it demands the establishment
of one universal Islamic state, ruled by a sin-
gle k h a l i f a h. Thus, the present division of
the Muslims into many nation-states must
be overcome.
The struggle for the establishment of the
Islamic Caliphate can take various forms,
peaceful as well as violent. Islam, the
Lashkar admits, is 'a religion of peace and
harmony', and seeks to 'eliminate mischief
and disorder, and to provide peace, not only
to Muslims but all of humanity'. However,
Muslims are commanded to take to armed
struggle, or jihad, to defend their co-reli-
gionists suffering from the oppression of
others. Such a situation is said to prevail
over much of the world today. While jihad in
defence of Islam and of Muslims labouring
under oppression is presented as a libera-
tion struggle, it is also seen as a means for
Islam to 'prevail on this earth', for Islam is
seen as the only true religion. Armed jihad
must continue 'until Islam, as a way of life,
dominates the whole world and until Allah's
law is enforced everywhere in the world'.
The subject of armed jihad runs right
through the writings and pronouncements
of the Markaz/Lashkar and is, in fact, the
most prominent theme in its discourse. In-
deed, its understanding of Islam may be
seen as determined almost wholly by this
preoccupation, so much so that its reading
of Islam seems to be a product of its own
political project. 'Sufism', it insists, 'has been
designed with no other purpose than to
dampen the spirit of jihad'.
India is a special target for the Markaz's
m u j a h i d i n. The Markaz sees the jihad as
going far beyond the borders of Kashmir
and spreading through all of India. The final
goal is to extend Muslim control over what
is seen as having once been Muslim land,
and, hence, to be brought back under Mus-
lim domination. Thus, at a mammoth con-
gregation of Markaz supporters in Novem-
ber 1999, the a m i r Hafiz Muhammad S ace e d
declared: 'Today I announce the break-up of
India, I n s h a l l a h. We will not rest until the
whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan.'
The Lashkar's direct participation in the
Kashmir conflict dates back to the end of
the Afghan war in 1992 when the Lashkar
shifted its attention to Kashmir. In this, it
was assisted by the J a m aca t - i - I s l a m i of Pak-
istan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Despite the limited support of Ahl-i-Hadith-
style Islamic purism in Kashmir, the Lashkar
has today emerged as the single most pow-
erful militant group in the region, owing
principally to the arms and resources that it
commands. In contrast to the earlier Ahl-i-
Hadith activists in Kashmir, the Lashkar has
consciously refrained from engaging in
intra-Muslim disputes or from openly at-
tacking what it sees as 'un-Islamic' beliefs
and practices among the Kashmiri Muslims.
In this way it has sought to broaden its ap-
peal beyond the narrow and restricted circle
of Ahl-i-Hadith followers in the region. The
support for the Lashkar in Kashmir must,
then, be seen as essentially a result of its
stern opposition to Indian 'colonialism',
rather than as representing any consider-
able acceptance of its theological vision.
The current crisis
The American reprisals against the Tal-
iban, following the 11 September attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
have been fiercely opposed by Islamist
groups, including the Lashkar. In the wake
of the attacks, the Lashkar is said to have
despatched several of its armed volunteers
to Afghanistan, to supplement the 600
Lashkar special guards who had earlier been
specially appointed as personal security for
Usama bin Laden. The Lashkar condemned
the American assault on Afghanistan as the
launching of a new 'crusade' (salibi jang) b y
the 'Christian' West against the Muslim
world. The head of the Markaz sternly
warned Pakistani President General Pervez
Musharraf not to cooperate with America,
and issued a thinly veiled threat, calling for
defiance of the government if it continued
to toe the American line. The head Mufti of
the Markaz issued a fatwa claiming it a bind-
ing duty on all Muslims to help their Afghan
co-religionists. If Pakistan's rulers continued
to support America this would be treated as
a gross violation of Islam, and they would be
considered as 'rebels and traitors of Allah
and His prophet'. Usama bin Laden, it assert-
ed, had now become 'the symbol of jihad all
over the world'. In the on-going 'war be-
tween Islam and k u f r [disbelief]', led by
Usama, it laid down, 'it has become obliga-
tory for all the Muslim states in the interest
of the dignity of Islam and the Muslims to
[…] forge unity in their own ranks and send
their armies to support j i h a d and the m u-
j a h i d i n. '
The implications of the American inter-
vention in Afghanistan and the downfall of
the Taliban for the Lashkar are not clear as
yet. Pakistan's President General Musharraf,
under pressure from the US, has been trying
to reign in certain Islamist groups, but it ap-
pears that this is proving to be largely un-
successful. Widespread opposition in Pak-
istan and Kashmir against the American at-
tacks on Afghanistan are an indication that
many resent Musharraf's pro-American
stance, but whether this would translate
into greater support for Lashkar-style Is-
lamist radicalism is a moot question. 
The Lashkar is affiliated to the Ahl-i-Hadith
school of thought, a reformist Islamic move-
ment, which had its origins in early 19t h- c e n-
tury India. The founders of the Ahl-i-Hadith
believed that they were charged with the di-
vine responsibility of purging popular Mus-
lim practice of what they saw as un-Islamic
accretions and borrowings from their Hindu
neighbours. They insisted that Muslims re-
turn to the original sources of their faith and
abandon all beliefs and practices not sanc-
tioned therein. They called for Muslims to
abide strictly by the s h a r ica and to abandon
'imitation' ( t a q l i d ) of the schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. Besides, the Ahl-i-Hadith also
bitterly critiqued Sufism, which they saw as
a b i dca, for, they argued, it had no sanction
in the practice of the Prophet. Given the im-
mense popularity of the Sufi traditions and
the influence of the Hanafi cu l a m a a m o n g
the Muslims of South Asia, it was hardly sur-
prising that the Ahl-i-Hadith faced stiff op-
position, being banned from worship at
mosques and condemned as apostates and
'enemies of Islam'. For their part, the Ahl-i-
Hadith appeared to have revelled in contro-
versy, not losing any opportunity of attack-
ing their Muslim opponents for what they
branded as their 'un-Islamic' ways.
Expanding its base
Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947,
the Ahl-i-Hadith began making gradual
progress in the country, establishing
mosques and madrasas of its own. It tended
to have a more visible presence in urban
areas, its strict scripturalist literalism appeal-
ing to groups such as urban traders who
were not tied down to local Sufi shrines.
From the 1980s onwards the Ahl-i-Hadith
was able to make considerable inroads in
Pakistani society following the rapid expan-
N o t e
* The quotations are taken the following sites:
www.lashkertaiba.net; jammu-kashmir.com;
www.dawacenter.com, and markazdawa.org
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Inter-Faith Relations in Contemporary India'.
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So uthea st As i a
Y A T U N  S AS T R AM I D J A J A
In Indonesia the coming out of Islamic radicalism has
once more disquieted public life. Since the US assault
on Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist
acts, Islamic youth organizations have been staging
anti-America protests throughout Indonesia's main
cities, showing the world a face of Indonesian Islam
different from the moderate one with which it is usu-
ally identified. The protests also show a different
face of young Indonesian activists. This time they do
not appear as the spirited bunch of the student
movement that ousted Suharto in 1998, but as fiery
campaigners for a jihad.
Indonesian Youth
and Islamic Revival
The young activists are far less numbered
nowadays but the impact of their actions is
no less considerable, especially in the con-
text of enduring crisis, with recovery de-
pending on stability. The question is how
this affects Indonesia's uplifted image as an
open, tolerant civil society, or the image of
the youth, fostered by their role in upsetting
an aged regime, as progressive harbingers
of change and modernity.
Many Indonesians consider the rise of Is-
lamic radicalism harmful to the process of
reforms if not a sheer setback to modernity.
But in fact it fits the era of reforms and in-
deed modernity quite well, if only to sub-
stantiate its predicament of plurality and
conflict. With Suharto's policy of strict con-
trol and engineering of the uniform nation-
state gone, marginalized voices have resur-
faced and are more expressive than ever. In
theory, this would give way to the formation
of a plural base for a diverse civil society. But
among the manifold voices that have been
raised in the past three years, those of Mus-
lim interest groups, both 'modernist' and
'traditionalist' (with new alliances being
forged the distinction is not always clear)
have been among the most vocal. As a re-
sult the era of reforms has seen a new Islam-
ic revival. Muslim parties have gained a larg-
er share in power, as confirmed with the re-
cent election of Hamzah Haz, leader of the
conservative Muslim party PPP for vice pres-
ident. Moreover, Islamic disposition has be-
come more prominent in public space.
There has been a marked rise in public dis-
plays of Islamic practice, idiom and activism,
while the mass media further added to the
publicity of Islamic discourse with a sub-
stantial increase in Islamic teachings ap-
pearing in print and on television. Even in
the world of show business an Islamic way
of life is exalted. Many celebrities have
turned devout, appear in Islamic dress as a
latest fashion item, or have their marriage
ceremonies arranged in Mecca; all of it in
great style and well documented by tabloid
m e d i a .
Yet the broad revival of Islam means
more than just a trend. Particularly in this
period of national transition with its endur-
ing crises of economic slump, political in-
stability and social breakdown, an Islamic
way of life is often taken up as an act of
consciousness; a deliberate choice mostly
made by urban, educated young people.
Considering that the urban youth are re-
putedly demoralized, inasmuch as many
appear to have lost faith in traditional and
societal institutions, a reinvigoration of an
Islamic disposition among them is remark-
able indeed. These days many students
prefer to join Islamic rather than universi-
ty-based, nationalist or leftist student or-
ganizations and a growing number of cos-
mopolitan young women choose to wear a
j i l b a b, Islamic head covering, in the public
sphere. Besides this being a matter of fol-
lowing one's peers, to be sure, it appears a
self-confident expression of a reconstruct-
ed identity, as an individual and member of
a peer group community that wishes to go
beyond traditional orders and contempo-
rary society as it developed under New
Order rule. In this regard their choice is dis-
tinctly progressive, synthesizing religion
with the tenor of liberality, social aware-
ness and enlightenment, characteristic of
the spell of reforms.
However, young people's attempts to re-
fashion and present a modern, tolerant
Muslim identity are complicated by ambigu-
ity and different opinions on what moderni-
ty and tolerance mean and where to put the
limits on these. Confusion particularly arises
in relation to issues of morality. Adding to
the confusion, altered attitudes towards re-
ligion and morality are also at stake in the
actions of some of their radical peers which,
according to several young people spoken
to, 'are giving Islam a bad name'. Anyhow,
existing tensions are certainly amplified in
these radicals' actions.
Moral wars
A striking illustration of such tension (ob-
served by the author Ayu Utami in D j a k a r t a,
September 2001) is the staining of a bill-
board advertisement along Jakarta's main
roads starring the popular actress and pre-
senter Sophia Latjuba. Her sensually pic-
tured figure had been covered with black
paint, leaving bare only the area around her
eyes in a meticulous attempt to make it look
as if Sophia, Indonesia's leading sex symbol
and personification of a cosmopolitan life-
style, was shrouded under an Islamic veil.
This meaningful act did not carry a signature
but it was clearly not an act of random van-
dalism. It rather seemed to fit into a series of
'small wars' that the radical youth have been
waging in the name of religion and morality.
Several radical Islamic youth organizations,
for instance Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI, Is-
lamic Youth Movement) and Front Pembela
Islam (FPI, Islamic Defence Front), both based
in Jakarta, have lately stepped up public ac-
tivity. This involved sporadic and seemingly
ad hoc actions that nonetheless show re-
markable coherence. While borrowing from
the repertoire of student activism as estab-
lished since the protests of 1998 and the
global repertoire of political Islam as imitated
from mass-mediated images of Palestinian
activism, their actions are notably marked by
a specific discourse of morality; or rather, im-
morality, often expressed through an idiom
of evil and sin. Radical groups have used such
idioms when engaging in political protest, as
when they joined the demonstrations at the
beginning of this year against then President
Wahid (whom they accused of corruption as
well as treason of Islam and covert commu-
nism). But a discourse of immorality has been
most of all pronounced in their actions
against social vices. These included violent
attacks on discotheques, bars, homosexual
venues and other sites of assumed perversi-
ty, and also public orations pointing the gen-
eral public to its sinful habits, such as the
consumption of pornography.
In addition, there has been a boost in the
campaign against an alleged revival of com-
munism, the historical enemy of Islamic
movements. Besides the spread of anti-
communism propaganda, for instance using
banners in public space that warn the peo-
ple to watch out for lurking communism (a
method reminiscent of New Order tactics),
this has also entailed occasional fights with
left-wing student organizations. Most
shocking to critics, however, has been the
act of book burning and threatening to
'sweep' from the market (semi-)leftist publi-
cations branded communist, recently con-
ducted by a broad alliance of several Islamic
youth organizations. As these publications
had only just been relieved from their ban
under Suharto's rule, this act was widely
condemned for undermining the new free-
dom and openness of reforms. But criticism
has hardly been discouraging. Now, linking
with the global mood of war, GPI, FPI and
their allies have found the ultimate infidel
foe in America, while Bin Laden has become
a cult hero whose holy war is seen by many
among them as worth dying for. Dozens
have already volunteered to join the Taliban
fighters in Afghanistan and are currently un-
dergoing military training at secret posts in
I n d o n e s i a .
But what kind of war and whose war are
they actually waging? Regarding them as al-
lies of Bin Laden does not make much sense.
Some Islamic youth organizations do have
ties with global Muslim affiliations with bases
in the Middle East, but this does not account
for most of their actions which are related to
distinctively local or national concerns. Then
assuming them to be pawns of certain off-
stage powers – relics of the New Order estab-
lishment that wish to upset the sitting gov-
ernment of President Megawati, which has
also been much hinted at – may also be mis-
leading. For the radical Islamic youth are not
the unitary bloc easily mobilized by third par-
ties. Most seriously, such explanations draw
attention away from the moral calls implicit
in their actions. Is their cause then, at least of
the rank and file of youths that feel urged to
join radical movements, essentially a moral
cause, impelled by the frustration of witness-
ing the rampant corruption among the pow-
ers that govern them and depravity in the so-
ciety they live in? Of course it is not that sim-
ple. But at least this suggests that their move-
ment does not stand completely apart from
the plights of present-day Indonesian society
and young people's experiences of them.
Challenges of modernity
The radical Islamic youth will find little
support among the mass of their Muslim
age-mates, although direct opposition has
been notably absent; maybe for fear for vio-
lent retaliation, or maybe because young
people struggling with their own Muslim
identity are unsure of how to deal with the
bearing of their radical peers. In any case, to
understand what an Islamic revival among
the youth in present-day Indonesia means,
we should avoid interpretations that dis-
connect 'radicals' from 'moderates', or for
that matter 'political' from 'popular' expres-
sions of religion. It makes more sense to ex-
amine how young people are variously re-
sponding to the conditions in which radical
movements arise – urban environments
where the maelstrom of change is most
pressingly felt by younger people – and to
relate this to their experiences of religion in
daily life. Then we may get a better picture
of the tensions and dilemmas that face GPI
activists, students drawn to Islamic mysti-
cism, or young feminists wearing a j i l b a b, in
attempting to reconcile old and new de-
mands and desires of life in an increasingly
plural world.
In Indonesia as elsewhere, the crumbling
of establishments together with changing
conditions of modernity confront young
people with new challenges, such as the
problem of balancing tolerance and criti-
cism in a world fraught with incongruity and
conflict. It should come as no surprise that
religion comes to play an important role in
taking up these challenges, or that the
meaning of religion itself will alter in the
process. 
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Responses to the events of 11 September have been
extraordinarily mixed, not to say confused. They have
been further complicated by responses to 7 October
and after, when the air raids against Afghanistan
started. In Britain, the situation is particularly affect-
ed by the high proportion of Muslims with strong
links to Pakistan, to Pathan and Pushtun origins, and
in some cases directly to Afghanistan.
British Responses
to 11 September
One of the first questions journalists have
been asking has been regarding the num-
ber of Muslims in Britain today. This is a
question no one will answer at the moment
because we are expecting the results of the
April 2001 Census – to be reported during
the next twelve months – which included
for the first time since 1851 a question on
religion. So we have to work with vague or-
ders of magnitude. But it is obvious and well
known that the public profile of British Islam
is dominated by Muslims of South Asian ori-
gin, a fact of which the public was reminded
very directly during the racial disturbances
in some northern cities in the early summer
of this year.*
In the immediate aftermath of 11 Septem-
ber there were a number of incidents of
'low-level' harassment of Muslim targets.
Some Muslim websites closed down after
they were flooded by hate mail. Mosques
and Muslim buildings were attacked by air
guns and stone throwing. Behind the osten-
sible Muslim targeting has often been tradi-
tional racism. Individuals and families have
been harassed in public. There have been
cases of women having their head scarves
ripped of and others being physically at-
tacked. Often such attacks have been direct-
ed against Asians regardless of whether
they really were Muslim or not – thus a num-
ber of Hindu and Sikh individuals and insti-
tutions have also been targets.
Covering Muslim responses
Muslim organizations were quick and ex-
plicit in their condemnation of the New York
and Washington attacks. The Muslim Coun-
cil of Britain issued a very sharp statement
already on 12 September, as did a number
of local organizations and leaders as well as
Muslim members of Parliament, Lords and
Commons. Further statements appeared
over the following weeks as events interna-
tionally and nationally developed. In many
mosques and Muslim schools prayers were
said for the victims, and in many towns Mus-
lims, Christian and Jewish leaders met to
pray together and to issue joint statements
of condemnation and appeals for calm. Pub-
lic meetings have been held bringing lead-
ing Muslims together with the Archbishop
of Canterbury, the Catholic Archbishop of
Westminster and the Chief Rabbi. The Inter-
faith Network for the UK, which brings to-
gether leaders of all the main faiths in the
country, also issued a measured public
s t a t e m e n t .
However, much attention was attracted
by a small group of mosques and organiza-
tions, mostly in London, which expressed
support for the attacks and for Usama bin
Laden and the Taliban regime. The leader of
Supporters of Sharia, Sheikh Abu Hamza al-
Masri, based at a mosque in Finchley, de-
clared the attackers to be martyrs and called
on young Muslims to join the 'jihad'. Al-
Muhajiroun, a splinter group from Hizb al-
Tahrir, led by Sheikh Umar Bakri Muham-
mad, held public demonstrations in several
cities in support of the attacks. During Octo-
ber, they alleged that four young British
Muslims had died fighting with the Taliban,
and that more had travelled to Afghanistan
in a programme organized by the Al-Muha-
jiroun. Relatives and friends of the young
men denied the allegations.
These incidents served to illustrate the
mixed reactions of the media to events
since 11 September. The Al-Muhajiroun
demonstrations were widely reported both
in print and on radio and television stations.
It was usually made clear that they repre-
sented only a small minority, but the picture
material that accompanied reports often
left a sense that the correction was of a
token nature. Coming at a time when the
concept of 'Islamophobia' had gained a
good degree of circulation following the re-
port of the Runnymede Trust two years ago,
a number of observers were quick to note a
widespread Islamophobia in the press. Run-
nymede Trust staff have confirmed their
view that this has been the case. There have,
however, been extensive and often notable
exceptions. Perhaps the most surprising has
been the public stand which the S u n n e w s-
paper has taken in its editorial pronounce-
ments against racism and harassment of
Muslims. Some commentators have sug-
gested that this has been the result of per-
sistent lobbying by the prime minister's
press spokesman. Others have suggested
that it reflects the newspaper's well-known
sense of where its readers' views are moving
(whence its shift from Conservative to
Labour in the 1997 elections). A G u a r d i a n
poll on the public's attitude to the war after
7 October also indicated that more than
two-thirds of those polled did not see Mus-
lims as a threat in Britain. Other newspapers
have commissioned external writers to pro-
duce pieces aimed at calming public senti-
m e n t s .
Politicians have also been busy. Prime
Minister Tony Blair has, on a number of oc-
casions, called for civil calm, condemned
those who have harassed Muslims, and in-
sisted that the diplomatic and military ac-
tion has very specific aims which are far
from amounting to a 'war against Islam'. He
held a widely reported meeting and press
conference with Muslim leaders at Downing
Street, at which he expressed his support
and sympathy for their situation and they
repeated their condemnation of the attacks
and of terrorism in general. Local members
of Parliament have met with local Muslim
leaders to express support for their rights.
When Lady Thatcher, former Conservative
prime minister, said that Muslim leaders had
not been strong enough in their condemna-
tion of terrorism, the newly elected leader of
the Conservative Party, Ian Duncan Smith,
was quick to say that she was not speaking
for the party.
From the beginning, the attacks of 11 Sep-
tember have been linked with a number of
long-standing issues in the Muslim and de-
veloping worlds. Only the Daily Telegraph
(whose Canadian owner also owns the
Jerusalem Post) has consistently refused to
consider the attacks in a broader context of
Western policies towards key issues in the
Muslim world, above all the US presence in
Saudi Arabia and the question of Palestine.
Particularly notable in drawing attention to
such links have been Robert Fisk, writing in
the I n d e p e n d e n t, and David Hirst in the
G u a r d i a n. But they have not been alone. A
number of newspapers have made the
point editorially, as did the prime minister
by clear implication in a speech to the
Labour Party conference.
British specificity
Clearly the various responses outlined
above will be recognizable in other Euro-
pean countries in varying degrees, depend-
ing on the particular configuration of politi-
cal, ethnic and cultural balances. The speci-
ficity of the British response is related in part
to the length of time that Muslim communi-
ties have been present – longer than in
most of the rest of Western Europe. Since
the early 1990s there has been a major de-
mographic shift by which much of the lead-
ership has been taken over by younger peo-
ple born in Britain, a change that was trig-
gered, at least in part, by the Rushdie affair
twelve years ago. The encounter of social
marginalization in some parts of the com-
munity and some of the radical Islamism
present among London-based exiles has, at
the opposite end of the scale, offered a
route by which a few young men have been
lured into violent resistance in parts of the
Muslim world. An example of this was the
instance in 1999 when a small group of
young men, mostly from Birmingham,
found themselves facing a Yemeni court on
charges of plotting terrorism in Aden. But a
significant element in the British context
has also been the marked shift towards po-
litical inclusion of ethnic and religious mi-
norities instituted by the Labour govern-
ment since it came to power in 1997. This
has increased the value of the organized
Muslim leadership's investment in working
within the local and national political sys-
t e m .
Another dimension of the British situa-
tion, which I suspect is shared with France,
is that the two countries had their 'affairs' –
Rushdie and headscarves – twelve years
ago. I have recently had occasion to observe
at close quarters the response in Denmark
to the 11 September events. My impression
is that there many more issues, tensions and
sensitivities are being concentrated into
this response than has been the case in
Britain. In a sense Denmark appears to be
experiencing 11 September and the Rush-
die affair all in one. The political and cultural
debate bears many similarities to the de-
bates we saw in Britain in 1989, above all the
issue of the degree of Muslim integration
into and identification with Denmark – and
the consequent questions about Muslim
'threats' and 'loyalties'. At the same time the
demographic chronography of Muslim im-
migration and settlement is such that the
Danish-born Muslim generation is begin-
ning to become politically active a decade
later than in Britain. The result is that Mus-
lim organizations have recently seen a
growing generation shift in their leadership,
and that young Danish Muslims are also be-
coming active in the political parties. With
the decision to hold a parliamentary elec-
tion on 20 November, the issues of immigra-
tion and refugee policy have been placed
firmly into a context of post–11 September
public debate about Islam, and Danish Mus-
lim election candidates are being exposed
to harder public scrutiny and interrogation
about views and backgrounds which previ-
ously would have attracted rather less at-
tention. So the Danish response has be-
come dependent on the strength of a de-
mocratic and liberal tradition which has al-
ready for some years been under threat
from the nationalist right expressed in the
Danish People's Party. By comparison the
British environment has had time to con-
struct the experience and the networks
which can provide the resilience necessary
to get through the current crisis. 
N o t e
* The following account is drawn from the abstract
of British press reporting on Islam in Britain, which
my Centre publishes in the British Muslims Monthly
S u r v e y ( w w w . b m m s . n e t ) .
Jorgen S. Nielsen is professor of Islamic studies and
director of the Centre for the Study of Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations (CSIC), Department of
Theology, University of Birmingham, UK.
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Mi ddl e Ea st
F R AN Ç O I S  B U RG A T
Days before the American campaign against Afghan-
istan began, an editorialist of the government jour-
nal Al Thawra chose, to give an indication of the gen-
eral mindset of people in Yemeni streets, to publish
the words of a corn vendor and some of his clients lo-
cated on the Sanaa Aden route in the heart of the old
country. 'How dare America claim that it is combat-
ing terrorism, while it itself terrorizes the entire
world?' asked the vendor. 'How dare they accuse us
of not being able to protect the "Cole" [destroyer]
whereas they themselves were not able to protect
their Pentagon?' 'Not a bad analysis', noted the edi-
torialist, 'maybe we should have him appointed to
Foreign Affairs in Sanaa.' 'You're not spot on yet',
said his travel companion with a note of irony, 'it is in
Washington, at the State Department, that he should
be appointed!'
The Sanaa Chronicle
The editorialist, ex-president of the Univer-
sity of Sanaa, Abdelaziz Maqaleh, is a man of
letters renowned throughout the entire
Arab world. He is not particularly 'Islamist'.
As an old Baathist, he would have even been
inclined to distance himself from that gen-
e r a t i o n .
But it is in an almost unanimous fashion
that the Yemenite vox (populi) manifests a
double reticence. The news that, for once,
the pilots were Arab and the victims Ameri-
can seemed to certain people to exorcise an
old evil spell. Few, however, spontaneously
identify with the presumed actors in the sui-
cide attacks against the World Trade Center
or the Pentagon. Nonetheless, and all politi-
cal affiliations taken together, no one ac-
cepts the categories of the American dis-
course of war 'against terror'. Depending on
whether one launches the bombs or re-
ceives them, depending on whether those
bombs come from armament factories of
the 'big ones' of the world or the backyards
of those who combat them, the juridical
qualification of terrorism is, as we know, the
object of long-standing controversies. 'Give
us your aeroplanes and we will give you our
cradles' was a phrase already pronounced
by Algerian independence fighters to the
French colonial forces. In Sanaa, as in the
rest of the Arab world, armed resistances to
the world order that originated at the end of
the 1980s from the breakdown of the USSR
are less automatically criminalized. The
rhetoric of he who apparently succeeded in
administering such a terrible blow to the ar-
rogant United States indeed arouses a cer-
tain degree of curiosity. On every street cor-
ner, one is offered recordings of his inter-
views, recent or not so recent. Listening at-
tentively to them can be very instructive for
several reasons. Behind the religious rhe-
toric of legitimation and that nasty habit of,
a little like George Bush it is true, dividing
the world into two irreconcilable camps, we
especially discover very profane and very
banal anti-imperialist claims. Usama bin
Laden is the son of a Saudi entrepreneur of
Yemen origin, who can boast of having re-
stored the three most sacred mosques of
Islam: those of Mecca, Medina, and Jeru-
salem. It is the occupation of the homeland
of the former two and the feudalization of a
great number of regimes of the Peninsula
and of the Arab world that feed the most ev-
ident of Bin Laden's frustrations. 'Even a
chicken, if an armed man takes some of his
territory, will fight the man! And that is just a
chicken! […] We do not demand anything
more than the right given to every living
creature, not to mention humans, not to
mention Muslims: the right to defend one-
s e l f . '1 The occupation of the Al-Aqsa
mosque, symbol of the age-old Palestinian
conflict, although chronologically first,
comes in second place, he willingly admits.
But Palestine has always been present in his
preoccupations, contrary to what those who
blocked this invasive filiation seemed to
think. The murderous embargo on Iraq is
the third great source of exasperation, with
the long procession of 'double standard
policies' of the West in this region of the
world. 'Why are massive arms of destruction
reserved for only one of the two camps?'
'Why was Iraq not condemned when it em-
ployed its chemical weapons against
Khomeyni's Iran?'
We can also come to understand by listen-
ing to Al-Jazeera the disquieting distance
that is forming between information on
Western and Arab-speaking shores. Al-
Jazeera is not, as certain people have tried
to make us believe, the 'propagandist' chan-
nel of the Islamist guerrilla. On the other
hand, Al-Jazeera does not forbid allowing its
listeners to know – if for nothing else, if they
so wish, to better condemn – its motivation
and objectives. And this is where the big dif-
ference lies. The more or less scholarly cal-
culations by which a former student of the
Department of Economy of the University of
King Abdelaziz of Jeddah exposes the ex-
tent of financial loss of oil countries since
the Saudi princes, along with the US admin-
istration, have the common cause of bring-
ing down the price of the barrel, do not
manage to reach television audiences of the
West, despite their fondness of 'informa-
tion'. It seems preferable to insist on the
simplifying and warlike dichotomies (believ-
ers vs. non-believers) of the protégé of the
(former allies of the USA) archaic Taliban. It
is not certain that 'information' will benefit,
in terms of quality, from all this. From the all
too often unanimist incantations of CNN il-
lustrating the strikes 'against terror' to the
contrasted debates of Al-Jazeera, in which
the voice of America is never excluded nor
even mistreated, it would seem that the old
torch of mediatic objectivity is changing
camps – an unpleasant defeat for Washing-
ton and its allies.
Return to the Arab political
n o r m ?
Political Yemen had, for a time, a precious
particularity: the Islamists, well implanted in
a society in which the religious norm re-
mained very rooted, were less repressed
and ostracized than they were integrated
into the system, in any case in the now
hegemonic North.2 Due to their participa-
tion in the revolutionary struggle against
the absolutism of the Zaydite i m a m a t ( d u r-
ing the 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1948
and the civil war from 1962 to 1970) the Is-
lamist current gained historically important
credit in the eyes of President Ali Abdallah
Saleh's regime. Until 1994, the latter regu-
larly instrumentalized some of its members,
in not always noble combats it is true, to
eliminate the 'communists' of the South.
This proximity of the political power with
the universal (Islamist) enemy at the mo-
ment (is the parliament of Sanaa not led by
an Islamist sheikh elected with the votes of
the party in power!) disturbs a number of
Yemen's Western partners. Visiting Sanaa,
journalists from the world over, with a
touching unanimity, have chosen without
exception to interpret this complex political
Yemen through the sole prism of those
'Afghans' that the regime is accused of hav-
ing tolerated for too long on its soil and
those Islamists 'that it does not combat vig-
orously enough'. The old habit of tribes of
settling their business, by abducting
tourists, with a central state that is rather 'in-
complete' facilitates even further all the
amalgams. Tribes and beards…!: Bin Laden
cannot be too far away.3
The present Yemeni formula does not,
however, have only bad sides. The relative
calm of the country with respect to the
American campaign on Kabul and – com-
paratively speaking – the relative liberalism
that prevails is notably due to the fact that
the real political forces are integrated into
the system. Despite all of its limitations, the
Yemeni regime is not merely content with
manipulating the puppets of pluralism that,
from Egypt to Algeria, passing through
Tunis, form the substratum of the current
Arab 'democracy'. In the wake of the 11 Sep-
tember events, President Ali Abdallah Saleh
managed to conclude a pact of moderation
with those who may have been tempted to
act against the United States and its allies.
An anti-American demonstration did take
place, but this was in Amrane, some 50 kilo-
metres north of Sanaa, far from the televi-
sion cameras. This fragile equilibrium 'that
burns the hand of the state leader' as he was
keen to say to several foreign visitors, risks
being re-questioned under international
pressure. The United States in fact demands
each day more 'guarantees' in the battle
against 'terrorism', the frontiers of which we
know increasingly little since it includes
henceforth formations of Palestinian or
Lebanese resistance. The chief of state
could thus at any given moment seize the
opportunity of the American injunctions to
give in to repressive complaisance. Yemen
will perhaps come even closer to the institu-
tional 'Arab' 'norm'. The more or less trun-
cated elections (the president-candidate of
the presidential elections of 1999 did not
tolerate any adversary other than another
member of his own party4) already form part
of the system. The only thing left is the re-
pression by the regime of half or even more
of the political landscape. The country will
perhaps then attain the felicity of Western
recognition and be qualified (according to
the formula that the French chief of state
employed in 1996 with respect to the
Tunisia of General Bin Ali) as an 'exemplary
experiment of modernization'. 
A daily scene:
boys bathing in
a b i r k e h.
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The N ether l and s
K A DI R  C A N A T A N
The discussion about the position of religious lead-
ers was already ongoing in the Netherlands before
11 September. After the attacks on the US, relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims came under fur-
ther pressure. The media, followed by the Dutch gov-
ernment and social organizations, began assiduous-
ly looking for t h e representatives and t h e s p o k e s p e o-
ple of the Muslims. The result was the rolling of
Rolodexes with outdated or randomly gathered con-
t a c t s .
It is remarkable that the Dutch government
is interested in Islamic organizations as part-
ners in dialogue primarily in times of crisis.
In these difficult times the structural prob-
lems of Dutch Islam resurface on the nation-
al political scene: the lack of a representa-
tive consultative body for both Muslims and
the government, the function and position
of imams, and the creation of a Dutch train-
ing programme for imams (which should
provide replacements for the so-called com-
muter or import imams). Meanwhile, the
Dutch government makes management
mistakes in times of crisis, placing increased
pressure on relations and endangering the
integration process of Muslims.
In the public debate on Islam the media
plays an important role. Good news, like the
unambiguous joint statement of national
organizations strongly condemning the at-
tacks, attracts little attention. The interest is
focused mainly on more dramatic incidents
and views, such as the celebration of the 11
September attacks by Moroccan youths in a
rural town and the circulation of a 'hate cal-
endar' among Muslim students. As it ap-
peared, both cases were outright fabrica-
tions, but the damage had been done.
Moreover, individual Muslims making strong
statements came to the fore and some
media suggested that the silent majority
and its organizations are not very different
from these voices. The result was a crisis of
confidence between the 'white' Dutch pop-
ulation and Muslims.
How to restore confidence? The most
common answer is that Islamic leaders have
to fulfil an intermediary role between the
Muslim community and the government.
They should also act as spokespeople in the
media and participate fully in public discus-
sions. This places high demands on their
knowledge and skills, and whether the cur-
rent leaders have these remains to be seen.
At the same time, one can honestly ask: Who
are the leaders of the Dutch Muslims? Are
they the big shots of the Muslim organiza-
tions or the imams? Either way, Dutch soci-
ety approaches Islam and its spiritual leaders
from a Christian perspective, and expects
the imams to assume the role of spokesper-
sons and fully participate in public debate.
The fierce reactions of Dutch politicians and
intellectuals to the statements on homosex-
uality by Imam El-Moumni (see ISIM Newslet-
t e r 8: 33) and later by a Muslim psychiatric
care-worker and part-time imam are not just
about the actual content of the statements,
but rather about the authority that is unjust-
ly attributed to these people. In the Nether-
lands imams function mainly within the
Muslim communities. Their tasks are closely
related to prayer services (leading prayers
five times a day, preaching during the week-
ly Friday meetings) and religious education
in mosques. In their countries of origin it
would be out of the ordinary for the media
to ask their opinion or for them to get mixed
up in any kind of social discussion. They are
religious leaders more in practical than in
theological terms.
El-Moumni made statements about ho-
mosexuality without considering the conse-
quences. He has no insight into the relations
within a society like that of the Netherlands.
He was not 'integrated' – on the contrary, he
was an 'imported' imam whose contacts in
the Netherlands were by and large limited
to a local Moroccan community. But what
did the Dutch politicians and intellectuals
who lashed out at him (to make it clear to
him 'how people relate to each other here in
the Netherlands') know about the position
and authority of imams within the Muslim
community? The hefty reactions went on for
months and led to a polarization in society.
It showed that the role and authority of the
imams are clearly overestimated. The entire
matter was a clear example of intercultural
miscommunication between both parties,
which also means that better integration of
the imams will solve only one half of the
p r o b l e m .
Is the imam in charge?
Dutch labour regulations consider imams,
like ministers and priests, as holders of a
clerical position. Their legal (labour) status is
not protected by law. The labour conditions
of the imams currently working in the
Netherlands are far from meeting current
standards; not only are imams' working con-
ditions poor, their status as migrants is
weak. When an imam has a conflict with his
employer (usually the board of the mosque),
he risks being sent back immediately to his
country of origin. It is clearly not the imam
but rather the board members of the
mosque association who are in charge.
Imams in the Netherlands are also con-
fronted with another problem in relation to
their tasks. An imam is expected to not only
fulfil his primary religious functions within
the mosque, but to also take on numerous
social functions, such as participating in
inter-religious meetings and offering moral
support. This second category of functions
is hardly fulfilled, if at all, by the current im-
ported imams. As a result, the imam loses
authority and prestige. He is seen as not
being capable of fulfilling his position prop-
erly. Not only is the white Dutch population
dissatisfied with the imams; their con-
stituents, in particular the young, are too.
In dealing with this problem, an imam
training programme in the Netherlands is
often presented as a solution. The most im-
portant motivation for such a programme is
that future imams would gain knowledge of
the Dutch language and society. But that is
not all. There are two other motives, which
equally imply a more all-encompassing vi-
sion of the future of Islam in the Nether-
lands and can at the very least count on
broad support. The first motive is that of the
emergence of a 'Dutch Islam', i.e. an inter-
pretation of Islamic religious doctrine and
ethics that fit this situation of a religious mi-
nority in a strongly secularized society. The
second reflects the idea that foreign-trained
imams would exert a negative influence on
the integration of Muslims in Dutch society
and that such an influence should be inhib-
ited by an imam training programme in the
country. It also means that, in the long term,
admission of imams from the Middle East
and North Africa would have to be limited, if
not stopped.
The motivations behind the call for Dutch-
trained imams imply that the role of the
imams must comprise more than that of re-
ligious counsellor; an intellectual or ca l i m i s
expected. It would be very difficult to meet
the profile of the imam sketched above
through an imam training programme with-
in regular Dutch educational settings. This
brings two questions to the fore. Firstly, is
an imam training programme necessary to
meet the needs of the mosque communi-
ties? To this end, a practice-oriented train-
ing programme at a higher vocational edu-
cation level would be sufficient. Secondly, is
it imperative to introduce theological Islam-
ic studies which will breed the future Mus-
lim elite? This question is more complicated
and can not been answered in isolation
from conditions in the Muslim world.
The Muslim community in the Nether-
lands lacks a strong intellectual elite. With
respect to the Turkish immigrants, this de-
rives from their social background as they
come mainly from the countryside and tend
to have low educational levels. Neither a
Muslim intellectual discourse nor an interac-
tion between popular and intellectual Islam
exists in the Netherlands. The relations of
the Muslim organizations with the country
of origin should be understood within this
perspective. The lack of a strong intellectual
leadership creates a relationship of depen-
dency between Turkish Islam in the Nether-
lands and Islam in Turkey. It is this relation-
ship of dependency that complicates an au-
tonomous development of Turkish Islam in
the Netherlands.
In addition, Muslims, coming from differ-
ent countries, do not form a homogeneous
unit that allows for common action. There
are ethnic and regional differences as well
as religious and cultural ones. These differ-
ences, combined with ethnic power strug-
gles and all sorts of miscommunications,
have made it impossible up to now for Mus-
lims to establish a representative body.
Modernization and alienation
Modernity has brought about a crisis in
Muslim intellectual leadership that is not
easily solved. In very broad lines, we can dis-
tinguish two types of intellectuals in con-
temporary Islamic society. The first is the
westernized intellectual, who is oriented to-
wards the West and has to a large degree
distanced himself from his religious and cul-
tural heritage. Most of these intellectuals
stand for the modernization of their soci-
eties along Western lines. This puts them, in
fact, in line with modern cultural imperial-
ism. The second type comprises the more
traditional cu l a m a, who tend to resist out-
right westernization and are reluctant to ac-
cept religious reforms. Although they have
different points of departure and orienta-
tion, both cu l a m a and westernized intellec-
tuals are faced with fundamental problems.
The latter are often unable to offer solutions
for modern questions from within the Islam-
ic tradition and lack popular support. cU l a-
m a are familiar with the intellectual tradi-
tions of Islam but only few seem capable of
translating it into the conditions of moder-
nity. Both westernized intellectuals and cu-
l a m a find great difficulty in providing lead-
ership in the Muslim world.
In discussions about imam training pro-
grammes in the Netherlands, the existence
of this crisis affecting the contemporary
Muslim world and its relevance to Muslim
diasporas are ignored. To solve the intellec-
tual crisis, an increasing number of people
place hopes on a new form of leadership
that is as yet in its infancy. This new form of
leadership is sometimes called the 'enlight-
ened cu l a m a', comprising persons with ex-
traordinary erudition in the Islamic disci-
plines in addition to knowledge of the mod-
ern sciences and languages. As long as Mus-
lims, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, do
not take stock of this alternative profile in
the development of their educational
model, the current intellectual crisis will
persist. 
Kadir Canatan is a cultural anthropologist and
a freelance researcher. His Ph.D. thesis (2001)
focused on the development of Turkish Islam in
t h eN e t h e r l a n d s .
E-mail: k.canatan@chello.nl
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supported by a fellowship within the University
o f California, Irvine Humanities Research Institute
research cluster, 'Islamic Modernities in an Era
o f Globalization' (winter, 2000).
3 . For confidentiality purposes, my research
participants' names have been changed.
4 . The term 'racialization' refers to the
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to belong to the category 'Muslim'.
5 . Sonia E. Alvarez, 'Translating the Global: Effects
o f Transnational Organizing on Latin American
Feminist Discourses and Practices', M e r i d i a n s :
A Journal of Feminisms, Race, Transnationalism 1 ,
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For an exploration of Arab Americans' ambiguous
position within – as well as between themselves
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Naber, 'Ambiguous Insiders: An Investigation of Arab
American Invisibility', Journal of Ethnic and Racial
Studies 23, no. 1 (2000): 37–61.
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Uni ted Sta tes
N A D I N E  N A B E R
As 'Bosnia' awakened the dead among Muslims world-
w i d e ,1 new expressions of Muslim identity have
emerged on college and university campuses in the
US that stress the liberation of Islam from geographic
determinism. Among Muslim student activists in Cali-
fornia, this trend is often articulated in phrases such
as 'there is no colour in Islam', or 'I consider myself
Muslim first, Arab second.' Based on research among
young Arab and Muslim Americans between 1996
and 2001,2 this essay traces a particular interplay be-
tween the 'local', the 'national', and the 'global' that
gives rise to Muslim student activism in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area of California.
Muslim Student
A c t i v i s m
Americanizing Islam or
Islamicizing America?
Central to Muslim student activism in Califor-
nia has been a critique of the contradictory
position of Muslim Americans within US na-
tionalist discourses and practices in which
they are marked simultaneously as US citizens
and the 'enemy within'.
Hani, a mentor among Muslim students ex-
plains that:
Even though these students are born here,
nurtured with apple pie, they are viewed as
immigrants. The main place students expe -
rience rejection is in the classroom – which
is full of misrepresentations of who they are.
That is where the Muslim student is trans-
formed into a terrorist. Their teachers who
say things like, 'Muslims are more inclined
to engage in terrorism because when they
die they go to paradise and terrorism does-
n't have pain for Muslims as it does in other
cultures'…or…'Muslim men aren't afraid
to die because when they die they believe
they will be given 75 virgins in heaven.'
That's in a classroom discussion and stu-
dents ask me how to answer to this.
Hannan, an undergraduate, articulates that
'[w]omen are forced to represent the entire
situation of Muslim women. The teacher has
an anti-Muslim position, so even if I do not
have the tools, it becomes the class vs. me
and I have to answer for Afghanistan, Saudi
Arabia, and places I don't know much about.'
As a strategy for resisting the racialization4
of Muslim men as terrorists and Muslim
women as passive and oppressed, some Mus-
lim students consciously assert a visible Mus-
lim identity on their college campus. Nesreen
recalls that she and her friends, all of them
wearing headscarves, regularly walk into the
classroom to ensure seats in the front row as a
strategy to 'force the class to deal with us'.
Hani explains: 'I see the students feeling com-
fortable wearing a head cover or Muslim
beards. They care less that they might appear
to be wearing a bizarre outfit.'
The viability of public displays of Muslim
identity is enabled by the demographic
make-up of California, the first state to be de-
scribed in terms of a growing white minority.
The historical context of the San Francisco
Bay Area in particular, considered the hotbed
of US 'multiculturalism' and 'diversity', further
empowers students to assert their 'difference'
as intensified identity politics encourage the
public display of identity symbols on the
body. Yet as over 700 hate crimes against
Arabs and Muslims or those who have been
mistaken for them have been reported in the
aftermath of September 11, students have
become more cautious when it comes to
Bosnia made people realize that you can be Muslim and white and still
be killed on the basis of your Islam. They're blonde, blue-eyed, they live
in Europe, and they were still mutilated, slaughtered and thrown into
mass graves because they're Muslim. That's when it's not just about
Arabs anymore…
Lubna, Palestinian American, San Francisco, California, May 20013
publicly displaying their identities. That some
have chosen to remove their headscarves and
shave their beards points to the contradic-
tions of liberal US multiculturalism in which
the assumption 'different but equal' is always
already inflected with power, inequality, and
racism.
Noha explains that the racialization of Islam
ranges from 'comments such as "Look, Mo-
hammed the terrorist is coming!" to a spit in
the face at the Emeryville Shopping Center, to
the statement "Go back home", which was
made to someone in the city hall of Berkeley.'
Intensifying the interplay between the local
and the national are political struggles that
emerge in the interaction between Muslim
student activists and neocolonialist capital-
ism on a global scale. In May 2000, when
Madeline Albright was invited as the keynote
speaker to the University of California at
Berkeley's commencement ceremony, Mus-
lim student activists joined hundreds of pro-
testers with diverse political loyalties in
charging Albright with genocide and naming
her 'War Criminal'. Central to their critique
was that Albright represents the State De-
partment's enforcement of US-led sanctions
on Iraq and that she stated that the price of
killing half of the population of Iraqi children
is worth it on the Larry King Live television
show.
Contributing to the diverse political ideolo-
gies publicly articulated at this campus event,
an airplane, funded by a Muslim community
organization, flew over the outdoor com-
mencement ceremony with a banner at-
tached to it that read, '1.7 Million Dead. End
the Sanctions Now!' The presence of this
plane reinforced students' faith in Muslim
community organization as a viable frame-
work for asserting their political critiques.
Other acts, such as their call and response,
'Takbir – Allahu Akbar', more specifically dis-
tinguished Muslim students' message from
other protest participants in that it indicated
the significance of the ideological force of
God in igniting their activism.
The Palestinian cause
Palestine has been another key issue on
Muslim student activists' agenda. At a student
protest against Israeli occupation at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, Basim, a Mus-
lim student activist, declared: 'We're here to
stand against oppression. This Israeli flag
stands for killing innocent children who are
throwing stones and fighting for their lives.
Muslims all over the world are fighting
against the oppressors, be it the Zionists, Rus-
sia, Uncle Sam, or who ever it may be.'
Student activists' loyalties to the Palestinian
cause culminated in October 2000, when they
joined millions of Muslims throughout the
world in support of the Aqsa Intifada. In
teach-ins and protests, and in advertise-
ments, articles and letters sent to editors of
campus newspapers, students declared that
the purpose of their actions was to expose: Is-
rael's use of aggression; Republican and De-
mocratic candidates' pro-Israeli bias; exces-
sive US military aid to Israel; and the main-
stream US media's pro-Israeli bias.
While many student activists of Arab de-
scent are tied to Palestine through diasporic
kinship networks, those from various racial/-
ethnic backgrounds have become closely
linked to Palestine through the global spread
of technology (i.e. satellite television and the
internet), which has strengthened students'
collective sense of an attachment to the
Palestinian cause, Palestinian people, and a
transnational Muslim community. Maha, a
Muslim student activist of Palestinian descent
explains that '[w]hat makes this Intifada dif-
ferent from the 1980s is that not just Arabs,
but Muslims throughout the world – like
Africans and Pakistanis – see the images of
murdered children on TV.'
The internet has linked diverse Muslim stu-
dent activists into further communication
with their 'Palestinian brothers and sisters' in
the form of daily news reports and updated
lists of martyrs including their age, name,
type of wound, and date and place of death.
That many students have access to the cultur-
al and material capital required to connect to
satellite TV and the internet has enabled
them to view the disjuncture between main-
stream US media representations of Palestine
and the images that appear on the internet
and satellite television stations and has, in
turn, inspired their political participation.
During the first few weeks of the Aqsa In-
tifada, Muslim student activists joined 5,000
Muslims for a jumaa prayer in solidarity with
Palestinians on the grass in front of San Fran-
cisco's city hall. This prayer became the
largest political mobilization of Muslims in
San Francisco's history. Satellite TV and com-
munity leaders agreed that the internet was
essential to the success of this mass mobiliza-
tion. They have enhanced Muslim student ac-
tivism, mobilizing ideas, opinions, and social
linkages within and between Iraq, Palestine
and San Francisco that are re-articulated in
the form of localized political projects and ex-
pressions.
As some Muslim student activists distin-
guish themselves in terms of those who are
'Americanizing Islam' as opposed to those
who are 'Islamicizing America' they further
expose the fact that Islamic 'movement log-
ics'5 – through which lost histories are retold
and silences are transformed into expression
– are constantly being contested and are con-
stantly under construction. Despite the ongo-
ing reproduction of these movement logics in
light of historically specific intersections be-
tween the 'local', the 'national', and the 'glob-
al', the post–September 11 political climate
has witnessed an increase in portrayals of the
category of 'Muslim' as fixed, unchanging and
abstracted from history. In the aftermath of
September 11, the multiplicity of Muslim
voices has been buried under the rubble of
New York and Afghanistan, and all the Mus-
lims of the world have been reduced to either
'the good Muslims vs. the bad Muslims', or
'those who are with us vs. those who are
against us'. During these difficult times, there
exists an ever-growing need for historically
situated research on Islam that traces its com-
plexities and its various localities. San Francis-
co, California, is one cultural location where
the increasing global appeal for an Islamic
framework to articulate popular political sen-
timents is empowered by local histories, cul-
tural formations, and power relations as it
takes on local form. 
Ahmad Kamel is Al-Jazeera's Europe correspondent.
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AH MA D  K A M E L
The events of September 11 and their aftermath
brought with them the 'discovery' of Al-Jazeera by
much of the world, due to its coverage of the war. The
Arab-speaking world of course had known of its exis-
tence for 5 years. Arab-speakers had already asked
the questions that are now being posed in the West:
What is Al-Jazeera's role? Who finances the station?
What are its working methods and its style of cover-
age, especially of political events? What is its influ-
ence on viewers? What will be its future?
A l - J a z e e r a
An Insider's View
Al-Jazeera is an independent channel, spe-
cialized in news, political debates and docu-
mentary programmes. Launched in 1996,
Al-Jazeera comprised a team of Arab-speak-
ing journalists from 20 countries, the major-
ity being composed of former groups com-
ing from the BBC Arabic TV and radio.
Al-Jazeera was launched with the aid of a
government loan of 150 million dollars
spread over a five-year period allocated by
the Qatar government. On 1 November
2001, the 5-year period came to an end and
Al-Jazeera now relies on a number of finan-
cial resources to pay back the government
loan and to continue to broadcast quality
p r o g r a m m e s .
Its financial resources come from com-
mercial advertising; income from cable TV in
different Arab countries, Europe, and North
America (Al-Jazeera is broadcasted via satel-
lites and internet free of charge around the
world); technical services offered to other
channels and production companies by the
Al-Jazeera offices found across the globe;
and from the sale of exclusive images and
documentary programmes produced by Al-
Jazeera, as well as the sale of programmes
for the public. Since the outset, its trade-
mark has been its high level of professional-
ism, objectivity, independence and the im-
portance given by the channel to the intel-
lectuals and politicians regardless of their
influences. A weekly survey on the Al-
Jazeera website offers the public the oppor-
tunity to express itself and to ask questions
directly to the intellectuals and politicians.
Viewers participate in the debates by
phone, fax, internet, or by personal pres-
ence on the programmes. The Al-Jazeera
correspondents give the parties concerned,
but also the public, the chance to comment
on events and explain the basic facts.
From a socio-political and media point of
view, the creation of Al-Jazeera was an im-
portant event in the history of the Arab
world. From a media point of view, the Arab
public now has an independent Arab source
of information. For the past 50 years, Arab
citizens have had the choice between media
controlled by oppressive regimes, which
means information that borders on pure
propaganda, or foreign media (English or
French) in Arabic. The former being ex-
tremely want of information, the latter
sources were the only choice for millions of
Arab-speaking viewers, who desire non-bi-
ased information.
Since the 1950s, the Arab section of the
BBC became the primary source of informa-
tion for the Arab-speaking population, be-
fore sharing this position in the 1970s with
the Arab section of Radio France Monte
Carlo. Al-Jazeera liberated Arab viewers
from this monopoly of occidental informa-
t i o n .
Social-political issues
Al-Jazeera has managed to abolish the
censorship and propaganda reporting that
was enforced on the political and social rep-
resentatives as well as the intellectuals of
the Arab world. It has obliged the Arab gov-
ernments to broaden their views on free-
dom of expression and in numerous cases
has become a source of influence speaking
out against oppression and violation of
human rights in the Arab world. Other Arab
media have had to make an effort to im-
prove their level of professionalism along
with their freedom of expression and in
some cases Al-Jazeera is seen as a model to
follow in the Arab media world. The over-
whelming popularity of the channel, the
tone of liberty, and the possibility given to
all of the intellectuals and politicians has
been a thorn in the side of many of the non-
democratic countries of the Arab world. It is
for these reasons that these countries have
attempted to shut down the channel
through any means available, by exerting
both financial and political pressure on
Qatar and Al-Jazeera (four countries have
ceased diplomatic relations with Qatar). Sur-
prisingly enough, neither Qatar nor Al-
Jazeera has changed the attitude it has
adopted, Al-Jazeera staying free and inde-
pendent giving each individual the right to
express him/herself. Qatar continues its pol-
itics of non-intervention in the workings of
Al-Jazeera, as well as the democratization of
the country – a process which will be
crowned by the legislative elections next
year. Women will have the right to present
themselves as candidates and will have the
right to vote.
Not only dealing with pressure from hos-
tile governments, Al-Jazeera was faced with
hostility from its own audience. It has taken
a number of years in order for the public to
accept the fact that there will be Israeli
politicians and journalists with anti-Arab
sentiments that will be allowed on the air to
express their views. In addition to the hostil-
ity of anti-democratic governments and the
misunderstandings of its own viewers, Al-
Jazeera has also experienced a great deal of
international pressure.
Ex-president Bill Clinton criticized Al-
Jazeera's coverage of the Palestinian Intifa-
da and especially the broadcasting of cer-
tain violent scenes of the use of excessive
force by the Israeli army with respect to
Palestinian civilians. In the aftermath of the
September 11 events, international pres-
sure has dramatically increased.
Al-Jazeera, Afghanistan, and
Bin Laden
Two years ago the Taliban government
authorized two television channels in
Afghanistan: CNN, being the most viewed
channel in the West; and Al-Jazeera, the
most viewed by the Arab Muslim popula-
tion. The two channels started working in
the beginning of the year 2000 with offices
in Kabul. A few months later, CNN decided
to close down its bureau due to a lack of in-
teresting reports in Afghanistan and the
cost of operating the bureau in Kabul. Al-
Jazeera also had doubts on the usefulness
of keeping a bureau in Kabul, but the sup-
porters for this bureau managed to con-
vince the head office and Al-Jazeera re-
mained as the only channel working in a Tal-
iban-controlled area. Al-Jazeera did not re-
main in Afghanistan due to privileged rela-
tions with the Taliban or Ben Laden for that
matter, but rather because of its being the
most watched and respected channel in the
Arab Muslim world. CNN missed a historical
opportunity to be at the right place at the
right time.
The Taliban and Ben Laden are not the only
ones who choose to communicate with the
Arab Muslim world via Al-Jazeera; Barak,
Perez, Blair, Solana, Robertson, Powell, Rams-
field, Rice, Mayer, Arafat, Khatami, Sadam
Hussein, Castro, Kadafi, Heider, Vedrine,
Georges Mitchell, and Kofi Annan have also
chosen Al-Jazeera.
Certain individuals say that the correspon-
dent in Kabul was pro-Taliban, but his pres-
ence in Kabul was necessary. His reports and
images were the only ones being transmit-
ted from Afghanistan. Al-Jazeera's camera
was the only one relaying images during the
bombing by the Americans. The Arab view-
ers and the viewers around the world are in-
telligent enough to realize that the journal-
ist in Kabul was not completely 'free'. This is
the same situation for any correspondent
working in a country where censorship is
applied. The viewers would have also seen
that after every report coming from Kabul
Al-Jazeera gave the American and Northern
Alliance points of view, thus creating equi-
librium. Some critics hold that Al-Jazeera
does not have a correspondent in northern
Afghanistan, however Al-Jazeera was in the
North via the correspondents from CNN
who were working for Al-Jazeera under a
special agreement signed with CNN. Al-
Jazeera gave ample opportunity to the
Northern Alliance to express its views via
telephone or during trips outside of
A f g h a n i s t a n .
Faithful to its policy – namely freedom of
expression for all – Al-Jazeera did not hesi-
tate to diffuse the videotapes sent to the
bureau in Kabul by Ben Laden, since he is
one of the major actors in this conflict. Al-
Jazeera did not want to get dragged into a
dispute with the Americans over good and
evil but wanted to keep its independence
and objectivity by just reporting the facts.
Al-Jazeera has treated this war as any other,
a political conflict. It gave ample airtime to
the Americans to express their views and
broadcasted all of the President's and min-
istry press conferences voiced over in Ara-
bic. Numerous Americans have been re-
ceived on daily news broadcasts as well as in
live debates. This same opportunity was
given to the anti-Taliban and anti–Ben
Laden Muslims and politicians of any belief.
Having experienced problems in finding
individuals who could explain and defend
the ideology behind A l - Q aci d a, it was logical
for Al-Jazeera to diffuse Ben Laden's video-
tapes. Two videotapes of Ben Laden were
received and two from his collaborators.
The first videotape of Ben Laden was dif-
fused a few hours after the bombing by the
Americans had begun. The following three
tapes were edited by Al-Jazeera to cut out
the repetitive information.
The US government, angered by the
showing of the first videotape, applied di-
rect pressure to the Qatar government. Cer-
tain American newspapers clearly asked for
the bombing of the bureau in Kabul. This in-
timidation was strongly condemned by the
international press and the organizations
defending the freedom of expression.
Many questions are being asked on the
bombing of the bureau in Kabul by the
Americans a few hours after the fall of Kabul
into the hands of the Northern Alliance. Al-
Jazeera confirms that the office is well
known by the Americans and it is difficult to
believe that a mere error was committed.
Al-Jazeera has come as a surprise for
many, for its journalists are advocating prin-
ciples that are considered foreign with re-
spect to their countries of origin, namely
freedom of speech, liberty and objectivity.
Not well endorsed by many Arab countries
as well as the American government, Al-
Jazeera receives ever-increasing support
from both the Arab public and the interna-
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Sa tte l ite  Cha nne l
N A O M I  S A K R
Never has any Arab-owned media venture attracted
so much Western attention as Al-Jazeera Satellite
Channel, broadcaster of 24-hour news and current
affairs from the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar. Al-Jazeera
was just five years old when it soared to internation-
al prominence in late 2001 through its presence in-
side Afghanistan and access to the videotape of
Usama bin Laden. Yet media coverage of Al-Jazeera
itself, as a newsworthy institution in its own right,
long predated the September atrocities and subse-
quent US air strikes on Afghanistan. Indeed, the very
uniqueness of Al-Jazeera's output in Arabic provides
an insight into the unusual power relations that have




Free, open and constructive dialogue among
people of diverse political persuasions is
rare on Arab television, because govern-
ments impose tight censorship. As most
commentators point out, this censorship is
self-evidently not imposed on Al-Jazeera.
Even those who have never watched the
station have grasped why its programme ti-
tles – like 'More than One Opinion', 'The Op-
posite Direction', or 'Without Bounds' – are
so significant in a region where television
channels are uniformly treated as organs of
the ruling elite. In most Arab countries it is
the information minister's job to ensure that
state television expresses one opinion, fol-
lows one direction and stays well within
bounds. As for privately owned Lebanese or
Palestinian channels, or most pan-Arab
satellite stations, these remain subject to
legal constraints and political imperatives
that prevent them from giving airtime to a
full range of political views.1 The stormy talk
shows, viewer comments and critiques of
government policy that have become hall-
marks of Al-Jazeera have gripped audiences
across the region because they are unprece-
dented on Arabic-language television.
While reaction to such programming has
been predictably hostile from those with a
vested interest in continued censorship, a
school of thought is finally growing in the
Arab world that draws a link between the
censorious and autocratic nature of local
rule and the rise of extreme and violent
forms of protest. This view, expressed for ex-
ample by Sheikh Nahyan Bin Mubarak, the
UAE minister of higher education, attributes
the extremism of suicide bombers to 'the
way Arab countries are ruled'.2 When the
minister said a 'giant step' was needed to
'change political life in the Arab world', he
seemed to be echoing calls from every quar-
ter for the opening up of political, cultural
and media channels through which griev-
ances can be openly articulated and reme-
dies hammered out, without the process
ending in a jail sentence or other sanctions
for those involved.
Bias or balance?
With conduits for authentic Arab public
opinion in very short supply, Al-Jazeera's
management and staff have had to find
their own way in a lonely part of the institu-
tional landscape. While other television
channels conform to the expectation that
owners will dictate content (on the grounds
that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'),
Al-Jazeera's unusual ownership and funding
formula leave viewers confused about
whether its content is 'balanced' or 'biased'.
Al-Jazeera is not under the thumb of an in-
formation ministry because Qatar no longer
has one. The station was launched with a
five-year loan and set out to become self-fi-
nancing through sales of advertising air-
time, royalties from exclusive film footage
and the leasing out of facilities and equip-
ment in its many bureaux around the world.
Officials angered by what they perceive to
be bias against them consequently have
few levers to pull to influence future cover-
age. There is little to be gained from remon-
strating with the Qatari government, which
disclaims editorial responsibility for Al-
Jazeera. Pressurizing advertisers to stay
away merely reduces one source of Al-
Jazeera income.
Arab ministers have demonstrated their
displeasure over the years by boycotting
the station, closing its offices or withdraw-
ing accreditation from its correspondents.
Measures like these reinforce existing pro-
establishment imbalances, since those in
power already have ample access to the
production side of media outlets under their
control. What they do not have is control
over the reception side, since they cannot
guarantee to command the attention of
viewers. Those who decline to appear on Al-
Jazeera forego an opportunity to put their
points to an audience recently estimated at
35 million. But the price of making points on
Al-Jazeera is a readiness to see them chal-
lenged. The station's managing director,
Mohammed Jassem al-Ali, believes it is Al-
Jazeera's appetite for controversy and
clashing perspectives that 'respects viewers'
intelligence' and makes for 'interesting tele-
v i s i o n ' .3 Unlike the many perennially loss-
making Arab television stations, Al-Jazeera
is obliged to make 'interesting' television
and diversify its income in order to survive.
It has done this in the past by making full
commercial use of facilities in Baghdad, es-
pecially during the US and UK air strikes on
Iraq in 1998, and by providing intensive cov-
erage of the Palestinian uprising that erupt-
ed in September 2000. Given the dominant
US television channels' euphemistic report-
ing on Israel, which glosses over Israeli an-
nexation of Arab East Jerusalem, expansion
of illegal settlements in occupied territory
and assassinations of Palestinian political
f i g u r e s ,4 Al-Jazeera's engagement with the
Palestinian experience of occupation could
be seen as effectively redressing a long-
standing imbalance in international cover-
age of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
'With us or against us'
For Western politicians and journalists
perplexed about the realities of life in the
Arab world, Al-Jazeera has offered a small
and inevitably misty window onto pent-up
anger and alienation. Some observers, how-
ever, especially in the US in the wake of Sep-
tember 11, decided that what Al-Jazeera
staff regard as professional and compelling
programming was not merely unhelpful but
inflammatory. George Bush's stark message
to players on the world stage, that '[y]ou are
either with us or against us', called for Al-
Jazeera's output to be judged on criteria
that had not previously been applied to
supposedly independent news organiza-
tions. In accordance with Mr Bush's polariz-
ing message, Al-Jazeera came under sus-
tained US pressure to show whose side it
was on. On visiting Washington shortly be-
fore the US launched air strikes on
Afghanistan, Qatar's ruler, Sheikh Hamad
Khalifa al-Thani, told reporters that his hosts
had 'advised' him to have the television
channel toned down. Apparently embar-
rassed by the revelation, senior White
House figures took the opportunity to be in-
terviewed on Al-Jazeera. But ill will endured.
Zev Chafets, writing in the New York Daily
N e w s, urged the US military to shut down Al-
Jazeera, saying it had the power to 'poison
the air more efficiently and lethally than an-
thrax ever could'.5 When a US bomb struck
the station's office in Kabul on November
13, Al-Jazeera staff were not alone in deduc-
ing that it had been deliberately hit. If US
policy-makers wanted justification for re-
garding Al-Jazeera as the enemy, Fouad
Ajami regaled them with it five days later, in
a lengthy article in the New York Times. De-
scribing the station as a 'dangerous force'
with a 'virulent anti-American bias', Ajami
warned America's leaders not to waste their
time pressing its backers for more moderate
coverage, and not to give what he termed
the 'satellite channel of Arab radicalism' a
helping hand.6
The problem for Al-Jazeera and its audi-
ence, be they admirers or critics, is that it re-
mains one of a kind. For as long as the
broadcasting of uncensored, free-to-air
news and current affairs in Arabic remain
the exception rather than the rule, it is cer-
tain to arouse strong feelings and surprise.
As an Egyptian veteran of both English-lan-
guage and Arabic-language television once
remarked, Arab audiences react differently
to controversial television programming de-
pending on the identity of the broadcaster
and the language of the broadcast. The nov-
elty of Arab reporters making programmes
according to criteria other than political ex-
pediency has yet to wear off. Social scien-
tists from the region note the same shock
factor in their field. Path-breaking social sci-
ence research in Arab states risks being con-
sidered sensationalist and disloyal if pub-
lished in Arabic, simply because the body of
uncensored, newly released findings that
are accessible to local populations is cur-
rently rather small.
Survey results
Meanwhile, the problems of Al-Jazeera's
singularity are magnified by misconcep-
tions about media effects. These include the
widespread but misplaced conviction that
viewers are highly susceptible to propagan-
da whether or not its content accords with
their lifetime's accumulation of experience,
knowledge and beliefs. Professor Shibley
Telhami of the University of Maryland has
debunked this notion, using statistical evi-
dence from surveys conducted in five Arab
states. Addressing the Middle East Insti-
tute's annual conference in Washington on
October 19, Telhami said the deep personal
preoccupation of so many ordinary Arabs
with the treatment of Palestinians had noth-
ing to do with Al-Jazeera. His surveys
showed that concern for Palestinians was
higher among those who had not watched
Al-Jazeera than those who had. What had
changed in the last two years, he said, was
not Al-Jazeera and the screening of pictures
showing 'too much blood'. Radicalization
did not result from television. What had
changed was the world and, with it, the pos-
sibilities for Middle East peace.7
For as long as misunderstanding about the
shaping of Arab public opinion persists, and
with no channel ready to challenge Al-
Jazeera on its own terms, the aftermath of
September 11 will continue to be a testing
time for uncensored television in the Arab
world. If, as suggested, Al-Jazeera establishes
a presence in Somalia ahead of US action in
that country, its distinctive logo and 'Exclu-
sive' label will once again be seen on West-
ern television screens and the royalty com-
ponent of its revenue base will be further se-
cured. On the other hand, judging from
events in Kabul in November, and notwith-
standing the US military's insistence that a
bona fide news operation would not be seen
as a military target, the physical security of
an Al-Jazeera operation in Mogadishu or
elsewhere may be less assured. 
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N EŞE I H T I Y A R
Today mass media, especially the audio-visual media,
exert an immense influence on nearly every society,
and Turkey is no exception. The television appear-
ances of the Turkish Islamic theologian and author
Y aşa r Nuri Ö z t ü r k is striking in this context of rising
mediatic hegemony. The development of televange-
lism in the USA, which has lead to nation-wide reli-
gious movements, is not without parallels in Turkey,
where the television has virtually become a religious
medium – for some, even a 'tele-mosque' of sorts.
Televangelism and
the Case of Y aşa r
Nuri Ö z t ü r k
With the appearance of private broadcast-
ing stations since the early 1990s Turkish
television has experienced a steady increase
in importance for Turkish society, not only
within the country but also for the Turks liv-
ing in the diasporas. This is due to the fact
that nearly every Turkish household, wher-
ever it may be, receives Turkish pro-
grammes via satellite. In some of these
households, the television is on almost all of
the time. The broadcasting stations are
mostly secular and loyal to the state (e.g.
Show TV, ATV, Star, BRT, Kanal D, to name
but a few) but one can also find broadcast-
ing stations with a more religious touch
(Kanal 7, TGRT). All offer millions of viewers
innumerable soap operas, and game and
music shows. Regarding political pro-
grammes, Islam is undoubtedly one of most
widely discussed topics. In roundtable dis-
cussions popular academics from the theo-
logical, sociological and legal fields debate,
sometimes in a very emotionally charged
manner, about Islam.
A leading and outstanding figure in this
context is Yaşa r Nuri Ö z t ü r k, born in Bayburt
in 1945 into a family of the Naqshibandi
order. He acquired his deep religious knowl-
edge from his father. Having obtained de-
grees in Law and Theology, he is currently
the dean of the college of Theology at Istan-
bul University. So far Ö z t ü r k has published
more than thirty books, some of which are
translated into English and German. Since
the 1970s he writes articles for the popular
press such as H ü r r i y e t and Star Gazetesi
every Friday.
But apart from his books, newspaper arti-
cles and conferences around the world,
Ö z t ü r k attained popularity first and fore-
most through his continuous presence on
television. His aim is to present to the mass-
es his main thesis, namely the return to the
Qur'an and the elimination of superstitious
beliefs, in other words, t a g d i d – the recon-
struction of religious life.
He follows the ideas of ideologues such as
Muhammad Iqbal, whom he admires most,
Jamal ad-din al-Afghani, and Muhammed
Abduh. But he often also mentions Sayyid
Qutb and Ali Shariati. He regards them as
the intellectuals that the Islamic world with
its many conflicts needs today, even if their
ideas are quite varied.
As an opponent of t a q l i d (following of a
legal school) he considers i j t i h a d ( p e r s o n a l
reasoning) as an absolute must for Muslim
society. He is firmly opposed to the authori-
ty of the imams and h o c as, accusing them of
ignorance. With these approaches he di-
rects himself to a more secular audience,
even ironically using the term 'high society
h o c a' (s o s y a t i k h o c a s i) .
Secular programmes
a s a p l a t f o r m
The spectrum of television shows on
which Ö z t ü r k appears ranges from round-
table discussions to a talk show, and even a
one-man show. Ö z t ü r k's television debut
began with his speeches aired on the official
state television programme on religion, pre-
pared and supervised by the Directorate of
Religious Affairs. After the flourishing of
commercial television stations he began to
appear on private television channels and
participated in programmes on Islam as an
expert and discussant. As mentioned be-
fore, the channels are mostly secular in ori-
entation and can be described as main-
stream media. It can be said that since the
mid-1990s almost every television viewer
has become familiar with Ö z t ü r k's face and
s t y l e .
The concept of a roundtable discussion is
quite straightforward: Ö z t ü r k and other ex-
perts are invited for a special occasion to
discuss a particular issue. However, Ö z t ü r ki s
not the centre of attention in these discus-
sions. This is contrary to his own talk show,
where he personally and directly turns to-
wards the 'masses' which need to 'be awak-
ened', to use Ö z t ü r k's own terms.
Every year in the month of Ramadan,
Ö z t ü r k has his own programme called Y aş a r
Nuri ile sohbet (Talk with Yaş a r Nuri). In this
programme he talks about a special topic
for about ten to fifteen minutes before the
breaking of the fast (i f t a r). He is alone, with-
out guests or other discussants. Sufi music
plays in the background, thus creating a di-
dactic and sermon-like atmosphere. He
gives the impression of being very serious;
no emotions are shown. He is presented as
an enlightened man giving his beloved
viewers, as he calls them, some good advice
in this holy month. The topics are quite gen-
eral. He discusses questions like 'What are
good acts?', or 'What is the meaning of Ra-
madan?' But he also touches upon topics re-
lated to Islam and democracy.
Ö z t ü r k uses different types of television
programmes to spread his mission, and
whether he appears on this or that pro-
gramme he can be sure of reaching a wide
audience. Since 1996 Ö z t ü r k also appears
on the daily talk show A yş e Ö z g ü n. The con-
cept of this talk show is an adaptation of
those that are common in the West. There is
one host, the audience and some guests,
not prominent figures but 'normal' people
talking about everyday problems, for exam-
ple the relations between men and women
and family. But the host, A yşe Ö z g ü n, has a
very rational and scientific approach; she
questions everything and can only be per-
suaded by reason, for example when a
guest claims that he or she is a medium.
Ö z t ü r k appears on her show every Friday
morning. For about one hour he gives
speeches and answers the questions of the
audience, comprised mostly of women,
both veiled and Western-dressed. They
pose all sorts of questions, including re-
quests for advice on ritual practices such as:
'Are we allowed to read the Qur'an without
covering our heads?' This show offers him a
platform for his mission; namely to elimi-
nate what he considers irrational and wrong
beliefs. One of the means by which he tries
to achieve this is the use of everyday lan-
guage. When he cites a verse from the
Qur'an in Arabic he translates it into very
simple Turkish.
Pray TV in the USA
a s a m o d e l ?
It is interesting to draw a parallel to the
phenomenon of televangelism in the USA.
First of all, it should be kept in mind that
there are fundamental differences between
religion and television in Turkey and in the
USA. Of course in the Islamic tradition there
is no real equivalent to the church. The 'tele-
vision churches' in the USA replace, in many
cases, church attendance all together. Pray
TV started in the 1950s and such televange-
lists as Pat Robertson even established their
own education networks and built up pow-
erful financial empires. Nowadays they are a
very common feature – even becoming the
subject of satirical songs (for instance, the
song by Genesis 'Jesus, he knows me').
In Turkey it is hardly conceivable that the
mosque will ever be replaced by television.
Nonetheless, some have accused Ö z t ü r k o f
establishing his own school of religious
thought by means of his appearances. But
he rejects this arguing that he is an oppo-
nent of t a q l i d. In spite of the differences,
Ö z t ü r k does have a great deal in common
with the televangelists. Firstly, the US tele-
vangelists are predominantly republicans
and they have a great influence on republi-
can politics. Their main mission is to restore
public morals and to protect young people
from violence, drugs and sex. When Ö z t ü r k
talks about non-political Islam he is in ab-
solute agreement with the Turkish state's
idea of religion. Particularly his comments
on A yşe Ö z g ü n's talk show demonstrate the
typical embodiment of a Kemalist approach
to religion. Secondly, in both cases the tele-
vision preachers are absolute authorities.
Their ideas, opinions and solutions are re-
garded by many as definitive. What they say
can be much more important than what is
written and more important than the opin-
ions of the h o c a or any other reverend of the
local mosque or church. The following letter
from a viewer illustrates the way Ö z t ü r k i s
perceived by – at least – part of his audi-
ence. It is addressed to the programme edi-
tor of a show on which Ö z t ü r k a p p e a r e d .
Case in point. 
Dear Programme Editor,
I am a woman graduated from the
Italian High School and educated with
Western culture. I have been working for
years. My relation with my religion, to be
honest, is almost restricted to watching
your programme. Because of that I give
utmost importance to it and await a lot
of things from it. Forgive me, but
throughout this year I have not heard
anything satisfying me except from
D rÖ z t ü r k's serial speeches on Islamic
thinking. My hope is that the pro-
gramme and speeches of this high level
will be continued and detailed, including
every possible topic.
N eş e Ihtiyar obtained her MA degree in Islamic
Studies and Oriental Philology at Ruhr-Universität




Intersecting: Place, Sex and Race, a book
series published by Rodopi, aims to rigor-
ously bring into encounter the crucial in-
sights of black and ethnic studies, gender
studies, and queer studies, and facilitate
dialogue as well as confrontations be-
tween them. The series aims to think to-
gether place, sex and race, while realizing
productive alliances in a radical, transna-
tional community of scholars and ac-
t i v i s t s .
In 2003, it will have been 25 years since
Edward Said published his seminal work
on Orientalism. For an issue on the after-
math of Orientalism, the Intersecting se-
ries seeks contributions on the myriad
ways in which Said's book has stimulated
research in the humanities. Contributions
should be theoretically informed and take
the intersecting axes of place, sex and
race into account. Articles that extend
into fields not covered in Orientalism and
into novel, interdisciplinary approaches in
post-colonialism, transnational culture
studies or cultural analysis are welcome.
Articles may focus on visual culture, text-
image relations, and popular culture
and/or combine literature, film, photogra-
phy, fashion, opera, architecture, advertis-
ing, travel, etc. 
Publication of the issue is expected in April 2003.
Articles should be in English and must not exceed
20 pages (8,000 words). Please send one-page
proposals before 1 March 2002.
For information and proposals, contact:
Inge E. Boer
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D o c u m e n t a r y
Z I B A  MI R - H O S S E I N I
R u n a w a y, a documentary film directed by Kim Longi-
notto and Ziba Mir-Hosseini, was shot in late 2000 in
Tehran, and is set in Rayhaneh House, a shelter for
runaway girls. Like their earlier Divorce Iranian Style,
R u n a w a y shows how Iranian women are learning to
challenge the old rules, and how rapidly their coun-
try is changing. The film follows the stories of five
teenagers, exploring their longing for freedom, their
hopes for a brighter future, and their experiences of
society's double rules and standards when it comes
to gender rights. The shelter is run by the dynamic
and charismatic Mrs Shirazi and her team of counsel-
lors, who protect the girls from their families and
help to renegotiate their relationships.
The film portrays the courage and resource-
fulness of the rebellious new generation of
Iranian women. It opens with Monireh, a
teenage girl who has run away from home.
She is not new to Rayhaneh nor are her
grievances unique: they are shared by many
teenage girls in contemporary Iran who feel
that they have little freedom to do what
they want in life, that their parents do not
understand them.
Then come the stories of the film's five
main characters. Maryam, a boisterous 12-
year-old, comes from Doroud, a small town
in the west, far from Tehran. She ran away
from her abusive brother. Setareh's family
broke up after her mother's death; her fa-
ther became a drug dealer and prostituted
her to feed his addiction, then disappeared,
most likely arrested. Setareh became home-
less, was picked up by the police, then after
some time in prison was sent to Rayhaneh
to rebuild her life. At the shelter, 19-year-old
Setareh starts to reinvent herself, and be-
comes a source of strength and comfort to
other girls. A close friendship develops be-
tween her and 17-year-old Parisa, who, the
counsellors suspect, is not revealing her
true identity. Indeed, it turns out that far
from being without family as she claimed,
Parisa is engaged to be married. She ran
away because she failed her exams and was
frightened that her father would beat her.
Atena, already twice divorced at 18, was first
married off at the age of 12 by her mother,
who no longer wanted her at home. Her first
husband kept her chained up, but Atena
managed to get a divorce and returned to
her mother. When her stepfather tried to
rape her, she escaped. The film ends with a
second Parisa, an 18-year-old who ran away
from her abusive father and brother – both
drug addicts who deprived her of basic
rights and took out their anger and frustra-
tion on her. After a week on her own in the
park – surrounded by 'wolves' – Parisa turns
herself in to the police. She is sent to Ray-
haneh, where she is offered a chance to con-
tinue her studies and start an independent
life. But Parisa decides to go back to her
family, who desperately need her, despite
having abused her.
Facing reality
The problem of girls suffering abuse at
home and running away from intolerable
situations is neither new in Iran nor con-
fined to particular sections of Iranian soci-
ety. It is an age-old and deep-rooted phe-
nomenon that until recently was shrouded
in secrecy and ignored by the authorities.
But the creation of the Rayhaneh House in
October 1999 as a temporary shelter for run-
away girls, and the media attention this cen-
tre has received, are transforming the issue
from a taboo subject into a pressing social
p r o b l e m .
Two factors are at the root of this transfor-
mation. First, a new generation of girls rec-
ognize that they have rights and are no
longer prepared to put up with domestic
abuse. By running away from home, these
girls both register a protest and seek to
change their situation. Secondly, the unex-
pected victory of Mohammad Khatami in
the 1997 presidential election, and the birth
of a reformist movement, also brought a
less ideological approach to social prob-
lems, which has gradually opened a space
for a public debate on many taboo subjects.
The very existence of Rayhaneh, its philos-
ophy and its strategy for dealing with the
problem of runaway girls run parallel to the
history of the reformist movement which
found a voice in the structure of power after
the election of President Mohammed Khata-
mi in 1997. Since then the reformists, who
enjoy massive popular support (as shown in
the four elections conducted since), have
been locked in a fierce political battle with
their opponents, who have so far managed
to block most of their legislative moves. At
the heart of the battle lies one of the main
ideological conflicts that is now being
fought in Iran – over the very notion of
'rights'. The early discourse of the Islamic
Republic, premised on the notion of duty
(t a k l i f) as understood and constructed in Is-
lamic jurisprudence, is now challenged by a
reformist discourse premised on the notion
of h a q q (right) as advocated by modern de-
mocratic ideals.
R u n a w a y gives us a glimpse of how this
wider ideological struggle is playing itself
out in the lives of individuals. It is the story
of a struggle for dignity, respect and human
rights. As each story unfolds in front of the
camera, we learn about the gender biases,
contradictions and double standards of the
patriarchal culture in which these young
girls live. We come to appreciate how strong
and resourceful they are, how much they
are needed by their families, and yet how, in
the name of preserving the 'family honour'
and 'fulfilling their duties', they are deprived
of basic human rights. We also learn about
the centre, its counsellors and their conflict-
ing judgements and decisions about the
girls; we learn about the world outside the
centre, which both girls and counsellors
refer to as 'full of wolves'. It is a world that is
changing fast: old rules and boundaries are
breaking down and the new ones are hazy
and fragile.
Making connections:
shooting R u n a w a y
By the year 2000 there were 22 centres for
runaway girls nationwide. Rayhaneh is the
only one that allows media access. The rest,
mostly run by the Social Services Organiza-
tion, impose a strict ban. Aware of the im-
portant role of media, Rayhaneh is keen to
have its philosophy and the plight of the
runaway girls publicized. But it has also had
to deal with the harmful impact of media at-
tention on the girls. Concerned about the
possibly intrusive effect of a film crew on
the girls, the director, Mrs Shirazi, at first
agreed to let us film only for a few days. But
the girls accepted us almost immediately; as
they began to trust us with their stories, we
– the three women in the film crew (Kim
Longinotto as director and camera, myself
as co-director and Mary Milton as sound) –
soon became part of the healing process. It
was only then that Mrs Shirazi gave us a free
hand and let us stay until we had completed
our shoot. We tried to be as unobtrusive as
possible, but we never filmed without the
consent of the girls or their families. We
filmed at Rayhaneh over a period of four
weeks in November and December 2000. At
the time, there were 15 girls who had been
in the shelter for some time, but we sought
stories structured by arrivals and depar-
tures, following the stories in between. Our
decision was largely based on the fact that
the emotional drama was high; and we
wanted our stories to have resolutions.
Once we had chosen our characters, we
kept close to them and followed what was
happening to them as closely as we could.
When editing the film, we were concerned
to place the focus on the girls and their indi-
vidual stories, rather than on Rayhaneh as a
centre or on the world outside.
As in D i v o r c e, we were aware that we were
dealing with a universal issue; the problem
of runaway girls is not peculiar to Iran. We
wanted our film to give a voice to these
girls, to let them tell their own stories, and
through their stories to show Rayhaneh, the
counsellors and the dynamic and powerful
director, Mrs Shirazi. We wanted the film to
show their consensus approach to the prob-
lems, and how they set up delicate 'reconcil-
iations' between the runaway girls and their
families. We see these women disagreeing
with each other, and giving differing advice
to girls; we see them exasperated by the
lack of legal support for their organization.
At one point, we hear Mrs Shirazi telling
Parisa's father that, if he fails to keep to his
guarantee and starts to maltreat Parisa or
she runs away again, she will take him to the
International Court in The Hague. Perhaps it
is an empty threat – certainly it is a bluff –
but it tells of the extent to which human
rights discourse has made its impact in re-
formist Iran. Similarly, the fact that unlike in
the case of D i v o r c e we did not have to go
through an ordeal to get our permit to film
tells something of the ways in which the re-
formist government of Khatami has been
successful in creating a more open society
in Iran. This time our main negotiation was
with Rayhaneh and Mrs Shirazi, whose prin-
cipal concern was to protect the girls from
the film crew. 
A scene from
R u n a w a y.
Iran's Runaway Girls
Challenge the Old Rules
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I n t e r n e t
E R M E T E  M A R I A N I
With the vastly expanding use and popularity of the
world wide web in the closing decade of the 20t h c e n-
tury, Muslims began presenting themselves on the
web through sacred texts, images and stories. This
transmission includes h a d i t h, the sayings and acts of
the Prophet. Studying the transmission of the h a d i t h
through the internet and its function in the Islamic
on-line discourse helps in understanding the concep-
tion of a new discourse of Islamic jurisprudence.
Through the description of different formats of h a-
d i t h, it is possible to analyse the complex relation be-
tween the texts and the new medium.
H a d i t h O n - L i n e
Writing Islamic
T r a d i t i o n
The relation between text and medium
changes over time and space, because of the
varying cultural systems in which messages
are produced and the ongoing development
of information technologies employed to
transmit it. The technical characteristics of a
medium determine formats, uses of a text, as
well as the competences necessary to trans-
mit it. A comparison between the printed and
on-line hadith is necessary for understanding
in which way the 'real' and 'virtual' traditions
differ, but that is not enough. A tradition is
also a transmission protocol, so a description
of technical characteristics of the internet can
be useful for understanding how the informa-
tion circulates and by whom it is produced
and consumed.
Hadith means news, but in this particular
case it denotes the news about the Prophet
transmitted by way of his companions and
later generations of Muslims. As the imitation
of Muhammad's example is a moral and legal
principle, taqlid, the hadith constitutes next to
the Qur'an one of the most important sources
of Islamic jurisprudence and theology.
The oral transmission of the hadith was
soon replaced by written transmission, being
a more efficient means of communicating
them over the rapidly expanding Muslim
world. In written format it was also easier to
control their authenticity and limit the pro-
duction of apocrypha. The scrutinizing of the
hadith led to the composition of a number of
canonical hadith collections, known as the
kutub as-sitta – the six books – commonly
considered as authentic, or sahih.
A traditional hadith is composed of two
parts: the chain of transmitters, isnad, which is
the guarantee of authenticity, and the mes-
sage or text, matn. But in printed works, as in
oral discourses, they are often introduced by
'the Prophet said/did' without citing the chain
of authorities. This use makes it difficult to
verify whether the hadith are actually taken
from one of the classical compilations.
Hadith on the web
On the web can be found either complete
compilations of hadith, the kutub as-sitta , or
individual or small collections of the
Prophet's acts and sayings without the chain
of transmitters being given. Bibliographical
references are often incomplete or totally
lacking. Thus it is not always possible to check
their authenticity and to control the produc-
tion of new apocrypha. The hadith are avail -
able on the web as images or audio files, and
are sometimes used for decorating a web site
and electronic postcards (www.jannah.org).
They are produced in colourful and animated
icons, which is partly in line with more tradi-
tional uses; some hadith and verses of the
Qur'an have been used since early Islamic
times for decorating mosques and objects.
For centuries they have been used in elabo-
rate calligraphy. More recently, they can be
found written on walls as political slogans.
Apart from presenting their CVs, Muslim au-
thors sometimes present themselves on per-
sonal homepages with a collection of hadith,
in particular when they explain the main fea-
tures of Islam and its civilization. Sometimes
even hadith qudsi – the holy or divine sayings
attributed, albeit indirectly, to God – are pre-
sented (see www.ifrance.com/abchir-m). The
most original aspect of the hadith available
on the web is that they are published in dif-
ferent formats, simple text and colourful
icons, and with different purposes, all
through the same medium. Outside of the vir-
tual world each format is realized by a partic-
ular means, either through writing, calligra-
phy, architecture or popular art. On the web a
certain level of competence in computer sci-
ence is sufficient to use and present this reli-
gious literature in a variety of ways. A web de-
signer is able to realize what editors, archi-
tects or artists in the real world do through
different media, but with much less effort and
funds. Nonetheless, computer hard- and soft-
ware should be readily available and that is
why most Muslim virtual designers are Mus-
lim students living in the US. They have not
only the means, but also a strong motivation
to use cyberspace both as a way to re-create
and keep up with the Muslim umma.
Texts and authors
Before analysing the authors and texts, it is
appropriate to give a measure of the pres-
ence of on-line h a d i t h in the main languages
(based on the author's research): in English
212,686 a h a d i t h are available on 22 web
sites, in Arabic there are 62,078 on 6 sites,
and in French 2,487 on 8 sites have been
found. Considering the limits of search en-
gines and the instability of the web, these fig-
ures indicate the most visible h a d i t h and not
their totality. The prevalence of h a d i t h i n
English may be due to the fact that the inter-
net was born in the USA, arriving later in Eu-
rope and only recently becoming more com-
mon in Asia and the Arab world. Considering
the sheer magnitude, it is impossible to
analyse all the texts and verify the quality of
the translations. The same is true for estab-
lishing whether the h a d i t h concern existing
printed collections that have been published
on-line without any modifications.
The most common collections on-line com-
prise, in order of importance, the following:
– The complete Bukhari collection, A s-S a h i h ,
is to be found on two web sites: Al-Islam,
(www.al-islam.com) in Arabic; and the
Muslim Student Association (MSA) of the
University of South California's site
(www.usc.edu/dept/MSA) in English,
translated by Muhsin Khan. Fifteen other
web sites copied or linked their pages to
this address. In French no complete
collection was found, even if there are two
printed translations of it.
– The complete Abu Muslim collection,
A s-Sahih, is available in Arabic on the
A l-Islam site and, translated into English
by Siddiqui Abdul Hameed, on the MSA
site. Thirteen web sites are linked to the
latter. In French there is no full collection
as it has not been completely translated.
– There are three web sites that publish the
Imam An-Nawawi's Forty Hadith in English,
translated by Denis Johnson Davies and
Ezzeddin Ibrahim. In Arabic there is only
one site, Al-Islam, and in French, two (Le
Centre Islamique de la Réunion,
www.islam.ifrance.fr/islam; and L e s
Ressources Islamiques, www.chez.com/
abuhamza) translated by The International
Islamic Federation of Students (Kuwait).
The language-author ratio is similar to that
of the printed production of h a d i t h in West-
ern languages. Most of the on-line h a d i t h a r e
in English and the Imam Bukhari's A s - S a h i h i s
certainly the most published collection – on
the web as well as in print. Most of these web
sites are created by Muslim students in the
US or are hosted by American servers. The
most important centres of production of
English books, however, are located in the In-
dian Subcontinent and managed by profes-
sional editors.
It must be noted that a web site can be
composed of pages, located at the same ad-
dress or domain name; or by pages kept to-
gether by electronic links, in which case
they appear as a one web site but are actu-
ally located at different addresses. In the lat-
ter case, the webmaster has to check the
links periodically because web pages often
change contents and address.
These diverse 'statuses' of texts do not exist
in printed works. All the pages included in a
book have the same 'reality'; the author and
publisher have control over the entire text.
Muslims from all around the world are
using the internet to communicate, to pre-
sent their beliefs and their practices. The h a-
d i t h are an important part of their 'virtual
image'. A new tradition is taking shape fol-
lowing the technical characteristics of the
new medium and its uses. The main differ-
ence between printed and on-line hadith l i e s
in the medium and not in the texts them-
selves, because they use basically the same
texts. However, centres of production, edi-
tors' competences, formats used and means
of diffusion are completely different. Cultural
and religious changes in the information era
are not always voluntarily caused by authors
but by the m e d i u m i t s e l f .1
The internet is creating another language
that is neither written nor oral,2 it is a 'world
wide web' made of images, sounds and writ-
ten words. Moreover, in cyberspace there is
no memory because sites that shut down do
not leave a trace of their existence, and all the
efforts made to keep track of such a site can
suddenly fail.
Some effects of the new media become ev-
ident in discussions about the sanctity of the
fundamental texts of Islam. The MSA web site
(www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/) hesitantly sug-
gests that a digital copy of the Qur'an is as sa-
cred as a printed one. This means that a good
Muslim should perform the necessary ablu-
tions before reading a digital copy of the
Qur'an. On the contrary, the Dar al-Hadith
(www.al-muhaddith.com) refuses to publish
the h a d i t h and the Qur'an on-line because
they do not consider the internet a 'suitable'
means for its publication. Thus, considering
that a protocol of transmission of religious
knowledge, Ci l m, is not yet formulated and
accepted, it seems to be too early to affirm
that a 'virtual Islamic tradition' has been
born. However, if one considers how much
the increased circulation of the h a d i t h a n d
other fundamental texts in printed form con-
tributed to the religious and political devel-
opments over the last century, one may won-
der what the potential of the spread of these
texts in a growing number of languages
through the new media will be. It appears, as
yet, that changes are not determined so
much by new contents, but by the new medi-
um itself. 
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So uth As ia
D I E G O  A B E N A N T E
The recent scholarship on the process of Islamization
in India has stimulated a debate on the connections
between cultivation, sedentarization and conversion
in South Asia.1 Southwestern Punjab, and the Multan
region in particular, has become the object of inter-
esting discussions on the issue, given the crucial rela-
tionship it shows between ecology, social structure
and religious identity.2 After showing the relevant
role of the Sufi d a r g a hs (tombs) in the process of con-
version, the following aims to emphasize that Is-
lamization in Multan does not seem to be connected
with cultivation and sedentarization, which devel-
oped only in the late 19t h century under the British
colonization schemes. The process seemed to take
place in an environment which remained largely no-
madic or semi-nomadic until the colonial period.
Cultivation and
C o n v e r s i o n
in Multan
An urban settlement of considerable antiq-
uity in the lower Indus valley, Multan was
originally close to the confluence of the
Chenab and Ravi rivers, a fact which could
explain the early belief in the sanctity of the
place by the Hindu population. The city has
been for centuries a centre of Hindu pilgrim-
age, thanks to the presence of two famous
m a n d i rs, the Temple of the Sun and the
Prhaladpuri temple. Multan was also the
centre of a large commercial and agricultur-
al system. During the reign of the Mughal
emperor Awrangzeb (1658–1707), it was the
capital of one of the main s u b a hs (provinces),
originally comprising three s a r k a rs (dis-
tricts) and 88 p a r a g a n a hs (administrative
sub-divisions). The Mughal province cov-
ered the entire southern Punjab, part of
eastern Baluchistan and northern Sind. An-
nexed by the Sikh state in 1818, Multan was
the capital of a largely autonomous
province, particularly under the d i w a ns
Sawan Mal and Mul Raj. Both belonged to
the k h a t r i Hindu caste that has played an
important political and economic role in
southern Punjab. However, the growing ri-
valry between Multan and Lahore in the 19t h
century and the British interference in the
Punjabi political scene provoked the revolt
of the Multan garrison in 1848 and the as-
sassination of the British officers Vans
Agnew and Anderson, finally causing the
second Sikh war and the annexation of the
Punjab to the Raj.
Islam and the territory
The British district constituted approxi-
mately a triangle delimited by the districts
of Muzaffargarh, Jhang, Montgomery, and
the State of Bahawalpur. The total area of
the district in 1881 was about 5,880 square
miles. The basic element of the environ-
ment was the scarcity of rain, which made ir-
rigation central to the agricultural life of the
district. The territory of Multan was tradi-
tionally classified on the basis of the avail-
ability of water, in terms of riverain areas
(h i t h a r); the farther lands, which were par-
tially cultivable through artificial irrigation
(u t a r); and the central, arid lands, consid-
ered uncultivable (b a r) .
Most of the villages and q a s b a hs were sit-
uated near the river courses, while the b a r
lands were mainly inhabited by nomadic
tribes that lived on pasturage and a limited
trade. However, settled and nomadic peo-
ples did not live in separate worlds. The b a r
lands were not only used by the nomadic
tribes of the district but also by the people
of the settled areas for the pasturage of
their cattle. In Multan pasturage and breed-
ing integrated the income of the settled
areas. Moreover, given the scarcity of food,
traditionally the cattle had to 'wander over
wide tracts in search of food',3 a fact which
made a conflict possible between settled
and nomadic people.
The relevance of the Sufi d a r g a hs in
southern Punjab lies exactly in the need for
mediation between potentially conflicting
interests. As Richard Eaton has noted, the
'potential conflict' between pastoralists and
riverine people was mitigated by the fact
that the pastoralists needed access to the
settled world for water, trade, and for 'pro-
viding the rituals and belief structures that
made up their religious system.'4 As in many
Muslim societies, in the Punjab the struc-
tures of devotional Islam served to integrate
the settled and the nomadic-pastoral worlds.
This conclusion seems confirmed by the
connections between the d a r g a hs and the
rural population, represented by the tradi-
tions of conversion to Islam through the
preaching of Muslim saints, often identified
with Shaikh Farid-al Din Shakarganj of Pak-
pattan (d. 1265) or with the Multani saints:
Shaikh Bahawal Haq Zakariya (d. 1262),
Shaikh Musa Pak Shahid Gilani (d. 1592) and
Shah Yussuf Gardezi (d. 1136).
These traditions emphasize the centrality
of the myth of the saints for the religious
identity of the rural population. This sense
of identity was publicly emphasized at occa-
sions such as the sajjada nashins' (the custo-
dians of the tombs') visits to the m u r i ds (dis-
ciples) at their villages and during the cu r s,
the celebrations in memory of a Muslim
saint (literally his 'wedding' with God). The
cu r s were occasions that served to represent
the legitimating bases of the sajjada nashin
and his family. Particularly famous was the
cu r s at the tomb of Shaikh Bahawal Haq in
the month of s a f a r. In the words of the Com-
missioner of Multan in 1856, this shrine was
'a celebrated place of pilgrimage for the
S c i n d i a n s ' .5 The connections between the
tribes and the holy families were even crys-
tallized in the toponymy of the villages. Be-
tween 1885 and 1900, the then settlement
officer Edward Maclagan observed that the
Sufi saints were frequently recorded in local
memory not only as founders but even as
purchasers of villages, a fact that seemed to
represent spiritual authority rather than ac-
tual sale.6
S e d e n t a r i z a t i o n
This evidence supports the thesis pro-
posed by Richard Eaton and David Gilmar-
tin, that the d a r g a hs in southern Punjab in-
tegrated, culturally and politically, the mar-
ginal social groups into the orbit of Islam.7
However, while Eaton proposes a connec-
tion between conversion, cultivation and
sedentarization of the Jat tribes of southern
Punjab, this relationship is problematic in
the case of Multan, where Islam proceeded
in a context that remained largely nomadic
or semi-nomadic until recent years.
Due to the scarcity of rains, apart from the
riverain lands, cultivation in the Multan re-
gion necessitated artificial irrigation. The
use of the 'Persian wheel', a peculiar system
which was in use in the Punjab as early as
the 16t h century, and considered by Prof.
Irfan Habib as an important factor of change
in the economy of the Punjab, does not
seem to have influenced in a significant way
the socioeconomic structure of this territo-
ry. Even during the Mughal period, which is
commonly regarded as the beginning of
large-scale cultivation, in the Punjab as in
India generally, cultivation did not make
any real progress in the b a r territory. In the
early 18t h century, after 200 years of Mughal
rule, cultivation in Multan was still limited to
the fertile h i t h a r lands. A partial extension of
the cultivation towards the b a r h i g h l a n d s
began many years later under the Nawabs
of Multan and Bahawalpur in the mid-18t h
century. This fact was caused in large part
by the greater political autonomy enjoyed
by the Nawabs of Multan and Bahawalpur
with the passage of the sovereignty from
the Mughal to the Afghan kingdom.8
Nevertheless, despite the flourishing of ir-
rigation works in the region in the mid-18t h
century, these projects did not radically
change the ecological structure that, at the
beginning of colonial rule, was still quite
sharply divided into fertile strips of irrigated
areas along the rivers, mostly inhabited by
settled Jat tribes, and arid, basically uncul-
tivable lands at the centre of the d o a bs .
These lands were still in the late 19t h c e n t u r y
'a grazing ground for sheep and a browsing
ground for goats and camels' as a British ob-
server recorded, and were populated by no-
madic tribes – like the Langrial and the Hiraj
– that still lived of pastoralism and of a limit-
ed trade with the settled world.
C o n c l u s i o n
Our evidence would suggest that in the
Multan area the link between Islamization
and agriculture cannot be sustained. Local
traditions and colonial sources describe an
environment in which nomadic tribes were
gradually drawn into the fold of Islam by the
interaction with the Sufi tombs, but did not
abandon the traditional lifestyle till very re-
cently. In 1881 the Muslim population of the
district was recorded in the official census as
being slightly less than 79%; still, apart from
the riverain, the sedentary lifestyle was not
accepted by the population. While confirm-
ing the relevance of the d a r g a hs and their
custodians as mediators between socioeco-
nomic worlds and as vehicles for Islamiza-
tion, our research suggests that this process
be placed in a context where sedentariza-
tion and cultivation tended to proceed with
greater difficulty than previously suspected.
Of course the situation was to change rad-
ically with the beginning of the Canal
Colonies' projects that interested the Mul-
tan district with the Sidhnai Colony (from
1886 to 1888), the Lower Bari Doab Colony
(from 1914 to 1924), and with the Nili Bar
Colony (started in 1926 and concluded in
the 1940s). By promoting cultivation into
the b a r highlands and, more importantly, by
creating colonies of cultivators from differ-
ent areas of the Punjab, the social and eco-
logical configuration of the district, and the
traditional relationship between the pas-
toral tribes and the environment were ulti-
mately transformed. 
D a r g a h of Shaikh
Bahawal Haq
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East  Af ri c a
H U S S E I N  A H M E D
The last three decades of the 20 t h century witnessed
a revival of Islam in Ethiopia, the genesis of which
can be traced back to the 19 t h century. Since the
early 1970s Islamic revival has manifested itself in a
growing awareness among Ethiopian Muslims of
their collective identity, characterized by an intensi-
fied struggle to enhance the status of Islam at the
national level, to establish a countrywide Islamic or-
ganization, and to participate actively in the public
sphere. These aspirations were articulated through
mass demonstrations, representations and publica-
tions, especially after the demise of the military
regime that had ruled the country from 1974 to
1 9 9 1 .1
19 t h-Century Islamic
R e v i v a l
in Wallo, Ethiopia
One of the sources of inspiration for the
resurgence of Islam in Ethiopia today is 19 t h-
century Wallo, where reformist and militant
clerics initiated a process of Islamic renewal.
They also resisted the policy of religious co-
ercion pursued by the Ethiopian rulers of
the second half of the 19t h century. This re-
vival was primarily associated with the in-
creased activity of the mystical orders: first
the Qadiriyya, soon followed by the Sam-
maniyya, Shadhiliyya and Tijaniyya. These
orders contributed to the further expansion
and institutionalization of Islam by giving
impetus to the development of literacy and
scholarship and by introducing the ritual of
d h i k r. Moreover, they were the source of in-
spiration for the founding of shrines as local
centres of pilgrimage.
Four reformist and militant
s h a y k h s
Four of the most prominent exponents of
the revivalist, scholarly, reformist and mili-
tant tradition of Islam in Wallo who lived in
the 18t h and 19t h centuries were: Shaykh(s)
Muhammad Shafi Muhammad (1743–
1806/7), J acf a r Bukko b. Siddiq (1793–1860),
Bushra Ay Muhammad (d.1862) and Talha b.
J acf a r( c . 1 8 5 3 – 1 9 3 6 ) .
According to a biography written by his
son, Nasihat al-Muridin (Advice for Novices),
Shaykh Muhammad Shafi was a native of
Warra Babbo. After his initiation into the
Qadiriyya he travelled to Garfa where he be-
friended a local hereditary ruler, who pro-
vided him with men and arms for the propa-
gation of Islam in southeast Wallo. Muham-
mad Shafi strongly felt that the Islam prac-
tised by the local people was heavily influ-
enced by non-Islamic ideas and was there-
fore in need of reform. He accused the cu l a-
m a ' of the time of complacency and avarice.
His influence gradually spread to other parts
of Wallo including Borana, where he estab-
lished a more orthodox Islam among the
Oromo- and Amharic-speaking populations.
Later he moved to Albukko, where he set up
his centre at Jama Negus which, after his
death, became one of the biggest shrines in
W a l l o .
According to local traditions, Shaykh
Muhammad Shafi divided his time between
teaching, organizing a jihad (hence his epi-
thet, m u j a h i d), and prayer and meditation.
This was a reflection of his initiative to de-
velop a concept of a vigorous Islam in per-
petual renewal and expansion through a
harmonious combination of mystical exer-
cise, education and physical coercion. He
composed several religious treatises which
still remain unpublished.
The son of the well-known mystic Siddiq
Bukko (d.1800/01), Shaykh J acfar was noted
for his outspokenness and uncompromising
position on questions related to faith and
practice. According to a hagiographical ac-
count authored by his grandson under the
title, Misk al-Adhfar fi Manaqib Sayf al-Haqq
al-Shaykh J acf a r (The Pungent Musk on the
Virtues of Sayf al-Haqq Shaykh J acf a r), Shaykh
J acf a r attempted to abolish certain rituals as-
sociated with c h a t (Arabic: q a t). He strongly
condemned the belief that traditional lead-
ers of ritual ceremonies had the power of in-
tercession with God and criticized members
of the religious establishment, including the
judges and those who recited the Qur'an, for
their indifference to – or even violation of –
Islamic law, especially their uncanonical ap-
propriation of the z a k a t and contributions
collected during funeral prayers, which were
supposed to be distributed among the poor.
Shaykh J acf a r also waged a perpetual strug-
gle against the local chiefs and constantly ex-
horted them to rule according to the s h a r ica.
The third Muslim reformer was al-Hajj
Bushra Ay Muhammad, who was born in
Ifat. He travelled to the Sudan where he was
initiated into the Sammani order by Shaykh
Ahmad al-Tayyib b. al-Bashir (1824) before
he moved on to Mecca for the pilgrimage.
There he came into contact with some of
the cu l a m a', including Shaykh M u h a m m a d
cU t h m a n al-Mirghani (1793–1853). After his
return, he established his teaching centre at
Gata (southeast of Kombolcha). He was
renowned for his piety, sanctity and strict
observance of the s h a r ica, as well as for his
relentless struggle against all forms of b i dca
(innovations). He regarded the neglect of
the daily prayers as a relapse into infidelity
and condemned the z a r (spirit possession)
cult, the ritual sacrifices offered under big
trees, and the beating of drums. He au-
thored a number of treatises, only one of
which, Minhat al-Ilahiyya wa'l-Faydat al-Rab-
baniyya (The Divine Gift and Divine Emana-
tion), has been published.
The brief accounts and traditions about
the lives and careers of the reforming and
militant mystics and scholars of Wallo offer
an insight into the dynamism of regional
Islam, the interaction between indigenous
Islam and new trends in Islamic thought em-
anating from the wider Muslim world, and
the responses of the cu l a m a' to those trends.
The accounts also reflect the vitality of Is-
lamic scholarship and the local limitations
on the implementation of the clerics' aspira-
tions – of which they were keenly aware. Al-
though the intellectual roots of the re-
formist tradition originated outside Wallo,
the credit for introducing the new ideas and
adapting them to local conditions belonged
to the indigenous scholars who displayed
exceptional qualities of leadership, organi-
zation and piety. The Muslim uprisings in
Wallo in the 1880s were partly inspired by
them. Another legacy is the vital role that
the mystical orders still play in social and re-
ligious life as manifested in the veneration
of saints and annual visits to their shrines.
Resistance to the imposition
of Christianity
The policy of forced conversion to Chris-
tianity proclaimed by Emperor Yohannes IV
(r.1872–1889) and implemented by his vas-
sals was a serious, albeit temporary, setback.
Its injustice and the ruthlessness with which
it was carried out led to stiff resistance orga-
nized by militant cu l a m a'. Three forms of re-
sponse of the Wallo Muslims to the imperial
decree can be identified. Firstly, at the level
of both the ordinary people and some of the
cu l a m a', there was an outward acceptance
of Christianity which led to the phenome-
non of 'Christians by day and Muslims by
night': appearing to be practising Christians
while remaining loyal to Islam. This was
based on the Islamic concept of t a q i y a ( d i s-
simulation). Secondly, the enforcement of
the edict by violent means caused an exo-
dus of a large number of people to the
Sudan and the Hijaz. Thirdly, there were or-
ganized and armed rebellions led by Muslim
religious leaders. The first Muslim militant
cleric who led an armed opposition against
the policy of forced conversion of the Wallo
Muslims imposed by Yohannes was Shaykh
cAli Adam, originally from Jerru in northern
Shawa. His militancy was derived from two
sources: he was a disciple of Shaykh
Muhammad Shafi and his father was
renowned for his efforts to spread Islam in
Reqqe. Shaykh cAli fought a contingent of
Yohannes's army at Wahelo (northwest of
Lake Hayq), where he and his overzealous
followers lost their lives.
In 1884 Shaykh Talha, an innovative
teacher and a prolific writer of manuals in
Amharic for the teaching of Islam, pro-
claimed a major revolt against the harsh-
ness with which the policy of forced conver-
sion was carried out and against the official
prohibition of Islamic worship. His followers
included Muslims of Qallu and Reqqe. Dur-
ing the revolt, churches which the local
Muslims had been forced to build were de-
molished and priests who had been sent to
instruct the converts expelled. Talha's and
other revolts did not constitute a serious
military challenge to the Christian rulers of
Ethiopia, but they were a matter of concern.
According to a local tradition, Ras M i k a ' e l
(formerly Muhammad cA l i) once bragged to
Yohannes in Warra Ilu that Talha was only an
obscure cleric who, under the influence of a
heavy dosage of c h a t, had incited the local
Muslims to commit acts of bravado. Shortly
after this, news arrived that Talha's men had
successfully beaten off Mika'el's contingent.
This earned Mika'el a sharp reprimand from
Y o h a n n e s .
The Wallo Muslim resistance showed that
indigenous Islam, given the necessary stim-
ulus, was capable of not only inspiring the
Muslim community to organize and mobi-
lize its manpower and material resources for
launching an armed opposition against a di-
rect threat to its very existence, but was also
capable of sustaining such opposition over
a long period of time. That Islam played a
crucial role as a unifying factor cutting
across ethnic, regional and political loyalties
is evident from the fact that the resistance
led by Shaykh Talha included the Muslims of
Qallu, Reqqe and southeast Tegray, as well
as the disaffected members of the Wallo
hereditary aristocracy. However, they acted
within the context of Ethiopian polity. The
mere fact that they shared a common faith
with both the Egyptians and the Mahdists
did not make them any less sensitive than
the Ethiopian Christians to the hidden de-
signs that these external powers had on
Ethiopian sovereignty. They were reluctant
to seek external help and to ally themselves
with foreign elements even at a time when
they were unjustly provoked and persecut-
ed by the state and the church for no of-
fence other than following a different reli-
gion. It is therefore difficult to accept such
statements as: 'Thus the achievement of his
[Yohannes's] aims, […] did not a l i e n a t e p o r-
tions of the population, whether regional or
r e l i g i o u s [ … ] . '2
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Mi ddl e Ea st
C Y R U S  S C H A Y E G H Science and the
Iranian Middle
C l a s s
The turn of middle-class attention was rela-
tive because questions of political organiza-
tion, while placed on the back-burner, did
not quite disappear; and because concern
for sociocultural reforms became more ur-
gent than hitherto, but definitely had strong
historical roots reaching back into the later
1 9t h century. It was nevertheless a substan-
tial turn as the period from the late 1910s
was distinct from the prior period on the
grounds of changed contexts – the experi-
ences of the constitutional period, World
War I, growing urbanization – as well as of
the sheer dimension of proposed sociocul-
tural reforms.
'Insightful and knowledgeable individuals
from our midst have repeatedly written
books […] with the intention to find a treat-
ment for the ailments of their country.
When we sum up these opinions […], we
see that in general, there are no more than
two methods, one being science [ci l m], the
other morality [a k h l a q] . '2 With these words,
the famous Iranian modernist author, M. A.
Jamalzadeh, pointed out the core of mod-
e r n i s t3 reformism. For the modern middle
class, ci l m meant universal modern science.
It was opposed to the pre-modern modes of
knowledge of those social groups held re-
sponsible for Iran's retardation, and was
seen as the fundament of Iran's sociocultur-
al modernization. Judging from modern sci-
ences' overall importance, it is hardly sur-
prising that their formal acquisition (through
higher education and work in modern pro-
fessions) and application (in everyday life
and discursive self-understanding) came to
constitute the two pillars on which the Iran-
ian modern middle class was founded. The
former element became the base for the
modern middle-class men's superior social
status, while the latter informed a system of
ideal cultural behaviour and self-definition
by which men as well as women of this class
sought to differentiate themselves from the
others. A k h l a q retained some of its pre-
modern connotations, but also assumed a
new function. Building upon debates cur-
rent since the later 19t h century, the modern
middle class encoded a k h l a q as a token of
Iranian cultural authenticity, most of the
principles and objectives of which ultimate-
ly obeyed the principles of modern science
and were geared to fulfil the rational re-
quirements of modern society. In this mod-
ern usage, it served the dual purpose of de-
marcating the modernists from the colonial
West, and providing them with a cultural
system that challenged the Shiite cu l a m a.
Modern science in class
f o r m a t i o n
The principal pre-modern modes of knowl-
edge, in explicit opposition to which the
modern middle class introduced modern sci-
ence into Iran, ranged from the so-called 'ex-
ternal' knowledge of nature provided by clas-
sical literature, to (Aristotelian) non-experi-
mental sciences, to religious metaphysics and
superstition. The social agents of these out-
dated modes of knowledge, who constituted
the main targets of the modernists' critique,
encompassed those persons and groups
most closely associated with central political
power, 'the masses', and the Shiite culama. For
example, the latter were often accused of
over-emphasizing metaphysical disciplines
and thereby encouraging an otherworldli-
ness, which had 'hampered national progress
[…] for centuries'.4 Such critiques, treating
traditional religious knowledge as superflu-
ous, vain, or useless, were paralleled by at-
tempts launched in the later 19th century to
limit the clergy's fields of action in public life
and to 'laicize the concept of knowledge'.5 A
second line of attack against the clergy, com-
mencing in the late 19th century, accused
them of advocating – often for personal inter-
est – superstitions and pure ignorance which
incapacitated 'the masses' to think and act ra-
tionally. With regard to modern science itself,
central elements distinguishing it from pre-
modern modes of knowledge were a correct
experimental methodology, logical thinking,
and exactitude. For instance, the German-ed-
ucated chemist Taqi Arani, killed in 1940 in
Reza Shah's prison after being condemned in
the famous 1938 process against the commu-
nist 'Fifty-three', stated that '[w]ithout logical
and mathematical thinking, man cannot un-
dertake investigations in any science, not
even regarding the most simple problems.
[…] In Iran, there is a group of people who are
staunchly opposed to mathematics, i.e. who
do not think logically. These anti-mathemati-
cians of the 20th century are really a strange
curiosity.'6 Modern science's most distinctive
trait, however, resided in its great usefulness,
its beneficial reformist impact on social and
individual life.
This point was mentioned time and again,
in a view which directly linked science with
its (technological) applications. 'It is with re-
gard to science, and especially to hard sci-
ences which are of utmost importance in
today's life and civilization, that we Iranians
are lagging three to four hundred years, if
not even more, behind the Europeans.'7
Besides the latter factors, it was the insis-
tence on the incorrectness of pre-modern
types of knowledge and their association
with deficient sociomoral character (corrup-
tion of morality, uselessness, self-interest,
ignorance) that formed the central condi-
tion for the construction of modern science
and its attributes (usefulness, rationality, al-
truism, correct logic) as their absolute and
fixed opposite. This ideal juxtaposition be-
came relevant through its insertion into the
modern middle class's reading of Iran's so-
cial forces. The ignorant masses, a selfish
clergy, and a classe politique as avaricious as
out of touch with a rapidly changing mod-
ern world: all main social groups held re-
sponsible for Iran's chaotic 'real-constitu-
tionalism' and its stalled sociocultural re-
forms were criticized for their faulty modes
of knowledge and immorality. In other
words, modern science was embraced as su-
perior to pre-modern knowledge not simply
because it was seen as detached objective
truth, but also because it helped the mod-
ern middle class to secure concrete social
advantages. The belief in modern science's
absolute distinction and superiority was
vital, first of all because it buttressed the
modernists' challenge of the social status
and the cultural power of dominant social
formations like the cu l a m a. However, it had
other social and material-financial conse-
quences. For instance, it helped to justify
the entrance of modern middle-class men
into professional areas such as medicine,
law, and education, which were already oc-
cupied by strong contenders. Within that
class itself, it gave men grounds for their su-
perior position vis-à-vis women, and their
interest in gendered contests over intellec-
tual and material resources and social posi-
tions could be covered in the neutral terms
of modern vs. traditional or advanced mod-
ern knowledge vs. limited modern knowl-
edge. All in all, modern science and access
to it constituted the cultural and social fun-
dament of modern middle class formation
because the discourse of science's neutral
objectivity was underpinned by that class's
sociocultural and financial-material inter-
e s t s .
If the relational nature of the modern mid-
dle class's genesis is mirrored by its deploy-
ment of modern science in interaction with
other social groups, the historical contin-
gency of its formation is illustrated by the
way in which it used modern science – and
in this instance also a k h l a q – in view of and
in reaction to Iran's complex cultural, eco-
nomic, social, and political contexts. The
lines above have already alluded to the
modern middle class's use of a k h l a q as a
marker of cultural authenticity. Iran's en-
trance into the modern period of mass poli-
tics constituted another context: the Consti-
tutional Revolution had, on a formal-legal
level, resulted in the enfranchisement of
growing segments of men, and on a practi-
cal-political level triggered modes and di-
mensions of political participation hitherto
quite unknown. Although the nascent mod-
ern middle class was theoretically in favour
of male enfranchisement, it was worried
that under these new circumstances, 'the
masses' ignorance' would help to throw Iran
into yet greater havoc, especially as it was
being exploited by 'selfish' traditional mid-
dle and upper classes, such as the Shiite
clergy. The modern age's pressure on na-
tions to boost their economy by developing
a large work force was also a challenge since
it was linked to the downsides of a principal
social problem of the period: the growth of
urban centres, such as Tehran, which was
seen not only as an opportunity, but also as
a potentially degenerative force menacing
all urban groups. It was precisely modern
sciences' practical applicability to such com-
plex and yet concrete problems of contem-
porary Iran which caused the modern mid-
dle class to embrace them as the key to the
country's modernization and to place them
at the core of its own social and cultural for-
m a t i o n .
Modernity: local and global
d i m e n s i o n s
If the formation of the Iranian modern
middle class and its deployment of modern
sciences occurred in clearly contingent ways
betraying its (semi-)colonial position, it also
became part of an increasingly homoge-
nized global modernity. While the mod-
ernists maintained their capacity to adopt
Western models to Iranian contexts and so-
cial relations, the country's ultimately inferi-
or position vis-à-vis 'the West' meant that
that main elements and underlying goals of
modernist reformism structurally resembled
originally Western models. For example,
Iranian modernists deployed modern sci-
ences not only to engineer macro-social
changes, but also to shape informed, self-
disciplined individuals through science-
based 'technologies of the Self'. Physiologi-
cal-medical knowledge of oneself was con-
sidered vital for individual health; teachers
and parents were called to follow certain
fundamental psychological laws in the edu-
cation of their pupils or children; and numer-
ous books and articles sought to teach self-
control. Although early 20t h-century mod-
ernist Iranians did not simply copy the ways
in which modern Europeans wanted to
shape themselves, certain basic traits of
these (bourgeois) 'technologies of the Self'
were necessarily reflected in Iranian mod-
ernist visions – and this was the case be-
cause Iran had become part of a global mod-
ern world in which the basic models for, in-
deed the idea of, 'society' and 'individual'
were introduced by Western countries. 
Roughly a decade after the Constitutional Revolution
of 1905/06, many Iranians were of the opinion that
constitutionalism had failed to build a sound social
and political order in their country, although they
understood this situation in different ways in that
period of accelerating processes of social diversifica-
tion. One of several social groups was the nascent
modern middle class, emerging since the late 1910s,1
which reacted to Iran's post-constitutional troubles
with a turn of attention away from political revolu-
tion to sociocultural reform as the panacea for the
creation of a modern individual, society, and state.
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Easter n Eur o pe
AL L E N  J .  F R AN K
The study of Islamic culture in Russia, and especially
in imperial Russia, is a newly emerging field in the
area of Islamic studies, yet one which promises con-
siderable dividends for illuminating both the field of
Inner Asian Islam and for Islamic studies as a whole.
When speaking of Islam in Russia, we have in mind a
specific region of imperial Russia, namely the Volga-
Ural region and western Siberia, where substantial
sedentary and nomadic Turkic Muslim communities
came under Russian rule at a relatively early stage, in
the middle of the 16t h century. In the context of Russ-
ian colonial expansion in the 19t h century we can con-




The development of Islam, specifically Is-
lamic intellectual and institutional life, in
this region differed in several important
ways from the other Muslim regions of the
Russian empire, such as Central Asia, Azer-
baijan, and the North Caucasus. The Volga-
Ural region and Siberia were conquered by
Russia in the 16t h century and were populat-
ed by large settlements of Russian colonists
and indigenous Finno-Ugric and Turkic non-
Muslims. By the second half of the 18t h c e n-
tury Muslims in the Volga-Ural region and
Siberia had already experienced two hun-
dred years of Russian rule, and many Mus-
lims figured prominently among the elite of
Russia's merchants and gentry. At the same
time, only a small proportion of Muslim
peasants were serfs, and the vast majority
were either state peasants or tribute-paying
tribesmen, which placed them in a more
privileged position than the vast majority of
Russia's non-Muslim peasantry. By the sec-
ond half of the 18t h century, the Volga-Ural
region's Muslim communities were firmly
integrated into the Russian state's systems
of estates and privileges, and overall can be
said to have held a generally favourable po-
sition in comparison with the empire's
Christian majority. Except for localized and
largely unsuccessful Christianization cam-
paigns before the second half of the 18t h
century, Muslim communities in Russia were
allowed to practice their faith freely, and
this was especially true along the steppe
frontier, where Russian officials depended
upon Muslim translators, Cossacks and
agents to maintain imperial authority over
their nomadic co-religionists. In fact, one of
the defining features of Islam in Russia from
1552 until 1917 is that the administration of
Islam was firmly in the hands of the civil and
military authorities, and not in the hands of
the Orthodox Church.
Another defining feature of Islam in Russia
proper, which separated it intellectually and
institutionally from other Muslim communi-
ties in the Russian empire, was the existence
of state-sponsored and funded imperial-
level organizations staffed almost entirely
by Muslims. These organizations were
founded in the 1780s, during the reign of
Empress Catherine the Great, and remained
in place up to 1917, into the Soviet era, and
to a degree their institutional successors
survive in the Russian Federation. The most
important and consequential of these orga-
nizations was the Orenburg Muslim Spiritu-
al Assembly, founded in 1788 and head-
quartered in the city of Ufa. This organiza-
tion administered nearly all of the Muslim
communities in a vast area, encompassing
the Volga-Ural region, southwestern Siberia,
and at varying times, the northern Kazakh
steppe. In all, by the beginning of the 20t h
century the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual As-
sembly administered approximately seven
million Muslims.
While firmly integrated into the Russian
state in political and economic terms, cul-
turally the Volga-Ural Muslims in imperial
Russia were for the most part isolated, or
rather insulated, from Russian cultural influ-
ence. In fact, the establishment of imperial-
level Islamic institutions unleashed a highly
dynamic Islamic intellectual revival at the
grassroots level which paralleled and was
dependent upon Russia's general political
and economic expansion. To be sure, this
very much self-aware revival was the foun-
dation for the emergence of Pan-Turkist,
Pan-Islamist and local nationalist move-
ments in Russia after 1905, but the Islamic
revival is worthy of study in its own right as
an example of the symbiotic relationship
between Russian political and economic
power on the one hand, and its Muslim
communities on the other.
The Islamic revival
in Imperial Russia
The Islamic revival that took place in im-
perial Russia at this time involved the estab-
lishment of a massive network of local insti-
tutions, including mosques, madrasas, m a k-
t a bs, and Sufi lodges. Before the accession
of Catherine II, these institutions existed in
Russia but were very poorly developed.
Equally important was the revival of Muslim
intellectual life. Thousands of m a k t a bs ,
where village children received Islamic pri-
mary education, and a network of dozens of
madrasas, regional centres of higher educa-
tion where imams and other Islamic schol-
ars received training in all of the major Is-
lamic sciences, were the institutional engine
of the revival. Already by the end of the 18t h
century the madrasa network was well es-
tablished, especially in the cities of Oren-
burg and Kazan, which to a large degree
were the centres of Russia's Islamic revival.
This network extended throughout the Is-
lamic world, where many Volga-Ural schol-
ars study. The most prominent destinations
were Central Asia, especially Bukhara, Dagh-
estan, and Egypt. Intellectual aspects of Rus-
sia's Islamic revival have been recently dis-
cussed in a pioneering study by the German
scholar Michael Kemper, entitled Sufis und
Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baschkirien: der is-
lamische Diskurs unter russicher Herrschaft,
1 7 8 9 - 1 8 8 9 (Berlin: Schwarz, 1998). In this
study the term 'Islamic Discourse' has a re-
stricted meaning. It implies the debates and
discussions of social, political and religious
issues expressed through traditional Islamic
literary genres and institutions, such as Su-
fism and Sufi treatises, theology, law, and
h i s t o r i o g r a p h y .
At the foundation of Islamic revival in the
Volga-Ural region and Siberia were, howev-
er, local Islamic institutions, which were
overwhelmingly rural. These consisted of
mosques, madrasas and m a k t a bs, and were
staffed by imams, m u d a r r i ses, and m u ' a d h d-
h i ns. To these we can also add local Sufi net-
works, which were closely integrated into
this institutional structure. A singular fea-
ture of these institutions, which is made ob-
vious in the considerable institutionally fo-
cused historiography produced within
these communities, is that the growth and
the very existence of Islamic institutions was
predicated on the institutional framework
of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly
as well as upon the bureaucratic mecha-
nisms administered by the provincial civil
authorities. Such a framework not only for-
malized the status of these communities as
Muslims vis-à-vis the empire's non-Muslim
majority, but it also served to distinguish
Volga-Ural, Siberian Muslims, and to a limit-
ed degree Kazakh Muslims from the em-
pire's newly incorporated Muslims outside
of Russia proper. Another important feature
characterizing these institutions was that
they evolved in the context of rapid empire-
wide economic expansion. Specifically, the
number of mosques grew at an ever increas-
ing pace, well beyond the natural increase
of the Muslim population. Within his own
lifetime, an individual could witness the
number of mosques, m a k t a bs, and scholars
multiply several times over in his own com-
munity. Momentum carried this growth
through the 1917 Revolution and ensuing
civil war. New mosques were being built
and new Islamic scholars were being trained
right up to 1929, when the Soviet authori-
ties began closing mosques and arresting Is-
lamic scholars in earnest.
A detailed examination of Russia's rural
Muslim institutions indicates that the flour-
ishing of institutional life was symptomatic
of a very dynamic and active cultural life in
rural areas. As we have noted, Michael Kem-
per has examined the major intellectual cur-
rents, or Islamic discourse, challenging ill-in-
formed yet commonly encountered stereo-
types depicting pre-modern Islamic intel-
lectual life as decadent, derivative and be-
nighted. However, these modernist-in-
spired depictions of Islamic life in imperial
Russia, which seek to emphasize the 'mod-
ernization' and 'national' aspirations of Rus-
sia's Muslims, have tended to say very little
about rural institutions as such, instead as-
suming that their already doubtful conclu-
sions could simply be applied to rural areas,
which they assumed without elaboration
were obviously backward. Such nationalist-
inspired studies have assumed that by the
end of the 19t h century traditional Muslim
institutions were in serious crisis, unable to
meet the needs of a population entering the
modern (that is, European) world. These his-
torians argue that j a d i dist education, that is,
European-style education adapted to a
Muslim context, simply replaced the decay-
ing and useless traditional modes of educa-
tion in these communities. Typically these
modernist depictions of 'traditional' educa-
tion are not based on any empirical evi-
dence; the superiority of modernism and
European education is simply assumed and
s t a t e d .
Islamic education in
Novouzensk district
Research undertaken on the Islamic insti-
tutions of a single district, specifically
Novouzensk district in Samara province,
demonstrates that dynamic institutions, es-
pecially educational institutions, existed at
the rural level essentially up to the 1917
Revolution. At the beginning of the 20t hc e n-
tury in this district, 'traditional' educational
institutions were in no way 'in crisis', but
were actually expanding. Both parents and
s h a g i r ds were closely involved in monitor-
ing the curriculum and effective m u d a r r i se s
were actively sought. Furthermore, the sys-
tem of patronage of institutions and finan-
cial support by the community as whole in-
volved close interaction and cooperation
between the community and instructors.
Local instructors and ca l i ms were closely in-
tegrated into the regional Islamic network
and into larger networks as well.
As a result, the curriculum both in
madrasas and m a k t a bs was fairly uniform
throughout the Volga-Ural region and en-
abled literate villagers to express them-
selves in an Islamic discourse that linked
them both regionally and to the Islamic
world as a whole. Thus, isolation from Russ-
ian education, which modernists cite as a
failure of the traditional curriculum, was ac-
tually seen by these Muslims as desirable,
not only because it distinguished them from
non-Muslims, but also because it helped link
them to the Islamic world. In fact, when
modernist (j a d i d) schools opened in Novou-
zensk district during the first decade of the
2 0t h century, they were forced to close, not
out of opposition but out of apathy on the
part of the villagers. Clearly they deemed
modernist education to be of little value. 
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We ste rn  Euro p e
I R K A - C H R I S T I N  M O H R
Muslim institutions in Europe harbour growing ex-
pert knowledge. One example of this development
comprises the syllabi for religious instruction of Mus-
lim children at public schools that have been devel-
oped in different European contexts. Among other
things, these instruction programmes aim at posi-
tioning their clientele vis-à-vis the religious sources,
in a particular community and society. The premises
on which these positionings are based, as well as
their religious-theological justification and legitima-
tion, form the focus of a thesis project that incorpo-
rates syllabus outlines and instruction materials




In Germany, two proposals for the transmis-
sion of Islamic knowledge are currently
under discussion: the plan for Islamic in-
struction developed by the umbrella organi-
zation Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutsch-
land (ZMD), and the programme developed
by the pedagogical expert organization In-
stitut f ü r Internationale P ä d a g o g i k und Di-
daktik (IPD), both in Cologne. The latter pro-
posal forms the first practical attempt by
Muslims to provide Islamic religious instruc-
tion at two elementary schools in Berlin. In
the following summary of preliminary re-
sults, it is important to remember that Ger-
many is the only country within the sample
without 'practical experience'. Compared
with the syllabus drafts – as Muslim organi-
zations name their first attempts in the area
of syllabus development – the practical ex-
perience with religious instruction in Austria
and the Netherlands is likely to have impact-
ed the further development and reworking
of programmes in those two countries.
Divergent concepts
The key concepts presented in the two
German proposals for instruction are inter-
preted in quite different ways. For example,
the planning committee1 at the IPD consid-
ers the concept of g e s c h ö p f l i c h k e i t or 'creat-
ed-ness' to be the common denominator of
all humankind, and as such the starting
point for its anthropology and worldview.
The Zentralrat, on the other hand, does ac-
knowledge this concept but in its own pro-
posal it has made the u m m a of Muslims –
rather than the concept of created-ness –
the centre of attention. These two concepts
are vital to the respective attempts at self-
positioning: the IPD places the Muslim chil-
dren at the centre of society and of hu-
mankind in general, whereas the Zentralrat
is concerned with ensuring a protective
space for the umma as a minority under
threat. Orienting the children towards a de-
fensively defined u m m a, which functions as
a haven or shelter, is thus the focus of the
latter's education programme.2
Different from the approach of the IPD, the
notion of God remains abstract in the Zen-
tralrat's proposal to the extent that there is a
deliberate avoidance of God as a thematic
unit. This absence of theologizing is charac-
teristic of the religious attitude of its syllabus
planners: God is a self-evident cause of belief
and at the same time remains distant. In
sharp contrast to this, the instruction pro-
gramme of the IPD mirrors the conviction
that a relationship with God has to grow in
every single child in a very special way, and
that a personal relationship with the Creator
is a basic condition for leading an Islamic life.
The Zentralrat is oriented ultimately to-
ward an ideal u m m a, and thus its proposal is
open only at its margins to the non-Muslim
world: regardless of where they live, Mus-
lims remain within this u m m a, dealing pri-
marily with and referring to each other. The
Zentralrat's planners affirm that religious in-
struction should seek to combat the disori-
entation experienced as crisis by the indi-
vidual in a fragmented lifeworld, by provid-
ing a s i n g l e orientation by means of a s i n g l e
religious perspective. This lifeworld is not
understood in terms of individual learning.
Instead, the salvaging perspective is pre-
sented inside and through the community.
The IPD, on the other hand, encourages chil-
dren to locate themselves within the con-
text of Islam understood as a universal cul-
ture, as a natural perspective on the world. It
encourages them to feel connected with
others in this context, to positively focus on
commonalities, and thus to see themselves
as part of a plural society rather than as a mi-
nority suffering from discrimination.
Religious sources
Analysis of the German Islamic syllabi re-
veals that it is the attitude toward the
sources – the particular perspective on the
nature of the texts – that forms the basis for
the planning committees' relationship to
the world. This basic attitude toward the re-
ligious sources determines which elements
the instruction plans consider to be crucial
and non-negotiable for Islam and for being
M u s l i m .3
Both programmes place different empha-
sis on the religious sources. In the conception
of the IPD, the entire world is accessed
through the Qur'anic text, and the text in
turn is illuminated by the concrete lifeworld.
As a result of the vital relation between text
and life, the meaning of the source, its reach
and interpretation dominates the IPD's syl-
labus. The meanings of the Qur'an develop a
force and dynamics that enable a continuous
expansion of the definition of Islam as well as
an incorporation of plural, contemporary
ways of and perspectives on life into the un-
derstanding of Islam. The Zentralrat, on the
other hand, does not posit an integrated rela-
tionship between text and world, since it pre-
sents religion predominantly as ritual and
ethics, which are extracted from the sources
and become relatively independent from
them. This idea of religious instruction re-
mains focused on the teaching of precepts
and prohibitions. However, the latter are lim-
ited to the ritual area defined as religious – a
strategy to render Muslims compatible with
different societies and establish themselves
among other religious communities in Eu-
rope. In this regard, the syllabus of the Zen-
tralrat has to be termed secular, because it
assumes a separation between religion and
other subsystems. By presenting religion as a
canon of fixed rules and bodies of knowl-
edge, the Zentralrat attempts to protect reli-
gion as a distinct subsystem and to situate it
as a stable element in the lives of children.
The focus on the individual leads planners
of the IPD to emphasize individual answers
and paths in the sense of t u r u q (paths), all of
which lead to God – thereby separating the
concept of t a r i q a from its mystical back-
ground. In contrast, the Zentralrat is rather
oriented toward the public structure of reli-
g i o n .4 Whereas t a r i q a refers to the individ-
ual path toward certainty and perfection,
s h a r ica means the God-given – publicly visi-
ble – way of life of the entire community.
But the Zentralrat incorporates only that
part of the s h a r ica that regulates the rela-
tionship to God and reduces the m uca m a l a t
from a legal code managing the totality of
social life to moral comportment. According
to Halstead, it can be said that the Islamic
education envisaged by the Zentralrat re-
spects individual freedom regarding the de-
velopment of spiritual faculties or feelings
and does not interfere with it, without how-
ever extending this freedom to the public
face of religion and the visible commitment
to the shared path of life.5 In turn, the em-
phasis on the primacy of the individual in
the IPD's logic by no means indicates a re-
striction of religion to one system among
others. Instead, religion claims validity for
the entire, non-secularized lifeworld of the
individual. This is what the syllabus planners
call a 'global' perspective.
Neglecting the Islamic
t r a d i t i o n
Both instruction plans under discussion
tend toward an autonomous approach with
regard to the interpretation of Qur'anic
texts, and thus toward a neglect of tradition
– understood as accumulated knowledge
which is the result of centuries of research in
various Islamic sciences. Both organizations
do not cling to Islamic tradition, but rather
circumvent it or draw upon single elements
that they deem befitting. As a result, their
appropriation of tradition is highly selective,
unsystematic and remains unarticulated.
Neither the Zentralrat nor the IPD draws ex-
plicitly on classical exegesis. This neglect
probably has to do with a lack of available
experts, and thus may be of a temporary na-
ture. But it is above all due to the modernist
tendency to approach the sources indepen-
dently and not allow tradition to get in the
way of addressing contemporary issues. It is
not the quoting of authorities and variants
of interpretation, their selection and presen-
tation that prove the originality of an author.
In the case of the instruction plans under dis-
cussion, it is rather the selection and presen-
tation of the sources themselves, that is the
Qur'an and h a d i t h, which clarify the respec-
tive religious-theological approaches. Both
syllabi do not problematize the lack of ex-
plicit engagement with the Islamic tradition
that characterizes them. Instead, direct ac-
cess to the sources is implicitly offered as a
guarantee for a modernist understanding of
religion, which the IPD presents as one
method among others; whereas the Zentral-
rat claims it to represent Islam as such. The
latter assumes the irrelevance of tradition to
such an extent that it does not even see the
need to confront it in order to justify its own
theological point of view.
Apart from the differences described
above regarding the religious-theological
positioning in the context of Islamic reli-
gious instruction, on the level of phenome-
nology the plans offer familiar, shared or at
least similar definitions of Islam as based on
the t a w h i d, the 'five pillars', the six articles of
faith and other known elements. It seems
obvious that these agreed-upon elements
of Islam build a common and formal de-
nominator in inter-Muslim relations. It re-
mains to be seen how the positionings de-
veloped in the Netherlands and in Austria
differ from those that have emerged in Ger-
many. 
Learning how to
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Muslims make up about 2% of the 42 million people
in South Africa. They were classified under the
Apartheid as 'Malays' and 'Indians' and settled in
such major cities as Cape Town, Durban, Port Eliza-
beth, Johannesburg and Pretoria. As the longest sur-
viving religious minority in a predominantly Christ-
ian and secular country, the Muslims of South Africa
have preserved their cultural and religious identity.




In 1658 the first Muslims arrived in the Cape.
They were the Mardykers from Amboya (in
the Indonesian archipelago) and part of the
involuntary migration of slaves and political
prisoners that lasted until 1834. The Mardyk-
e r s were the Malay servants of Dutch offi-
cials who were returning to the Netherlands
from the East but preferred to remain in the
Cape. The Dutch East Indian Company, rec-
ognizing the Dutch Reformed Church as the
only official religious institution, prohibited
Muslims from the public practice of Islam.
The first most notable exile from Indonesia
was the princely Sufi, Shaykh Yusuf (d. 1699)
from Maccasar, who was exiled to the Cape
in 1694 for his struggle for Bantam indepen-
dence from the Dutch. As a shaykh of main-
ly the Khalwatiyyah Sufi order, he was an in-
spiration to the small Muslim community.
Many slaves came later from the Bengal
coast, but large numbers of political exiles
came from the Indonesian islands. In all,
about 72% of the Muslims came from Asia,
particularly India. The first group of Indian
Muslims arrived in South Africa from Gujarat
and Bombay as indentured labourers from
1860. Indian Muslims are concentrated in
Kwazulu Natal, Gauteng and the adjacent
areas. Although they respected Arabic as a
sacred language, they regarded Urdu as a
religious language to be used in sermons
and to be taught in madrasas.
The first figure to be associated with Is-
lamic education is an exile from Indonesia,
Abdullah Kadi Abdus Salaam (d. 1807),
known as Tuan Guru. He became a prisoner
on Robben Island until 1793, and after the
new ordinance of religious freedom in 1804,
he founded the first mosque and madrasa in
Dorp Street, Cape Town. He performed the
first Friday congregational prayer and
paved the pattern for the home- and
mosque-based classes in Qur'anic recita-
tion, Islamic beliefs and Islamic law. By 1832
there were about 12 mosque-based schools
in Cape Town. These schools attracted a
large number of slave and free black chil-
dren as the colonialists denied them of edu-
c a t i o n .
The foundation of the higher Islamic
learning in South Africa dates back to the
m i d - 1 9t h century. In 1860 Shaykh Abu Bakr
Effendi (d. 1880), a Turkish scholar who had
come to the Cape at the request of the
British colonizers, established a school of
Higher Islamic Theology. This was different
from the mosque-based schools, and judg-
ing from Effendi's Arabic-Afrikaans work,
Bayan al-Din (The Elucidation of Religion),
the school provided a more in-depth knowl-
edge of Islam. It was the precursor to the Is-
lamic seminaries and community colleges
that followed much later.
Madrasas and schools
The madrasa, whether home-based or
mosque-based, remains up till today, an im-
portant vehicle for the transmission of a
rudimentary Islamic education in South
Africa. It is an extension of the home. At
home parents set the example of religious
practices and children imitate their exam-
ple; at the madrasa the children learn more
about these religious values and practices.
But most importantly, they learn to read the
Qur'an. However, since the 1960s Muslim
parents have become more earnest in hav-
ing their children pursue a higher secular
education, and with the increased pres-
sures of schoolwork, many of these children
stop attending the madrasa after primary
s c h o o l .
The development of the madrasa must be
understood in the context of the political
status of Muslims as 'non-white' and ipso
facto part of the second-class citizenry in the
land of their birth. This sets them apart from
their compatriots who adhered to the domi-
nant Christian culture. Thus Muslim children
had to be socialized according to a different
set of values; independently of mainstream
culture and directed at the acquisition of Is-
lamic knowledge, Qur'anic recitation, and
the personal observance of Islamic worship.
Since the Christian mission schools and
state secular schools did not accommodate
the religious sensibilities of Muslim children,
Dr Abdullah Abdurrahman (d. 1940) a med-
ical doctor and popular politician, found an
alternative form of education and thus es-
tablished Rahmaniyah, the first state-aided
Muslim mission (primary) school in Aspeling
Street, Cape Town. The objective was to pro-
vide children with a modern education, but
not to neglect the elementary teachings of
Islam. By 1957 there were 15 such schools
registered with the State Education Depart-
ment. Recently, one such school, the Habibia
primary school, offered Arabic as an exam-
inable subject.
Under Apartheid the schools were segre-
gated, and most Muslim children either
went to schools under the Indian Affairs De-
partment (mainly in Gauteng and Kwazulu
Natal) or the Coloured Affairs Department
(mainly in the Cape). The schools were gov-
erned by the Christian National Education
Policy, which did not provide for the needs
of minority religions. Muslims parents felt
that the religious identity of their children
was being undermined, and so they de-
manded that Arabic be offered in the state
schools. Arabic was introduced for the first
time in 1975 in the Kwazulu Natal and Gaut-
eng regions under the Indian Affairs Depart-
ment of Education. Parents readily support-
ed Arabic, not merely as a language, but as
an important part of Islamic education. The
school boycotts of the 1980s disrupted the
education of children, obliging many Mus-
lim parents to consider alternative means of
education. When the Habibia Girls College
was founded in 1985, it gained the support
of many parents. The college was inspired
by the global trends in the Islamization of
knowledge; today there are probably over
40 such private schools in South Africa,
known as Islamia Colleges. However, these
Islamic private schools have been criticized
for being elitist, excluding the poorer seg-
ments of society, and for not preparing the
Muslim child for integration into the broad-
er society. The madrasa therefore still pro-
vides a supplementary Islamic education for
the majority of Muslim children in South
A f r i c a .
In the 1990s the provisions for Muslims in
state schools increased. By 1993, Arabic
was offered in 8,921 state primary schools
and 1,124 secondary schools, albeit that as
a result of the downsizing of schools, Ara-
bic as a subject was also affected. In the
Cape it was introduced for the first time at
Spine Road Senior Secondary School in
1992. Recently, Islamic studies was intro-
duced as a non-examination subject in the
state schools to provide an alternative to
biblical studies for Muslim children. Not all
schools offer Arabic or Islamic studies,
which leaves the madrasa as the one insti-
tution which has enduring formative influ-
ence on the lives of Muslim children. How-
ever, Muslims have now generally acknowl-
edged that madrasas would have to func-
tion in tandem with, or parallel to, the sec-
ular schools.
More recent educational developments
include the establishment of foreign
schools, both Egyptian and Turkish. The
Egyptian 'Al-Azhar schools' are funded
mainly by Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Ara-
bic and Islamic studies are taught in Arabic
by Egyptian shaykhs and modern subjects
are taught in English by South African
teachers. The code of dress is Islamic.
Higher education
The University of South Africa was the first
to introduce an Arabic programme in 1955,
followed by the University of Durban-West-
ville (1975) and the University of the West-
ern Cape (1982). The following institutions
offered Islamic studies: the University of
Durban-Westville (1974), Rand Afrikaans
University (1976), and the University of Cape
Town (1986). In recent years, due to lack of
student numbers, some of these depart-
ments have had to close down or merge
with other departments. Unlike the Islamic
seminaries, the universities have adopted
an academic approach to the study of Islam,
be it historical (University of the Durban-
Westville), social scientific (University of
Cape Town) or philological (University of
the Western Cape).
Historically, Muslim religious leaders have
graduated in the Middle East or the Indo-
Pakistan Subcontinent, but opportunities
for studies were created locally when in
1971 the first Darul-Ulum was established in
Newcastle, Kwazulu Natal. This Darul-Ulum
was based on the Darsi-Nizami course from
Deoband, India. However, while the Darsi-
Nizami course was originally broad and in-
cluded the rational sciences, the current
versions, in India and in South Africa, are
confined to the religious sciences only. In
Newcastle they offer the following subjects:
Islamic history, Islamic creed, jurisprudence,
principles of jurisprudence, h a d i t h, princi-
ples of h a d i t h, Qur'anic exegesis, and Arabic
language and literature. A significant differ-
ence from Deoband is that all instruction is
in English.
Less indigenous to South Africa and more
in keeping with the Deobandi spirit is the
Azaadville seminary, near Johannesburg,
which teaches all subjects in Urdu. Even Ara-
bic was taught in Urdu! Today there are
many Islamic seminaries in South Africa that
aim at conferring Islamic knowledge and
preserving Islamic faith. A shortcoming,
however, is that because their curriculum is
devoid of the rational sciences, they pro-
duce graduates that are unable to confront
the challenges of secular modernity.
Community-based colleges
The sole institution that tried to overcome
the dichotomy between the secular and the
religious, and to combine the academic ap-
proach of the university with the religious
approach of the Darul-Ulums, is the Islamic
College of Southern Africa, which was es-
tablished in 1991 in Gatesville, Cape Town.
This community-based college offers a four-
year bachelor's degree in theology, Arabic,
and Islamic law. The Islamic College has a
wide curriculum, including subjects such as
comparative religion and Islamic spirituali-
ty. The lecturers' backgrounds vary; some
are graduates of universities and others of
Islamic seminaries. The Islamic College is a
feeder for the honours degrees in Arabic
and in Islamic studies at the University of
the Western Cape and the University of
Cape Town, respectively.
To conclude, the above Islamic education-
al institutions have evolved over three cen-
turies and have contributed to the preserva-
tion of the Islamic faith. In the current post-
Apartheid period, Muslims are exposed to
an open society with new challenges, mak-
ing it essential for Islamic educational insti-
tutions to prepare their graduates to con-
front the challenges of secular modernity, or
come to terms with it, and by so doing,
make a larger contribution to society while
still retaining their religious identity. 
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C entr al  As i a
B A Y R A M  B A L C I
The Nurcu movement founded by Said Nursi
(1873–1960) is probably one of the most important
religious organizations in Turkey. After Nursi's death
in 1960, the Nurcu brotherhood fragmented into sev-
eral sub-communities with different interpretations
of religion, different goals and different positions on
political issues.* Nowadays, Fethullah G ü l e n c o n t r o l s
the most powerful of these groups. His followers are
also active in Central Asia but, with the possible ex-
ception of Turkmenistan, the movement is unable to
operate in an open and public manner.
Fethullah G ü l en's
Missionary Schools
Fethullah G ü l e n was born in Erzurum in
eastern Turkey in 1938. Deeply influenced
by his family, his religious environment and
by the writings of Nursi, G ü l e n began his
career as an official preacher for the gov-
ernment in 1953. In 1966, he was sent by
the direction of religious affairs to Izmir,
where he created a brotherhood with a
small group of students and disciples. His
community, or c e m a a t, is designated as the
F e t h u l l a h c i movement, although its mem-
bers do not appreciate this term. Basically,
Fethullah G ü l e n's ideas serve to accomplish
three intellectual goals: the Islamization of
the Turkish nationalist ideology; the turkifi-
cation of Islam; and the Islamization of
modernity. And therefore, he wishes to re-
vive the link between the state, religion and
s o c i e t y .
Development of an
educational network
No one knows exactly the size of G ü l e n' s
enormous community of followers and sym-
pathizers, but most agree on an average es-
timate of 3 million members. The move-
ment obtains much of its support from
young urban men, especially doctors, acad-
emics and other professionals. The move-
ment has grown in part by sponsoring stu-
dent dormitories, summer camps, colleges,
universities, classrooms and communica-
tion organizations. Without any doubt, edu-
cation is central to the identity of the com-
munity and favoured its growth in the
Balkans, Central Asia and the Turkic world in
general. However, Central Asian Turkic Re-
publics enjoy a special position in G ü l e n' s
s t r a t e g y .
The collapse of the Soviet Union opened
opportunities for Turkey. The state and pri-
vate companies quickly designed special
policies to develop their presence and influ-
ence in Central Asia. But very soon, Fethul-
lah G ü l e n took the lead with his business-
men, supporters and his community teach-
ers. Economic and cultural networks were
established between the c e m a a t ( g r o u p s
within the movement) and the different so-
cial and economic actors. Several Nurcu del-
egations visited these countries and invited
Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz officials
in Turkey to convince them to advocate the
replication of Nurcu educational structures
in their home countries.
Those early connections helped to inau-
gurate in each of the Central Asian republics
dozens of schools. Statistics show that in
January 2001 the movement in Kazakhstan
had already 30 high schools and one univer-
sity, welcoming 5,664 pupils and employing
580 teachers from Turkey. In the same peri-
od, 11 high schools and one university were
established in Kyrgyzstan, with more than
3,100 pupils and 323 Turkish teachers. In
Turkmenistan, the community controls 14
high schools and one university for 3,294
pupils and 353 teachers. Finally, in Uzbek-
istan (until September 2000, when all were
closed because of a diplomatic crisis) 17
high schools and one international school,
employing 210 teachers and welcoming
3,334 pupils, had been founded.
These schools can be said to focus on
modern and scientific education. Religious
matters are completely absent from their
curricula. In all these countries, as a conse-
quence of the Soviet legacy and of the local
leaders' suspicion, religion has no place in
the educational system. The movement's
schools are managed by Turkish and nation-
al administrators and teachers. Usually sci-
entific matters (e.g. biology, physics, and
computer science) are the main courses and
are taught in English and Turkish languages.
The national language is of course very
much present, as is the Russian language,
which is still maintained as a language of
communication throughout the area.
The Nurcu community is considered elitist
in Turkey, and this is also true for Central
Asia. Selective competitions are organized
every year to identify the best pupils. As a
consequence of the conservatism of the c e-
m a a t, 95% of the schools are restricted to
boys, with only one or two schools in each
republic for girls, although all three univer-
sities accept both male and female stu-
dents. Thanks to the modern scientific edu-
cation, the opportunities for learning Eng-
lish and Turkish, and the favourable chances
in passing the universities' entry exams,
Nurcu schools have a very good reputation
among the local populations. The crisis of
the national educational systems partly ex-
plains the high performance of the Nurcu
s c h o o l s .
The schools' raison d'être
Turkish media have very often inter-
viewed Fethullah G ü l e n and his followers
about their intentions for Central Asia. They
were always given the same answer: 'We are
here to help the sister republics of Turkey.'
This supposes the creation of 'cultural
bridges' between Turkey and Central Asia.
Detailed research on the activities and the
project of the community shows that the
Nurcu movement in Central Asia is a real
missionary movement. Its mission is to re-
establish Islam in the region, which has
been dominated for the last 70 years by an
atheist power persecuting Islam. To that ob-
jective, the Nurcu employ methods similar
to those of the Jesuits. Indeed, like Jesuits,
the Nurcu have developed an elitist method
of recruitment; they wish to change society
through education; and they perceive edu-
cation as a global supervision of pupils in
and out of school. Also, the missionary
movement entertains excellent relations
with the target populations to in order to
'convert' them.
Despite similarities, the Nurcu missionary
method has its distinctive characteristics.
Schools, in spite of allegations in the Turkish
media – especially in the Kemalist media,
are not a direct instrument of proselytism.
Because it is too dangerous for the exis-
tence of the community itself in Central
Asia, Nurcu missionaries never openly or di-
rectly proselytize.
Their h o c a e f e n d i, or 'respected lord',
G ü l e n advocates two main ways of spread-
ing Islam: t e b l i g h and t e m s i l. The first, and
very classical, t e b l i g h, is to profess and teach
openly the 'good' mission. But since nowa-
days t e b l i g h activities are developing every-
where, the t e m s i l method seems to be pre-
ferred. With t e m s i l, G ü l e n expects his follow-
ers to represent in their daily activities the
proper and exemplary way of life. Through
t e m s i l the Nurcu will never profess openly
the philosophy of Islam, rather they live it.
For example, teachers of the movement's
schools have to be polite, immaculate, and
respectful. These ethics of life demand from
the missionaries both hard work and the ac-
ceptance of hizmet insani ('in service'), or
helping others. They must respect the coun-
try, its flag, its history, and must prove to be
good examples, in particular for the young
generation. They are not allowed to pro-
nounce the name of G ü l e n or Nursi, nor are
they permitted to spread Nurcu literature, at
least not openly. While in some cases a mi-
nority of pupils in some small cities (not very
well controlled by the central educational
authorities) are subjected to more direct
proselytism ( t e b l i g h ), the most important
aim of the c e m a a t is to spread the message
without expressing it directly.
The future of the community
The c e m a a t is present everywhere in Cen-
tral Asia and will definitely contribute to a
number of changes in these republics. It al-
ready influences the national educational
systems. Managed by private companies,
the Nurcu schools are perceived as proof of
the efficiency of the market economy (90 %
of the pupils enter university). For this rea-
son, in countries like Turkmenistan, cooper-
ation in the educational sector with the
Nurcu is encouraged and supported by au-
thorities in order to modernize the national
s t r u c t u r e s .
The aim of the community is to educate
and influence the future national elites, who
should radically differ from the old Soviet
apparatchiks. This might take 10 to 15 years,
but the Nurcu are ready to invest in this
long-term goal: the future elites are expect-
ed to speak English and Turkish and it is
hoped that they will prove their good inten-
tions towards the Fethullahci and towards
Turkey. Therefore, Turkish authorities show
an ambivalent attitude towards the move-
ment. If in Turkey the state (especially the
army) is sometimes very critical of the c e-
m a a t for its 'reactionary' projects, Turkish
embassies have developed and entertain
good relations with the Nurcu in Central
Asia. And by reciprocity the Nurcu benefit
from Turkish official support, for without it
private organizations face great difficulties
in terms of functioning in Central Asia. Con-
sidering the benefits the Nurcu schools in
Central Asia bring to Turkey, Turkish ambas-
sadors always support and encourage coop-
eration agreements between the local state
and Nurcu educational enterprises.
One should, however, realize that the de-
velopment of the Nurcu movement in Cen-
tral Asia is still in its infancy. The community
is active in Central Asia since 1991, but it is
still primarily a Turkish effort, with Turkish
teachers and Turkish businessmen and sup-
porters. Though they work at it in a patient
manner, the Nurcu still lack strong local
rooting among the populations and emerg-
ing elites. Moreover, Islamic movements are
not welcome in Central Asia by the govern-
ments, and that explains why the c e m a a t
never officially or openly shows its authen-
tic religious identity and why usually the
local communities have no clue as to the
schools' real nature. Most people will know
that in town there is a 'Turkish school' but
will never mention any 'Fethullahci' school,
as this term has no signification for them. Al-
most 95% of the Fethullahci in Central Asia
are still Turks from Turkey. That means the
movement is an expatriate and migrant
phenomenon. Openness on the part of the
movement will only be possible should the
governments in the area change their atti-
tude towards religion, in particular Islam.
The effects of the current crisis in Afghanistan
will most likely not lead to liberalization in the
Central Asian republics. In fact, it is highly
doubtful that activities of foreign religious
movements will be tolerated at any point in
the near future. 
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Southe ast  As i a
Y A S U K O  K OB AY A S H I
On 5 January 2001 the Japanese Asahi Shinbun n e w s-
paper reported that the Indonesian Department of
Health had ordered P.T. Ajinomoto-Indonesia to
withdraw its product, Ajinomoto, an artificial sea-
soning of monosodium glutamate (MSG), from the
market because it contained pork. A few days later,
the then Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid,
also an expert on f i q h, expressed to the Japanese
Minister of Justice that he believed the Ajinomoto
seasoning could indeed be consumed by Muslims.
This seemingly trivial occurrence nonetheless be-
came intertwined in the religious and political issues
of Indonesia under the Wahid government.
Ajinomoto Indonesia
Haram or Halal?
Ajinomoto, a multinational corporation based
in Japan, has been operating in Indonesia
for more than thirty years and has succeed-
ed in establishing itself in the Indonesian
market by selling its product in small bags at
quite reasonable prices. In Japan itself,
nowadays people do not consume this arti-
ficial seasoning very often as it is widely
known that natural ones are healthier. In
Southeast Asia, however, Ajinomoto is regu-
larly consumed despite the availability of
various kinds of natural spices.
Halal certificate
In Indonesia, one can find the mark of
'halal' or 'halal 100%' on the wrappings of
processed food. This means the product has
met the government requirements for h a l a l
products. The MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia;
Indonesian Council of Ulama) is authorized
to assess the products. The LPPOM-MUI
(Lembaga Pnegkajian Pangan, Obat-obat,
Kosmetika-MUI; Assessment Institute of
Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics of the ICU) is in
charge of scientific assessment. The results
of field and laboratory examinations are
brought to an auditors' meeting of the
LPPOM-MUI, after which the Fatwa Commit-
tee assesses the data relating to products
from the point of view of religion, granting
or withholding approval. A h a l a l c e r t i f i c a t e
issued by the MUI thus declares the legiti-
macy of foodstuffs in accordance with the
dictates of Islamic law. However, this certifi-
cation system, which began in 1994, is not
obligatory. A producer can apply voluntarily
for a h a l a l certificate. To date, almost 1300
products have obtained h a l a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n ,
but that figure constitutes only some 10% of
the total of products concerned.
The certificate is valid for two years, but
the LPPOM-MUI must be consulted prompt-
ly on any change of ingredient, food addi-
tive or raw material in order to gain ap-
proval for its use. Ajinomoto obtained its
latest h a l a l certificate in September 1998
and reapplied in July 2000. The application
showed that one of Ajinomoto's ingredients
had been changed – from Bactopeptone to
Bactosoytone – without consulting the
L P P O M - M U I .
The main raw material of Ajinomoto is
sugarcane molasses, fermented by mi-
crobes and made into MSG, which is further
separated and purified. Bactosoytone,
which is not produced by P.T. Ajinomoto-In-
donesia itself but is purchased from the
Difco Corporation in the United States, is
used as the growth medium for the fermen-
tation microbes. Bactosoytone is made from
soybeans out of which the protein is hy-
drolyzed. The LPPOM-MUI looked for infor-
mation on this unfamiliar ingredient and
they received a letter from the United States
informing them that in the process of hy-
drolysis, an enzyme extracted from a pig
pancreas is used as a catalyst in the manu-
facturing of Bactosoytone. The use of such
an enzyme in the production process be-
came an issue even though the final prod-
uct of Ajinomoto does not contain any pork
e n z y m e .
The LPPOM-MUI reported these findings
to the Fatwa Committee, where the matter
was hotly debated. In October 2000 the
LPPOM-MUI advised P.T. Ajinomoto-Indone-
sia to stop using Bactosoytone. They heed-
ed this and from 23 November began to re-
place Bactosoytone with Mameno, which is
free from pork enzymes. On 16 December
the Fatwa Committee concluded that the
Ajinomoto that had been produced by
using Bactosoytone was h a r a m.
Legal-formalism or multi-
dimensional approach
Let us consider briefly the i j t i h a d p r o c e s s
of the Fatwa Committee. Naturally the dis-
cussion starts with the prohibition of the
eating of pork, found in the Qur'an. Next is
the h a d i t h containing the Prophet Moham-
mad's utterance concerning the disposal of
oil in which a dead mouse has been found.
The committee quotes the cu l a m as' long-
standing agreement that every part of a pig
is najis ca i n, inherently impure. Then, a
k a i d a h (legal maxim) is applied, to wit: 'in
cases where h a l a l things are mixed with
h a r a m things, then h a r a m things are pro-
nounced to be dominant'. Finally the results
obtained by the LPPOM-MUI are considered
and a decision is taken.1 Clearly the MUI's
deliberations concentrate on the religious
domain and scrutinize religious materials.
We may look at how Abdurrahman Wahid
justified his opinion. He also began with the
Qu'ran, but specified the limitations of the
prohibition against the eating of pork. He
did not take issue with the use of pork, be-
cause it has too wide an application. He re-
ceived a report that no pork enzyme was ex-
tracted from the final product of Ajinomoto.
He applied a k a i d a h 'giving priority to the
rejection of taking a great risk rather than
wishing to gain benefit'.2 Also he took into
consideration the withdrawal of investment
and the possibility of mass unemployment.3
The first criticism of the MUI's fatwa came
from a scientist, Umar Anggoro Jenie, a
chemistry professor at Gadjah Mada Univer-
sity: 'Bactosoytone is not an active material.
So Ajinomoto is not a h a r a m i t e m . '4 A c c o r d-
ing to some Muslim intellectuals, this case is
included in the category of k h i l a f i y a h ( a n
issue on which different opinions are legiti-
mately possible), which is often found in
I s l a m .
President Wahid was criticized by rival
politicians for interfering in the religious ad-
ministration procedure. Demonstrators also
came to the presidential palace to protest.
Wahid has earned a reputation as a substan-
tialist Muslim, that is, one who wishes to
concentrate on the real substance of Islam.
For a long time he has been criticizing stiff
legal-formalism, and has been encouraging
cu l a m a to move out of the narrow frame-
work of religion and pay attention to social
problems. He considers how Islam can re-
spond to the demands of modern society.
He advocates a multi-dimensional approach
to practical problems. And so it is clear that
he would still have delivered the same blunt
opinion concerning the MUI's fatwa whatev-
er his position in Indonesian society. As a
supporter of pluralism, he did not forget to
say: 'Both opinions are correct in doing i j t i-
h a d' ,5 again provoking the anger of the con-
servative cu l a m a.
Political conflict
President Wahid stated that he saw this
problem as a political one, part of the series
of manoeuvres undertaken to damage his
government. Many were inclined to agree.
Indeed, during those months there was a se-
quence of attacks on the President, ranging
from bomb explosions to the disclosure of a
'sex scandal', all intended to effect a speedy
discrediting of Wahid and his government.
Indonesians seemed exhausted as a result
of all the political conflict – any and all prob-
lems were suspected of having a political
background. The starting point for all of
this, however, remains the issue of P.T. Aji-
nomoto-Indonesia and its having neglected
the obligatory consultation on a change of
ingredients. While it may be difficult to es-
tablish any political motivation behind the
issuing of the MUI's fatwa itself, there are
certain political issues that played a role in
the evolution of events.
The MUI and P.T. Ajinomoto-Indonesia
had initially agreed not to bring the issue
into the open, but to settle it secretly by
withdrawing products produced before 23
November. However, the h a r a m d e c i s i o n
was leaked by another Islamic organization
and the MUI was forced to announce this
publicly. It may well be that about this time
political motivation began to play a part.
The first media report appeared on 29 De-
cember in the newspapers. On 3 January the
Ajinomoto case was first reported on televi-
sion and the events were followed by the
media for several days but not to any great
extent. Suddenly on 8 January the Ajinomo-
to case was presented as the most impor-
tant item and was widely reported. This
scale of coverage was maintained for a few
days, the President's statement forming the
c l i m a x .
The internet newsgroup 'Indonesia-L' fea-
tured many postings on this issue, including
those of critics of the MUI who supported
the New Order to legitimize development
policy in accordance with the Islamic point
of view. Broader distrust of Din Syamsuddin,
the general secretary of the MUI, was ex-
pressed in that he often appeared in the
media as a spokesman of the MUI. It is wide-
ly known that Wahid bitterly denounced
him for having the intention of politicizing
Islam. It can thus be said that the historical
background also generated speculation
concerning the political motivation of this
c a s e .
However, the majority of the public re-
mained calm, although there were some
small disturbances. Around the middle of
January the news was disappearing rapidly
from the television as if the effort expended
in making use of this case to hasten political
conflict had been in vain. Only in newspa-
pers was related news found from time to
t i m e .
P.T. Ajinomoto-Indonesia apologized and
withdrew their product from the market, at
a cost of six hundred million yen excluding
transportation and personnel expenses. Aji-
nomoto obtained a new h a l a l c e r t i f i c a t e
around the middle of February. However, it
does not seem so easy to restore Indonesian
consumers' confidence in Ajinomoto.
This case demonstrates how in Islam dif-
ferences of opinion may arise, and some
Muslims can accept that while others can-
not. Also, in the midst of political conflict as
in the present Indonesia, anything can be
made into a political issue. However, we
should not forget that in such a situation a
sound and constructive opinion can still be
heard. 'It is regrettable that society, cu l a m a
and political elites are so responsive to the
issue of pork lard, but they seem to turn a
blind eye towards various corruption scan-
dals which should be punished more se-
verely in that their destructive power is far
more dangerous than is the consuming of
A j i n o m o t o . '6 
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Do w n Und er
S H AH R AM  A K B A R Z A DE H
Assaults on Muslims in Australia in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks have brought the
vexed issue of identity in a multicultural society to
the fore. Being Muslim in Australia has not been
easy, but before the recent events there was a sense
among Australian Muslims that the two objects of
loyalty could stand side by side. This was clearly evi-
dent among a growing number of Australian-born
Muslims who knew no other homeland than Aus-
tralia. That belief is now placed under enormous
strain as racist attacks on Mosques and Islamic
schools question the 'Australianness' of Muslims.
Muslims in Australia
Muslim settlement in Australia started in
earnest in the 1970s after the government
of the day lifted the White Australia Policy,
allowing non-Europeans to migrate to Aus-
tralia. Lebanese immigrants comprised the
first large Muslim community to arrive on
Australian shores, fleeing the Lebanese civil
war. They were followed by an influx of Iran-
ian, Iraqi, Somali and Afghan refugees, all
fleeing internal and inter-state conflict. In
1996 the census recorded a total population
of Muslims in Australia at just over 201,000,
or 1.1% of the total population, on par with
Hindus. But the actual number is likely to
have been higher as the question concern-
ing religious affiliation was optional and
many Muslims felt uncomfortable about dis-
closing their faith for fear of possible perse-
cution by government agencies. The 2001
census has not yet been published, but it is
estimated that the Muslim population in
Australia exceeds 300,000.
Although they still constitute a very small
minority, Australian Muslims have been es-
tablishing themselves in this country as per-
manent residents. This signifies a qualitative
shift from the sporadic Muslim presence in
the 19t h century. Muslims' first contacts with
Australia, represented by the arrival of Mus-
lim fishers, convicts and early settlers, were
too limited in scope to have any impact on
Australia. Muslim presence only became
permanent in the second half of the 19t h
century. This shift had significant implica-
tions for self-perception among Muslims.
Phases of identity-formation
It may be argued that the Muslim identity
in Australia has gone through three phases.
In the first phase, individual Muslims found
it extremely difficult to maintain their reli-
gious identity. They were often isolated
from mainstream Australian society and
from their country of origin. As many Mus-
lim men married non-Muslims, their Islamic
identity was often diluted, or placed in the
background. The adoption of Christian
names by freed Muslim convicts and early
settlers was indicative of a process of assim-
ilation. Individual Muslims in the 19t h c e n t u-
ry found it extremely difficult to exhibit their
religious identity and at the same time be
accepted in the larger Australian communi-
ty – these appeared to be conflicting objec-
tives. The first phase was therefore charac-
terized by the presence of atomized Mus-
lims and the absence of a Muslim communi-
t y .
The arrival of Afghan camel drivers and
the establishment of a community in 'Ghan
town' signalled a shift away from atomized
identity and the growth of a Muslim com-
munity. The Ghan town mosque, construct-
ed in 1889, symbolized the growth of a per-
manent Muslim community in Australia, al-
though it served a very specific ethnic
group. In the early 20t h century, Muslims in
Australia were still few (3,908 in 1911 and
2,704 in 1947), constituting less than half a
per cent of the total population. The small
size, however, had significant social implica-
tions: Muslims felt the need to band togeth-
er, emphasizing their commonality and
downgrading their differences in order to
maintain their Islamic identity and a sense
of community. This constituted the second
p h a s e .
The emergence of a veritable u m m a, com-
plete with its prayer houses and cemeteries,
indicated recognition among Muslims that
their existence in Australia was not transito-
ry. They needed to make Australia home
and establishing Islamic institutions was a
necessary step in that direction.
The third phase of Muslim identity in Aus-
tralia is characterized by the numerical
growth of various ethnic groups, made pos-
sible by the revoking of the White Australia
Policy. Like many other settlers, newly-ar-
rived migrants and refugees from Muslim
societies went through an adaptation
phase. As pointed out by many researchers,
mosques played a vital social role in this pe-
riod, providing assistance to newly arrived
settlers and acting as a conduit to the larger
surroundings. Mosques also provided a con-
genial environment for socialization and re-
habilitation. Iraqi women, for example, tend
to treat their mosque as a social club where
they can hear the latest news about family
and friends, exchange cooking recipes and
news of bargains in the shops. All this de-
pends on the ability to communicate in the
colloquial language. The growth of Muslim
ethnic communities has given rise to the
growth of ethnically oriented mosques to
serve their needs. Many Muslim ethnic
groups are now large enough to sustain
their own mosques.
The third phase, therefore, signifies an-
other qualitative shift in identity. Just as
ethnically mixed congregations contributed
to the ideal of u m m a, the growth of ethnic
congregations tends to detract from it. The
concept of a unified u m m a, though not re-
jected by Muslims, is now qualified with ref-
erence to ethnicity. This process has led to
the increasing relevance of ethnic and sec-
tarian Islam to Muslim settlers in Australia.
This is in line with the growing popularity
and accessibility of the community of lan-
guage which serves as the pillar of the na-
tional ideal, and the fusion of religious and
national identities. This nationalization of
Islam has resulted in a de facto fragmenta-
tion of the ideal Muslim community.
Islamic associations
Nationalization of Islam and the consoli-
dation of national identities among Muslims
in Australia may be a dominant trend but it
is not absolute. The alternative ideal of
u m m a is represented by many supra-na-
tional Islamic associations. The critical ques-
tion is to what extent such associations are
able to mobilize and sustain a truly multi-
ethnic community in Australia. The Muslim
Students Association (MSA) and the Muslim
Community Cooperative of Australia (MCCA)
present noteworthy cases for research.
These, and other similar associations, pur-
port to serve the imagined Muslim commu-
nity regardless of ethnic/national divisions.
However, these institutions are of different
natures and their members are attracted to
them for different reasons. MSAs tend to be
dominated by overseas students, whose ex-
perience in Australia is fleeting and for that
reason isolated. MSAs serve an important
social function by providing a familiar envi-
ronment for these short-term residents. The
use of English in MSAs helps bridge the lan-
guage gap and allows the participation of
second-generation Muslims, who often feel
more comfortable with English, especially at
a tertiary level of discourse, than with their
parents' mother-tongue. The extent of com-
mitment to the imagined u m m a a m o n g
these members, however, remains untest-
ed. It is unlikely that MSAs could operate on
the same level as they do now in the ab-
sence of the energy and enthusiasm of over-
seas Muslim students.
The MCCA, on the other hand, is an in-
digenous experiment. It relies on the com-
mitment and participation of its Australian-
based founders and account-holders. The
stated objective of the MCCA is to provide
ethically acceptable financial services to its
members, avoiding conventional banking
practices which are regarded as usurious
and illegitimate by Islamic scholars. This is
an attractive alternative for some Muslims in
Melbourne and Sydney, especially those
low-income borrowers who face gruelling
interviews in mainstream financial institu-
tions. For a good number of these borrow-
ers, the MCCA is their best chance of secur-
ing a loan. Services provided by this institu-
tion, therefore, provide tangible benefits to
its members, and that is an important factor
for its costumer base. The MCCA, by the
mere fact of its religious operation, fosters
the ideal of u m m a.
It might be a truism to say that the reality
of life for Muslims in Australia is contradicto-
ry, but it bears repeating as over-generaliz-
ing analysis can easily overlook this basic
factor. On an intellectual level, very few peo-
ple from Muslim societies would reject the
ideal of Muslim unity. At the same time,
Muslims tend to gather in national frame-
works because of the immediacy of that
community and flow-on benefits such as
Sunday language schools and celebration of
festive days on the national calendar. This
does not mean that they deny their Islamic
heritage. The Islamic component of their
identity is never far below the surface. But
the Islamic component is merely that, a
component, significant as it may be, of a
larger national identity. It does not dwarf
pride in national identity, but feeds it and by
doing so detracts from the ideal of Muslim
unity. For that reason it is more accurate to
talk about many ethnically delineated Mus-
lim communities in Australia, rather than a
single Muslim community.
There are occasions, however, when these
discrete communities are pulled together.
Developments overseas may provide the
stimulus for some form of Islamic cohesion.
The second Gulf War (1990-91) in which Iraq
was punished for invading Kuwait by West-
ern powers under the aegis of the United
Nations provided that stimulus. The plight
of the Iraqi people inspired sympathy
among Muslims in Australia and led to some
efforts to provide them with material assis-
tance. In more recent times, street fighting
in Jerusalem and the killing of Palestinian
youths gave rise to similar feelings of sym-
pathy among Muslims in Australia, who ex-
pressed their solidarity with the Palestinian
cause in street rallies in Melbourne, Sydney
and Perth. These expressions of unity, how-
ever, are limited, temporary and transient.
In this context, second and third genera-
tion Muslims face incongruent, sometimes
conflicting, sets of loyalties. On the one
hand they are brought-up by their families
to feel proud of their ethnic/religious back-
ground, on the other hand they seek recog-
nition and acceptance from their peers and
the wider Australian mainstream. It is not
surprising that those aspects of their par-
ents' identity which are regarded with scep-
ticism and bias by the Australian main-
stream tend to be under-played in favour of
less 'alien' characteristics. Second and third
generation Muslims in Australia, therefore,
tend to express their ethnic/national identi-
ty more readily than their Muslim identity.
That is in conformity with the secular nature
of the Australian society and the official
recognition of Australia's multiculturalism.
This sense of inclusion is important for the
well-being of the Australian society. It fos-
ters commitment and social responsibility
among Muslim residents, facilitating the
emergence of an Australian Muslim identity.
Just as historical developments have led
newly arrived Turkish, Lebanese and Bosn-
ian Muslims to value their national heritage
and acknowledge the place of Islam in shap-
ing it, policies of multiculturalism and social
inclusion favour the formation of an Aus-
tralian identity which acknowledges the
ethnic and religious diversity of its commu-
nity members. This acknowledgement facil-
itates the expression of Islam as a compo-
nent of Australian identity, giving rise to a
nascent community of Australian Muslims.
Government policies are instrumental in ad-
vancing or hindering this very novel identi-
ty, where the primary point of reference is
Australia. The emergence of an Australian
Islam would add another layer to the al-
ready multi-layered identity of Muslim resi-
dents, complementing the ethnic points of
reference among the existing Muslim com-
munities in Australia. 
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Mid dl e Ea st
J U L I A  D R O E B E R
Much has been written recently about the so-called
'crimes of honour' in Jordan.1 By now, the facts and
fiction about those heinous crimes have become
widely known. According to official statistics, about
25 women on average are killed every year for the
sake of their families' 'honour'. The number of deaths
that could also be categorized as such crimes but are
recorded as suicides or accidents is much higher.
W o m en's
R e p u t a t i o n
and Harassment
i n J o r d a n
The victims of honour crimes usually do not
share a common class background, yet they
are mainly unmarried women between fif-
teen and thirty years of age. The perpetra-
tors are generally male family members,
most notably brothers, fathers, and hus-
bands. Owing to Paragraph 340 of the Jor-
danian Penal Code 2, which continues to be
in force despite various proposals of
amendment, these perpetrators usually are
given very lenient sentences of only a few
months, or are completely exempted be-
cause they are minors, as is the case when
younger brothers kill the victims.
These killings can be considered within
various wider frameworks: firstly is that of
violence against women in general; second-
ly, they can be viewed against the backdrop
of the notions of 'honour' and 'shame' that
are prevalent in Jordanian society. Crimes of
honour can also be analysed as a manifesta-
tion of power relationships in a patriarchal
social system, or can be placed within a reli-
gious context. During research conducted
among young, highly educated, mainly
middle-class women in Jordan between
1997 and 1999, honour crimes were en-
countered under different circumstances.
F u r t h e r m o r e , at the time, they were the sub-
ject of heated debates not only in the
media, but also among the population. In-
stead of reiterating facts about those atro-
cious crimes, the following offers a closer
look at how the crimes and the debate
about them affected the young women
(and men) that were met during the re-
search period.
Reputation and rumours
A very crucial issue became evident dur-
ing the research period: individual as well as
family reputation and rumours play an es-
sential role in the everyday lives of young
women. The honour crimes can be related
to this. Women, especially during the phase
of unmarried adulthood and late adoles-
cence, are thought to carry a great deal of
responsibility for the reputation of their kin
group within society. While still unmarried,
this means they are to safeguard their vir-
ginity and behave 'modestly', and once they
are married they are expected to remain
chaste and modest.
It is important here to show how the so-
called 'crimes of honour' are not only a way
of actually punishing women for their al-
leged sexual misconduct, but also a means
of social control in their role within the sys-
tem of rumours and gossip.
Women in Jordan have become increas-
ingly 'visible' outside their homes in recent
decades and this increased appearance in
'public' seems to have created a greater
need for supervision, control, and restric-
tions. How have young, unmarried, highly
educated, and often working women coped
with the tensions inherent in this situation?
Stories about 'crimes of honour' such as
that of a young woman who was strangled
by her younger brother with a telephone
cord because she was talking to a man on
the phone, became public knowledge and
entered public discourse. Especially after
the instigation of the campaign to abolish
Paragraph 340 and the ensuing debate
about it, stories like these are often used as
a threat to enforce 'modest' and 'chaste' be-
haviour among young women. On a less
tragic level, this body of narratives includes
stories about assaults and harassment,
which have considerable impact on young
women, and which make them think care-
fully about their behaviour in public. By re-
minding each other about what had hap-
pened to other young women, who had
transgressed existing societal norms of be-
haviour, they are reinforcing existing con-
trol mechanisms and creating fear of the
consequences of misconduct. The creation
and repeated evocation of this body of nar-
ratives by men and women alike helps to
bolster patriarchal hierarchies in society.
Most of the young people met during field
research, however, were appalled by these
crimes. They generally thought that they
were not personally threatened by those
killings, since they were, according to one
young man, 'only found in rural areas where
tribal and social values are highly respect-
ed'. One young woman, however, explained
that the topic 'has become a cliché, but it is
an issue that touches each one of us.' Re-
garded as just another, albeit atrocious form
of violence, she asked whether this 'killing
and fighting helps to solve any problem',
and whether 'these acts are honourable'.
One young man, like many others, could not
relate to the notion of 'honour' that suppos-
edly was behind these crimes: 'I would be
ashamed of myself, if I even think of killing
someone regardless if he or she is guilty.
How can an honourable family tolerate the
idea of one of its male members killing his
sister or wife out of suspicion? Killing is a sin
condemned by all religions. And it has never
been an honourable thing to kill one's sister
out of mere suspicion.' A female university
student expressed criticism: 'What's even
worse than the "honour crimes" themselves
is the Parliament's refusal to throw out the
article that allows for lighter sentences for
people having committed honour crimes.'
Closer to their own experience, however,
were incidents of assaults and harassment.
Most of the young women interviewed had
personally experienced harassment in pub-
lic, but were so intimidated by the admoni-
tions concerning their reputation that they
often did not dare to bring these incidents
into the open, let alone confront the perpe-
trators. This caution with regard to voicing
protest might be due to the widespread no-
tion that the women are generally to blame
for such incidents as they are said to pro-
voke men in one way or another, which,
again, triggers an assault.
One young woman used to be harassed
by a man every time she walked through a
certain street on her way home. She told her
father about it and, instead of comforting
and supporting her, the father started
shouting at her, basically telling her that it
was her fault: 'It's probably the way you
dress that instigates such behaviour!' But
she holds that 'it doesn't matter what you
wear, or if you're walking alone or with a
group of friends. Nothing will stop them!'
She observed that Amman's streets have
become a 'hazardous territory for females in
this country', and that 'harassment of
women in public places is becoming a usual
thing that is not condemned by society at
l a r g e . '
Similar to the lenient punishment of the
perpetrators of crimes of honour, which is
apparently supported by many Jordanians,
the – what I would regard as misbehaviour
of men – assaults and harassment of women
in public is tolerated by many. In both cases,
'aggressors are usually proud of what they
do, bragging about it to every soul they
happen to know. And the poor victims usu-
ally feel guilty thinking they are the ones
that instigate such harassment.'
Examples abound. One young woman
was sitting next to her brother in a bus. Sud-
denly she started feeling someone pinching
her from behind. The young woman was
puzzled, not knowing what to do. She could
not just confront the man because her
brother was sitting next to her (and would
have had the responsibility of confronting
the man), and was afraid to tell him what
was happening for fear that he might kill the
man. She did not say anything for a while
but kept moving closer to her brother hop-
ing that the man behind would stop. He did
not, and her brother started suspecting that
something was going on. He asked her if
anything was wrong, but she kept saying
no. She thought the situation was fairly ob-
vious. Eventually, the young woman's
brother looked behind him and gave the
rude man a threatening stare. The rest of the
journey home went peacefully.
Change of attitude
Stories of silently bearing harassment is
nonetheless not totally indicative of how
women are dealing with this issue. In fact,
many young women seem to be becoming
more self-confident and aware that what
happens to them does not have to be en-
dured in silence. They are often advised to
confront the harassers audibly, and general-
ly the people around them come to their de-
fence. A young woman told me how she was
walking through downtown Amman with
her ten-year-old cousin. Suddenly, a young
man approached them and pronounced
some 'dirty words' directed at the young
woman. She was furious and embarrassed,
but at the same time thought that she
ought to do something about such rude be-
haviour. She stopped the man and confront-
ed him with what he had just said. People
who started crowding up to see what was
happening began shouting at the young
man asking him if he would like it if some-
one said the same thing to one of his sisters
or mother. The aggressor was speechless.
Another young woman was riding on a
minibus, which was half-empty. She sat
alone on a double seat with a man sitting
behind her. Suddenly she turned around
shouting at the top of her voice that he
should never do that again, that he should
never ever dare to touch her, followed by a
tirade of curses and a final: 'Get me?!' Intimi-
dated, he tried to make excuses, explaining
that he only wanted to push the curtain
aside, but by then the other passengers had
turned around with looks of dismay. The
young woman turned back again and could
terminate her journey in peace. The perpe-
trator, however, had clearly lost face in this
s i t u a t i o n .
In these cases, young women discarded
the feeling of guilt that they were often
made to take on (for their role in provoking
men), and by doing so, were also able to
protect their reputation. Had anybody wit-
nessed the women being touched and not
reacting – and therefore their silence poten-
tially being interpreted as consent – they
would have run the risk of being accused of
'immoral behaviour'. The consequences of
this need no further explanation. 
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J O S E P H  AL AG H A Hizbullah, Iran
a n d the Intifada
Twenty-one years ago, Imam Khumayni was
the first to inaugurate the last Friday of the
month of Ramadan as 'Quds Day' or
'Jerusalem Day', calling for the support of
Palestinians in any possible way and the es-
tablishment of a Muslim army to liberate
Jerusalem. He referred to Israel as the 'rapist
entity' (al-kiyan al-ghasib), the 'Zionist enti-
ty' (al-kiyan al-sahyuni) that is a cancerous
gland in the region and should be uprooted
at all costs. In Lebanon, on 22 December
2000, the commemoration of 'Quds Day'
had a new flavour because it was the first to
be held after the Israeli withdrawal, and be-
cause it coincided with the second Palestin-
ian Intifada that was characterized by sui-
cide missions causing heavy casualties on
the Israeli side. Also, it was the first time that
the Lebanese state sent an official represen-
tative – along with a minister and a repre-
sentative of the general of the Lebanese
army – to attend 'Quds Day', thus sheltering
the Hizbullah with the Lebanese govern-
ment's legitimacy.1
Conferences in support
o f t h e I n t i f a d a
From 28 to 30 January 2001, the 'First
Quds Conference' was held in Beirut to sup-
port the Palestinian Intifada. It led to the es-
tablishment of the 'Quds Foundation' with
temporary headquarters in Beirut, the 'capi-
tal of liberation and victory'. The final reso-
lutions included the following: severing any
engagements with the Middle East Peace
Settlement; calling for jihad and resistance
as well as political, economic, diplomatic,
and media support for the Intifada; boy-
cotting American goods; using oil as a stick
policy; refusing to naturalize the Palestinian
refugees in any country; the right of return
and self-determination to the Palestinians;
stopping all normalization procedures with
Israel; affirming that Jerusalem is the capital
of Palestine; lobbying in order to revive the
UN Resolution 3379 that stipulates that
Zionism is a form of racism; filing litigations
and preparing the required files concerning
Israeli war criminals; extolling the decision
of the Palestinians not to take part in the up-
coming Israeli elections; total support for
Lebanon in the continuation of the Resis-
tance until the S h i bca Farms – a 220 square
kilometre Lebanese territory still under Is-
raeli occupation – are regained; and the re-
lease of all detainees from Israeli prisons.
The primary speakers were Nasrallah and Ali
Akbar Muhtashami, an Iranian reformist and
an ally of Khatami. Muhtashami, the secre-
tary general of the International Committee
for the Support of the Intifada, urged every-
one to supply the Palestinian people with
arms, so that they can defend their legiti-
mate rights. He also reiterated the Islamic
Republic's solution to the Palestinian crisis,
namely, a general referendum that includes
the 'indigenous Palestinian people' com-
posed of adherents to the three Abrahamic
religions – who are spread worldwide and
inside the Occupied Territories – in order to
determine their future and the type of gov-
ernment to which they aspire. On his part,
Nasrallah affirmed that the Intifada, resis-
tance, and jihad should go hand in hand in
order to achieve victory, rather than futile
negotiations. Nasrallah called on the partic-
ipants to adopt Khumayni's injunction of
celebrating the last Friday of the month of
Ramadan as 'Quds Day'. Indeed, both his
calls were adopted in the final resolutions.2
After a lapse of ten years, Tehran hosted
the second Intifada Conference (April 2001).
M o s t Palestinian opposition groups attend-
ed this International Conference of Support
for the Intifada and the Islamic Revolution
i n Palestine, along with representatives
from 37 Arab and Islamic countries. Like the
'First Quds Conference' resolutions, the final
resolutions of the second conference con-
tained a clause affirming that the Lebanese
victory over the Israeli army in southern
Lebanon had opened new horizons with re-
spect to the Palestinian cause. It also legit-
imized the continuation of the Lebanese re-
sistance until the liberation of the S h i bca
Farms and the release of all the detainees in
Israeli prisons. In the wake of the Confer-
ence, while receiving Nasrallah, Imam
Khamin'i argued that the Aqsa I n t i f a d a i s
the result of the Hizbullah's struggles and
devotion, and that the current Intifada in
Palestine is awakening the sense of dignity
and strength among Palestinian Muslims
through the achievements of the Lebanese
Islamic resistance that materialized in liber-
ating Lebanon from the 'small Satan' (Israel)
after 22 years of occupation. He hailed the
Hizbullah's efforts in Lebanon, which ex-
horted the Palestinian people to rise up.
Khatami affirmed that the 'Zionist entity' is
the biggest threat posed to the Islamic and
Arab world. Referring to the Hizbullah's vic-
tory over the Israeli army in Lebanon, Khata-
mi held that '[s]hould the Zionist entity b e
defeated once, surely it will be defeated a n-
other time.' He added that Muslims should
defend the rights of the Palestinians and
mobilize their capabilities for the return of
the Palestinian refugees and their rights of
self-determination. Nasrallah stated: 'In the
name of Hizbullah and the Resistance, we
shall not stay idle; we shall assume our
moral, religious, and legitimate responsibili-
t i e s, and prove to the Zionists that the Pales-
tinians are not alone. We tell the Zionists:
"Be prepared to face us in places you expect
or do not expect to find us."'3
The status quo
The Hizbullah's ideological stance on the
continuation of the resistance and the liber-
ation of Palestine after the Israeli withdraw-
al from Lebanon is based on the distinction
between the Hizbullah's political ideology
(al-fikr al-siyasi) and political programme
(al-barnamaj al-siyasi). The Hizbullah hon-
oured, and still honours, its ideological pro-
gramme (commitment to the liberation of
Palestine, and no recognition of Israel) and
its political programme, namely that 'so-
cioeconomic, intellectual, and cultural work
is concomitant with resistance and should
go hand in hand with it.' As Nasrallah puts it:
'It is our "legitimate and religious responsi-
bility" [al-mas'uliyya a l - s h a rci y y a wa al-taklif
a l - s h a rci a l - I l a h i]4 to buttress the Palestinian
Intifada in any way we find fit.'5 In actual
practice, the Hizbullah's support for the In-
tifada is limited to political, moral and psy-
chological measures. Nasrallah exhorted the
Palestinians to keep the initiative in their
own hands and to depend on no one except
themselves. Nasrallah said unequivocally
that the Hizbullah does not have a branch in
Palestine or in any other country: 'There is
no Palestinian Hizbullah.' He added that all
of the Hizbullah's rank and file are honoured
to be soldiers fighting under the banner of
Hamas, of the Islamic Jihad, or any Palestin-
ian jihad organization.6 Thus, liberating
Palestine is not an aim; rather, it is a doctri-
nal-ideological commitment. Since Israel's
withdrawal from Lebanon is incomplete be-
cause of its refusal to relinquish the S h i bca
Farms, the Hizbullah's resistance continues
because it is not a militia, but rather the
Lebanese resistance par excellence; this is
one of the main sources of the Hizbullah's
political legitimacy. It is important to note
that all of the Hizbullah's operations in the
Lebanese S h i bca Farms were a show of soli-
darity dedicated to the Palestinian people.
By the end of 2001 seven of the S h i bca o p e r-
ations were carried out by the 'Battalion of
the Aqsa Martyrs' of the Islamic Resistance –
the Hizbullah's military wing, and the kid-
napping of the three Israeli soldiers was car-
ried out by the 'Battalion of the Martyr
Muhammad al-Durra' (one of the most well-
known Palestinian child martyrs).
After September 11
In the aftermath of September 11, US pol-
icy concerning the Hizbullah remained un-
changed. In April 2001, it had been classi-
fied by the US State Department as a 'terror-
ist organization'. After September 11, three
additional lists were issued, which either in-
cluded Hizbullah members or asked the
Lebanese government to freeze the Hizbul-
lah's assets. In response, a national consen-
sus emerged expressing that Hizbullah is
not a terrorist organization.
No alterations have been made in the
Hizbullah's doctrines as a result of Septem-
ber 11, although some manoeuvres and
camouflage tactics were modified. On 28
September 2001, the first anniversary of the
Intifada, Nasrallah threatened – behind bul-
let-proof glass (see photo) – that '[w]e are
ready for direct military intervention in the
Intifada when the benefit of the Palestinian
resistance really dictates recourse to this
option.' With these words, Nasrallah quali-
fied his threat and rendered his statement
ambiguous. On 2 October 2001 Nasrallah re-
iterated that nothing has changed since
September 11: 'Our culture is that of jihad,
resistance, and martyrdom.' He added that
the Hizbullah still opts for the 'military, jihad
option' to liberate Lebanon from Israeli oc-
cupation and to support the Palestinian In-
t i f a d a with all its might.7 On 22 October
2001, while commemorating the 'Day of the
Wounded of the Islamic Resistance' Nasral-
lah affirmed that '[t]hose who killed Za'ifi [Is-
raeli Minister of Tourism] are the most noble
members of this u m m a. Nothing will change
at all for us after 11 September 2001; the re-
sistance continues as long as S h i bca is occu-
pied, our prisoners of war are detained in Is-
raeli prisons, and the Palestinian people are
slaughtered. The Great Satan [the US] that
issues terrorist lists is a terrorist state that
has no right to classify people as terrorists
or not.'8
'We share the same destiny with the Palestinian I n-
t i f a d a till the liberation of Jerusalem.' With these
words Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, the Hizbullah's Secre-
tary General, opened the Solidarity Convention for
the Support of the Intifada in Beirut on 22 May 2001.
Rooted in the successful resistance against the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, the Hizbullah con-
tinues to be very vocal in its support of the Palestin-
ian cause.
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Senega l ese  Di a spo r a
S E R I G N E  M AN S O U R  T AL L
Islam in Senegal is essentially brotherhood-based.
The members of the Senegalese brotherhood of
Mourides are known for their dynamism symbolized
by their propensity for emigrating abroad and for
the colossal size of their capital, Touba. Reinforcing
the brotherhood identity and relying on merchant
networks, the Mouride diaspora – disseminated in all
corners of the world – has developed highly original




With a simple payment order by fax or by
telephone, the Mouride emigrants can, with
the intermediation of merchants based in
Senegal, make available important sums of
money to their families or partners. There is
an established system of compensation be-
tween emigrants and Mouride merchants.
The latter are reimbursed when they travel
to the host countries, often to procure mer-
c h a n d i s e .
The Mouride financial circulation evolves
within extra-legal spheres and relies on the
d a h i r a1 networks and other diverse forms of
brotherhood sociability. This informal glob-
alization of capital is supported by the enor-
mous organizational and communication
capacities of the Mourides and the high
level of solidarity amongst the members of
the brotherhood. In return, the brotherhood
identity spreads amongst transnational net-
works of emigrants, contributing to a glob-
alization of religious culture by virtue of
relay points constituted by the d a h i r as es-
tablished in the host countries.
This brotherhood identity provides a new
framework for a poorly educated popula-
tion, allowing it to control entire sections of
the economy and to inverse the classic
schema of social promotion by the é c o l e
f r a n ç a i s e. An analysis of the emigrants' fi-
nancial circulation demonstrates a link be-
tween commerce and migration, two do-
mains of predilection of the Mourides con-
trolled by increasingly mobile marabouts.
Transfers of 'emigration
m a r a b o u t s '
It would not be exaggerated to speak of
'emigration marabouts' after the 'ground-
nut marabouts' in view of the great extent
and constancy of their presence in the lives
of Senegalese migrants. Ranging from
prayers to facilitate the obtaining of a visa,
to blessings before a voyage, to visits to the
host countries and investment in Touba, the
Mouride marabout is a key figure in the or-
ganization of international Senegalese mi-
gration. To an increasing extent, the
marabouts are taking up their pilgrim's stick
during the summer months to cross the for-
eign lands of Senegalese migratory pres-
ence. Followers entirely finance their
marabouts' stay by collecting funds (a d i y a) .
This contributed to, for example, no less
than 50 Mouride marabouts coming one
after the other to Tenerife from May to Oc-
tober 1999.
In Spain, the collection of the a d i y a is car-
ried out in different ways, according to the
charisma of the marabout, at the places
where emigrant Senegalese salesmen work.
This strong concentration of emigrants at
one workplace facilitates the collection of
the a d i y a – neither a tax nor a tribute, but
rather a sort of 'pious gift' given to the
Mouride marabout.2 It is the payment of a
sum of money as a token of gratitude for re-
ligious guidance. It is difficult to pay this
'pious gift' in kind as was formerly the case
when a day could be reserved, generally a
Wednesday, to work in the fields of the
marabout. In Spain, the collection of the
a d i y a is organized by the 'host' or n d i a t i g u é
of the marabout at places of activity in the
evening as the emigrants finish up their
workday. There is a sort of silent pressure on
the donators; the voluntary aspect of the
gift is somewhat obscured by the public col-
l e c t i o n .
In Italy, the emigrants that are made
aware of the arrival of a marabout by his n d i-
a t i g u é visit him at his hotel, paying the a d i y a
directly to him. The marabouts thus go from
one city to the next. The separated and pri-
vate characteristics of emigrant workplaces
do not facilitate a grouped collection as in
Tenerife. However, the 'Prealpino' residence
in Brescia, a place of heavy concentration of
Senegalese emigrants, is a passage obligé
for emigration marabouts. The form of fund
collection in Italy does not favour 'small
marabouts', the little-known grandsons of
Sheikh Amadou Bamba whose arrival does
not incite many disciples to displace them-
selves for the z i a r (visit of allegiance). The
z i a r is always accompanied by a pious gift.
In New York, the fundraising is essentially
carried out by the d a h i r as, whose members
contribute regularly. The money is not com-
pletely paid to the marabouts as part of it is
used for community investments: repatriat-
ing corpses in case of death, organization of
religious chants, and construction of a
house for Serigne Touba in New York. The
collecting of funds by brotherhood associa-
tions such as the d a h i r as also exists in other
countries. The money of the dahira is given
to the Mouride authorities during annual
visits to Touba. These sums also serve to fi-
nance urbanization in the Mouride capital.3
The money collected by the d a h i r as i s
greater than that mobilized for the arrival of
a marabout since the d a h i r a collection is
permanent. The marabouts are also the con-
veyors of enormous sums of money for their
t a l i b és (disciples); but this only concerns
close t a l i b és, often residing in Touba, who
ask such services of the marabout. The sums
transferred by the marabouts are rather
substantial and are difficult to quantify.
Nonetheless, it can be said that they con-
tribute to the diversification of the means of
financial transfer.
Short-term financing
Senegal-based 'conveyor' merchants are
often linked to migrants in various ways:
neighbourhood links in zones where they
are lodged during their stay abroad, broth-
erhood links for those under the authority
of a particular marabout, kinship ties and
various ties of allegiance. The former travel-
ling merchants of Sandaga collaborate with
their Mouride ex-bosses coming to replen-
ish stock in New York. The merchants, by ac-
cepting to convey the emigrants' money at
no charge, demonstrate a certain degree of
altruism but are also driven by their own in-
terests. The money collected by emigrants
offers the merchants short-term loans,
which allow them to purchase, for example,
bags and shoes in Italy, or electronic devises
and cosmetics in New York. Furthermore,
the conveyor merchants can earn substan-
tial amounts of money by dabbling with dif-
ferent exchange rates before the money is
delivered to recipients. Apart from sums
earned from variations in exchange rates,
which the merchants master better than the
migrants, the former increase their capacity
to buy merchandise and can rapidly reim-
burse the collected sums. The amounts are
paid to the recipients after the purchased
goods are sold. Withdrawing the money
takes place in shops in Dakar: souks of
Sandaga, shops for detachable parts,
telecommunication centres, etc.
The level of sociability is sometimes so
high that the Mouride migrant can ask the
merchant to advance money to his family.
These mandated transfers are multiplying.
Without any displacement of financial flux,
this system of money transfer is based on a
principal of spending. The total is calculated
when the migrant returns and pays all that
was spent during his absence. This type of
transfer presumes frequent returns and a
regular and strong insertion in the commer-
cial networks necessary to establish a rap-
port of confidence. The Mouride brother-
hood identity is an element on which this
confidence is based.
Altogether, important sums of money
comparable to a 'new international aid' are
collected by emigrants and transferred to
Senegal. The creation of such original trans-
fer methods by emigrants and merchants
adheres to a logic of autonomous organiza-
tion, totally avoiding the constraints of the
administration of official transfers, yet not
uniquely functioning according to a social
or community logic. There is an instrumen-
talization of the Mouride identity in organiz-
ing the complex financial circulation in
countries with different legislations and
with different currencies.
Hybrid system
Merchants and emigrants are increasingly
setting up enterprises typical for financial
transfers at the limit of informal, combining
modern and traditional mechanisms, official
and unofficial circuits. Everything occurs as
though there were a conversion of relation-
al capital into a power of financial interme-
d i a t i o n .
The first phases of the development of en-
terprises of hybrid transfers first rely on a
small circle of family and commercial rela-
tions. It then expands to include members
of Mouride d a h i r as. The latter function as an
instrument of social protection, re-estab-
lishment of patriotic ties, and enlargement
of social circles for the emigrants. Solidarity
being a must, the d a h i r a constitutes a catal-
yser of activities, offering a new migrant his
first information channels, providing his
first clients.
The system of transfer is founded on mu-
tual trust between the various users, a sim-
plification of procedures and a rapidity of
collecting or withdrawing the transferred
money. The collecting of money gives great
importance to orality. The operation of the
transfer is a simple order of payment by fax.
After collecting the sum to be transferred
and the commission, the agent in New York
will fax his correspondent in Dakar asking
him to deliver the sum of money to the re-
cipient as agreed. The safety of the transfer
is guarantied by the brotherhood relations.
Withdrawal of sums transferred to Sanda-
ga, more than a simple financial operation,
is a fabrication and a reactivation of proxim-
ities. New ties are found and old ones re-es-
tablished. The systems of transfer are the re-
sult of informal mechanisms (brotherhood
and family networks and trusted relations)
and the institutional practices (payment of
transactions, professionalization of services,
security and rapidity of transfers, utilization
of the new communication technologies).
There is a strong link between commerce
and migration. The emigrant based in New
York finances the international Senegalese
commerce by according, voluntarily or not,
a free short-term credit to merchants by the
system of transferring his savings. He com-
pensates for the insufficiencies of formal fi-
nancing. The diverse proximities are re-uti-
lized in the framework of formal financial re-
lations. Several wholesalers that were met
are emigrants reconverted in commerce.
The Sandaga market in Dakar is the place
where potential migrants polish up their
arms while waiting to 'travel'. Sandaga is the
bastion of Mouride brotherhood networks,
a sort of anteroom for travel abroad. Prox-
imity, the primordial element in the system
of establishing trust, is the basis of all trans-
actions. Proximity is geographical and social
in the first instance (even village of prove-
nance, kinship). Brotherhood proximity is a
unifying element for the dynamism of the
Mouride d a h i r as .
At present, some ten transfer bureaux,
with or without actual offices, reproduce
the exact same system of transfer with vari-
ous sums of money. The proliferation of ex-
change bureaux, whose relay points in
Senegal are but simple tele-centres or
souks, contribute to rendering such interna-
tional financial transfers commonplace. We
are witnessing a mechanism of hybridiza-
tion of financial transfers, the aim of which
is to seize all opportunities, whether tradi-
tional or modern, to convey money. In this
context, the NTIC (New Technologies of In-
formation and Communication) play an in-
creasingly preponderant role in the finan-
cial transfers of Senegalese emigrants. 
N o t e s
1 . The d a h i r as are groupings of members of one
brotherhood according to residential or
professional proximity, or by common allegiance
to a marabout.
2 . Definition given by C. Gueye.
3 . C. Gueye, 'Croissance et organisation urbaine d'une
ville religieuse' (Ph.D. diss. in geography, Université
Louis Pasteur de Strasbourg, France, 1999).
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Re li gi o us  Studi es
F AR H AD  D AF T A R Y
In the course of their long and complex history dat-
ing to the formative period of Islam, the Ismailis have
often been accused of various heretical teachings
and practices and a multitude of myths and miscon-
ceptions circulated about them. This is mainly be-
cause the Ismailis were, until the middle of the 20t h
century, studied and evaluated almost exclusively on
the basis of the evidence collected or often fabricat-
ed by their enemies. It was only from the mid-20t h
century onwards that studies based on Ismaili
sources came to dominate the field, leading to a




As the most revolutionary wing of S h ici s m
with a religio-political agenda that aimed to
uproot the Abbasids and restore the
caliphate to a line of Alid imams, the S h ici I s-
mailis aroused, from early on, the hostility of
the Sunni Muslim majority. With the founda-
tion of the Fatimid state in 909, the Ismaili
challenge to the established order had be-
come actualized, and thereupon the Ab-
basid caliphs and the Sunni u l a m a l a u n c h e d
what amounted to an official anti-Ismaili
propaganda campaign. The overall objec-
tive of this systematic and prolonged cam-
paign was to discredit the entire Ismaili
movement so that the Ismailis could be
readily condemned as heretics or deviators
from the true religious path. Anti-Ismaili
polemical writings provided a major source
of information for Sunni heresiographers,
such as al-Baghdadi (d. 1037), who pro-
duced another important category of writ-
ing against the Ismailis.
By spreading a variety of defamations and
even forged accounts, the anti-Ismaili au-
thors in fact produced a 'black legend' in the
course of the 10t h century. Ismailism was
now depicted as the arch-heresy of Islam
carefully designed by some non-Alid impos-
tors or possibly even a Jewish magician dis-
guised as a Muslim, aiming at destroying
Islam from within. By the 11t h century, this
'black legend', with its elaborate details and
stages of initiation, had been accepted as an
accurate and reliable description of Ismaili
motives, beliefs and practices, leading to
further anti-Ismaili polemics and heresio-
graphical accusations.
Legendary tales – distorted
e v a l u a t i o n s
The revolt of the Persian Ismailis led by
Hasan Sabbah against the Saljuq Turks, the
new overlords of the Abbasids, called forth
in the 1090s another vigorous Sunni reac-
tion against the Ismailis in general and the
Nizari Ismailis in particular. Hasan Sabbah
(d. 1124) championed the cause of the
Nizari branch of Ismailism and founded a
state centred at the fortress of Alamut in
northern Iran with a subsidiary in Syria. The
Syrian Nizaris attained the peak of their
power and fame under Rashid al-Din Sinan,
who was their chief leader for some three
decades until his death in 1193. It was in the
time of Sinan, the original 'Old Man of the
Mountain' of the Crusader sources, that oc-
cidental chroniclers of the Crusades and a
number of European travellers and diplo-
matic emissaries began to write about the
Nizari Ismailis. The Crusader circles and their
occidental chroniclers, who were not inter-
ested in collecting accurate information
about Islam as a religion and its internal di-
visions despite their proximity to Muslims,
remained completely ignorant of Islam. It
was under such circumstances that the Cru-
sader circles produced reports about the se-
cret practices of the Nizari Ismailis. Medieval
Europeans themselves began to fabricate
and put into circulation both in the Latin
Orient and in Europe a number of tales
about the secret practices of the Nizaris,
who were made famous in Europe as the As-
sassins. These so-called Assassin legends
consisted of a number of separate but inter-
connected tales, including the 'paradise leg-
end', the 'hashish legend', and the 'death-
leap legend'. The legends developed in
stages, receiving new embellishments at
each successive stage, and finally culminat-
ed in a synthesis popularized by Marco Polo
(see F. Daftary, T h e Assassin Legends, Lon-
don, 1994). By the beginning of the 19t h c e n-
tury, Europeans still perceived the Nizari Is-
mailis in an utterly confused and fanciful
m a n n e r .
The orientalists of the 19t h century, led by
Silvestre de Sacy (1758–1838), began their
more scholarly study of Islam on the basis of
the Arabic manuscripts which were written
mainly by Sunni authors. As a result, they
studied Islam according to the Sunni view-
point and, borrowing classifications applica-
ble to Christian contexts, generally treated
S h ici s m as the 'heterodox' interpretation of
Islam by contrast to Sunnism which was
taken to represent Islamic 'orthodoxy'. It
was mainly on this basis, as well as the con-
tinued attraction of the seminal Assassin
legends, that the orientalists launched their
own study of the Ismailis.
Indeed, De Sacy's distorted evaluation of
the Ismailis, though unintentional, set the
frame within which other orientalists of the
1 9t h century studied the medieval history of
the Ismailis. As a result, misrepresentation
and plain fiction came to permeate the first
Western book on the Persian Nizaris of the
Alamut period written by Joseph von Ham-
mer-Purgstall (1774–1856). Originally pub-
lished in German in 1818, von Hammer's
book achieved great success in Europe and
continued to be treated as the standard his-
tory of the Nizari Ismailis until the 1930s.
With rare exceptions, notably Charles F. De-
frémery (1822–1883), who produced valu-
able historical studies on the Nizaris of Syria
and Iran, and the studies of Michael J. de
Goeje (1836–1909) on the dissident Qarma-
tis, the Ismailis continued to be misrepre-
sented to various degrees by later oriental-
ists. Meanwhile, Westerners had retained
the habit of referring to the Nizari Ismailis as
the Assassins, a misnomer rooted in a me-
dieval pejorative appellation.
New horizons
The breakthrough in Ismaili studies oc-
curred with the recovery and study of gen-
uine Ismaili texts on a large scale – manu-
script sources which had been preserved se-
cretly in numerous private collections. A few
Ismaili manuscripts of Syrian provenance
had already surfaced in Paris during the 19t h
century, and some fragments of these works
were studied and published there by S. Gu-
yard and others. More Ismaili manuscripts
preserved in Yemen and Central Asia were
recovered in the opening decades of the
2 0t hcentury. In particular, a number of Nizari
texts were collected from Shughnan and
other districts of Badakhshan (now divided
by the Oxus River between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan) and studied by Aleksandr A.
Semenov (1873–1958), the Russian pioneer
in Ismaili studies from Tashkent. However,
by the 1920s knowledge of European schol-
arly circles about Ismaili literature was still
very limited.
Modern scholarship in Ismaili studies was
initiated in the 1930s in India, where signifi-
cant collections of Ismaili manuscripts have
been preserved in the Tayyibi Ismaili Bohra
community. This breakthrough resulted
mainly from the pioneering efforts of
Wladimir Ivanow (1886–1970), and a few Is-
maili Bohra scholars, notably Asaf A. A.
Fyzee (1899–1981), Husayn F. al-Hamdani
(1901–1962) and Zahid Ali (1888–1958),
who based their studies on their family col-
lections of manuscripts. Asaf Fyzee, in fact,
made modern scholars aware of the exis-
tence of an independent medieval Ismaili
school of jurisprudence. Ivanow, who even-
tually settled in Bombay after leaving his na-
tive Russia in 1917, collaborated closely
with these Bohra scholars and succeeded,
through his own connections within the
Khoja community, to gain access to Nizari
literature as well. Consequently, he com-
piled the first detailed catalogue of Ismaili
works, citing some 700 separate titles which
attested to the hitherto unknown richness
and diversity of Ismaili literature and intel-
lectual traditions (see W. Ivanow, A Guide to
Ismaili Literature, London, 1933). This very
catalogue provided a scientific frame for
further research in the field. Ismaili scholar-
ship received another major impetus
through the research programmes of the Is-
maili Society of Bombay, established in 1946
under the patronage of Sultan Muhammad
Shah, Aga Khan III (1877–1957), the 48t h
imam of the Nizari Ismailis.
By 1963, when Ivanow published a revised
edition of his catalogue (Ismaili Literature: A
Bibliographical Survey), many more Ismaili
sources had become known and progress in
Ismaili studies had been truly astonishing.
Numerous Ismaili texts had begun to be crit-
ically edited by scholars, preparing the
ground for further progress in this new field
of Islamic studies. In this connection, partic-
ular mention should be made of the Ismaili
texts of Fatimid and later times edited to-
gether with analytical introductions by
Henry Corbin, published simultaneously in
Tehran and Paris in his Bibliothèque Irani-
enne series; and the Fatimid texts edited by
the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Kamil
Husayn and published in his Silsilat Makhtu-
tat al-Fatimiyyin series in Cairo. At the same
time, Arif Tamir edited a number of Ismaili
texts of Syrian provenance, and a few Euro-
pean scholars such as Marius Canard and
several Egyptian scholars made important
contributions to Fatimid studies.
By the mid-1950s, progress in the field had
already enabled Marshall G. S. Hodgson to
produce the first scholarly and comprehen-
sive study of the Nizari Ismailis of the Alamut
period (The Order of Assassins, The Hague,
1955). Soon, others representing a new gen-
eration of scholars, notably Bernard Lewis,
Samuel M. Stern, Wilferd Madelung and
Abbas Hamdani produced major studies, es-
pecially on the early Ismailis and their rela-
tions with the dissident Qarmatis. Progress in
Ismaili studies has proceeded at a rapid pace
during the last few decades through the ef-
forts of yet another generation of scholars
such as Ismail K. Poonawala, Heinz Halm, Paul
E. Walker, Azim A. Nanji and Thierry Bianquis.
The modern progress in the recovery and
study of Ismaili literature is well reflected in
Professor Poonawala's monumental B i o b i b l i-
ography of I smācı̄ l i Literature (Malibu, Calif.,
1977), which identifies some 1300 titles writ-
ten by more than 200 authors.
Modern scholarship in Ismaili studies
promises to continue at an even greater
pace as the Ismailis themselves are now be-
coming widely interested in studying their
literary heritage and history – a phenome-
non attested by an increasing number of Is-
maili-related doctoral dissertations written
in recent decades by Ismailis. In this context,
a major role will be played by the Institute of
Ismaili Studies, established in London in
1977 under the patronage of H. H. Prince
Karim Aga Khan IV, the present imam of the
Nizari Ismailis. This institution is already serv-
ing as the central point of reference for Is-
maili studies while making its own contribu-
tions through various programmes of re-
search and publications. Amongst these,
particular mention should be made of the
monographs appearing in the Institute's Is-
maili Heritage series which aims to make
available to wide audiences the results of
modern scholarship on the Ismailis and their
intellectual and cultural traditions; and the
Ismaili Texts and Translations series in which
critical editions of Arabic and Persian texts
are published together with English transla-
tions. Numerous scholars worldwide partici-
pate in these academic programmes, and
many more benefit from the accessibility of
the Ismaili manuscripts found in the Insti-
tute's library, representing the largest collec-
tion of its kind in the West. With these mod-
ern developments, the scholarly study of the
Ismailis, which by the closing decades of the
2 0t h century had already greatly decon-
structed the seminal anti-Ismaili legends of
medieval times, promises to dissipate the re-
maining misrepresentations of the Ismailis
rooted either in hostility or imaginative ig-
norance of the earlier generations. 
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secular political culture in the Middle East
and South Asia.
Viewed as the guardians of fatalism and
expectationalism, the early proponents of
clerical modernity and spiritual revolution
were intensely anti-clerical. In their forma-
tive phase, these calls were calls for the
transformation of a sedimented notion of
religion into a dynamic modern ideology
and culture. For instance Kasravi, whose
contribution to the emergence of Iranian Is-
lamism has been effectively suppressed,
viewed religion as 'humanism' ( a d a m i g a r i )
and as 'the source of worldly prosperity'.1 0
To establish Islam as a counter-Europist
'guide for life', he called for 'the returning of
Islam to its foundation by purging it of the
irrationalities of Sufi predestanarianism and
S h ici e x p e c t a t i o n a l i s m ' .1 1 As a rational hu-
manist project, Islam was thus set to provide
both the content of Eastern spirituality and
the perimeters of a modern and progressive
political culture. Overburdened by these
modern requirements, religiosity and spiri-
tuality were increasingly politicized and reli-
gious sodalities assumed the role of political
parties and civil institutions. Early examples
of such associations that contributed to the
formation of Islamic public sphere are the
Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the Indian-
Pakistani J a m aca t - i Islami, and the Iranian
Hay'ats, an extensive network of neighbour-
hood associations that emerged all over
Iran between the 1940s and the 1970s.
By claiming authenticity, morality, and
spirituality as their own exclusive domain,
these and other Islamist formations consti-
tuted their secular counterparts as replicas
of the materialistic, immoral, inhumane, and
decadent West. Consequently Islamist for-
mations, instead of contributing to the in-
vigoration of ethical, humanist, and civil val-
ues, have predominantly fostered violence,
intolerance, incivility, and religious bigotry.
As the Western claim of superiority es-
poused colonialism and imperialist domina-
tion, the Eastern claim of spirituality has
likewise produced shameful manifestations
that are contrary to basic norms of human
decency. The events of September 11 are
the latest expression of this degenerated
and vengeful spirituality. As postcolonial
scholars have critiqued the claims of West-
ern exceptionality, it is now urgent that the
foundational assumptions of Eastern spiri-
tuality are likewise deconstructed. 
killed in battle and going down as a martyr
Che Guevera style.
Yes, Bin Laden may have touched on most
if not all the Arab-Muslim world's historical
grievances. He may have demanded force-
fully to settle legitimate accounts. In these
respects he is echoing the deep yearning of
at least eight generations of Arabs and Mus-
lims – as his fellow desert reformer-warrior
Mohamed bin Abul-Wahab had tried at the
end of the 18t h century. But Bin Laden's me-
dieval language of discourse, his Wahabi
austere fundamentalist version of Islam, the
oppressive model of society imposed in
Afghanistan, and the terrorist methods used
to settle legitimate accounts with the out-
side world, all put him outside the main-
stream of history. They make him the wrong
accountant. His only remaining value, if any,
may be that of shocking mankind into con-
sciousness that there is urgent regional-
global business that must be equitably and
forcefully addressed, before another Bin
Laden – possibly more lethal – forces his
way to the world's centre stage again, and
takes us all to the brink of apocalypse. 
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1 0 . Ibid., 52.
1 1 . Ahmad Kasravi, Ma Chah M i k hWa h i m ( T e h r a n :
Kitabfurushi-i Paydar, 1319 [1940]), 200.
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An expert's political agenda
Stephen Schwartz, intellectual and jour-
nalist, thinks differently. In his widely circu-
lating article entitled 'Ground Zero and the
Saudi Connection', first printed in The Spec-
tator (22 September 2001), he claims to have
discovered the real cause of the crime of
September 11: the orthodox tradition of
Islam that originated in Arabia called, by out-
siders, 'Wahhabism', after the 18t h- c e n t u r y
Najdi reformer Muhammad bin Abdul-Wah-
hab. In my view the article is typical of much
irresponsible literature about 'fundamental-
ism' put out by the many 'experts' who ea-
gerly pursue their own political agendas.
Wahhabis have often been likened to Puri-
tans by Europeans for their severity in mat-
ters of religion, their insistence on simplicity
in worship and the equality of all believers,
and their strict legalism. They are also now
called 'fundamentalists' by critics. Schwartz
grandly concedes that not all Muslims are ex-
tremists, that terrorism isn't intrinsically con-
nected to Islam, but insists that 'all Muslim
suicide bombers are Wahhabis'. He goes on
with MacCarthyite logic to add: 'except, per-
haps, for some disciples of atheist leftists
posing as Muslims in the interests of person-
al power, such as Yasser Arafat.' Because all
Wahhabis are actual or potential terrorists, all
Muslim terrorists are Wahhabis. They are also
'Islamo-fascists' and, puzzlingly, 'have much
in common with Bolsheviks.' This kind of
logic enables Schwartz to put together a long
string of terrorist and militant activists (all
Muslims, of course) in different countries and
to call them Wahhabis regardless of whether
they adhere doctrinally to that tendency or
not. He either doesn't know or doesn't care to
tell us that Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali
school of law that (like all Sunni schools) does
not authorize the killing of innocents even in
war and certainly not the suicidal criminality
committed on September 11. He doesn't
know or doesn't care to tell us that theolo-
gians very close doctrinally to 'Wahhabis', for
example Shaykh Yusif al-Qaradawi who lives
in the Gulf, strongly condemned the Septem-
ber 11 terrorists on religious grounds, that
Shaykh Abdulaziz bin Abdullah (a 'Wahhabi'),
chief religious authority in Saudi Arabia, con-
demned suicide bombers on Islamic grounds
a year before September 11. Instead,
Schwartz gleefully reminds us that the ruling
family of Saudi Arabia is officially 'Wahhabi'.
What worries him is not that they are corrupt
and repressive rulers, or that their internal se-
curity is guaranteed by the United States on a
quid pro quo basis (all of which causes great
resentment among ordinary Saudis). His con-
cern is that 'Wahhabi Saudi Arabia' supports
actual and potential terrorism throughout
the world because it gives money to various
Islamic institutions. Hence the danger Saudi
Arabia represents – especially in the United
States where its religious influence among
immigrants is rampant. For here, so he as-
sures us, 80% of the mosques are 'Wahhabi',
and they preach extremism. The children of
Muslim immigrants who are exposed to
'Wahhabi' influence 'opt for Islamic revolu-
tion and commit themselves to their self-de-
struction, combined with mass murder.' Im-
migrants committed to mass murder? How
many school-shootings in the United States
have been carried out by Muslim children?
I attended over 20 mosques in New York
during last year, but I cannot claim that this
constitutes a representative sample. Howev-
er, in none of them did I hear preachers urg-
ing 'extremism' – although they did vary con-
siderably in liveliness and intelligence. I can't
help but conclude that Schwartz's article rep-
resents a recognizable kind of public dis-
course about what is supposed to be going
on in the Middle East, a discourse promoted
by a range of better-known names. It has
mischievous implications for American atti-
tudes to Muslim and Arab immigrants – and
for our foreign policy in the Muslim world.
Internally America is, for all its flaws, a de-
mocratic society committed to the rule of
law and freedom of speech. But externally
American military and economic might has
not always aimed at democratic outcomes
nor always followed international law – es-
pecially in the Middle East, where it has too
often supported despotic governments and
brutal occupiers, and engaged in military in-
terventions and conspiratorial politics. I
make this point not in order to 'justify' the
atrocity of September 11, to 'blame' Ameri-
ca and argue that the murder of several
thousand people was 'deserved'. I can only
repeat unreservedly that no one deserves to
be murdered. My suggestion – in common
with that of many other commentators – is
that we try to understand the conditions
that have made this kind of attack probable.
And I point to America's policies in the Mid-
dle East as being among those conditions.
When we seek to understand the conditions
that generate violent gangs among the
youth of Los Angeles, no sensible person
would think we were justifying murder.
It seems to me in any case that because
we now live in a highly interdependent
world where the exercise of power must
carry commensurate responsibility, the re-
sponsibilities of the world's only superpow-
er must be not only towards the safety and
prosperity of American citizens but towards
a just and secure world. 
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I n t e r n e t
S H I R AZ  A L L I B H A I
The Aga Khan Trust for Culture was founded in 1988
and is registered in Geneva, Switzerland, as a private,
non-denominational, philanthropic foundation. It is
an integral part of the Aga Khan Development Net-
work, a family of institutions created by His Highness
the Aga Khan, with distinct yet complementary man-
dates to improve the welfare and prospects of people
in countries in the developing world, particularly in
Asia and Africa.
One of the aims of the Aga Khan Trust for
Culture is to increase cross-cultural under-
standing of Islamic architecture and the inti-
mate connection between architecture and
culture in Islamic civilizations. It also aims to
create greater awareness and appreciation
of the diversity and pluralism of Muslim cul-
tures – within the Muslim world itself as well
as in the West. Architecture creates a space
which is less politically charged and where
common concerns and values can enter into
an exchange amongst peoples of different
cultures. This exchange and understanding
have never been more important than they
are now.
ArchNet (www.archnet.org) is an exciting
new project currently being developed at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
School of Architecture and Planning, with the
support of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture. The
central goal of ArchNet is to provide exten-
sive, high-quality, globally accessible intellec-
tual resources focused on topics of architec-
ture, urban design, urban development, in-
cluding restoration, conservation, housing,
landscape, and concerns related to the Islam-
ic world. It provides, on an accessible server:
images, a searchable text library, bibliograph-
rooms, and debates, it is hoped that the site
will encourage and promote discussions
amongst participants. The system is designed
to promote ready inter-communication and
maintenance of an international scholarly
community among scholars, practitioners,
and interested non-specialists in the field.
Furthermore, it is structured to facilitate effec-
tive division of scholarly labour and sharing of
resources, rather than the traditional pattern
of duplicating library holdings, slide collec-
tions, and so on at multiple locations.
Currently there are over 8000 images and
1500 publications related to both the con-
temporary and historical architecture of the
Islamic world in the Digital Library. This
number will continue to grow as collections
from MIT, Harvard University and the Aga
Khan Trust for Culture are added. In addi-
tion, there is an Institutional Workspace
which allows schools of architecture and
planning from around the world to share
their expertise, knowledge, research, stu-
dent work, and regional concerns.
ArchNet is envisaged as a borderless net-
work of institutions contributing to, and
learning from each other. It is hoped that
this will have considerable influence on the
way that architects and planners are educat-
ed and practise. New computer and tele-
communication technologies have great
potential for supporting communication
and collaboration among architecture and
planning students, faculty, scholars, and
practitioners throughout the world. Arch-
Net will provide opportunities for realizing
that potential. 
For more information, please consult the ArchNet:
w w w . a r c h n e t . o r g
E x h i b i t i o n
Abd al-Aziz Khan
M a d r a s a ,
B u k h a r a ,
U z b e k i s t a n
Refugee Camp in Pakistan Northwest Afghanistan, 
Province of Badghis
West Afghanistan
ical reference databases, on-line lectures, cur-
ricular materials, papers, essays, and reviews,
discussion forums and statistical information.
The structure is designed to offer each user a
personal workspace tailored to his or her indi-
vidual needs. From this space, users are able
to contribute their own findings and research
to the larger site. The website aims to foster
close ties between institutions and between
users. Through the use of on-line forums, chat
A r c h N e t
Islamic Architecture
o n the Web
A f g h a n i s t a n
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Afghanistan: Tree of Life and Ka-
lashnikov is an exhibition (14 July
2001 – 27 January 2002) at the Lin-
den-Museum in Stuttgart, Ger-
many. More than 20 years of war,
civil war, displacement of people,
and the Taliban's iconoclasm have
led to immense losses of cultural
treasures. At the same time the
brutalities of war have inspired a
new form of popular art. Baluch
and Turkmen tribal women and
those from other western Afghan
groups weave carpets that depict
automatic guns, tanks, helicopters
and other motives. The exhibition
exemplifies important periods of
the region's culture from the
Bronze Age to today, and displays
a selection of these modern war
carpets from a private German col-
lection with photo documents.
Talal Asad
Some Thoughts on the WTC Disaster
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Conference Report: Religion, Media
and the Public Sphere
Birgit Meyer and Annelies Moors
3
Project: Rights at Home
Laila al-Zwaini
3
Report: Local Production of Islamic
Knowledge: An Ethnographer's View
Dale F. Eickelman
4
Conference Report: Application of
Islamic Law in Courts
Muhammad Khalid Masud
5
Conference Report: Islam, Women's
Rights, and Islamic Feminism
Martin van Bruinessen
6
Lecture: The Netherlands and Islam
Peter van der Veer
7 – 8
F E A T U R E S
Atef Shahat Said
Homosexuality and Human Rights in Egypt
9
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Amr Hamzawy
Arab Intellectuals, Usama bin Laden and the
W e s t
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Saad Eddin Ibrahim




Misunderstanding Ethnicity in the Afghan
C o n f l i c t
1 2
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi
Frontline Mysticism and Eastern Spirituality
1 3
Yoginder Sikand
Islamist Militancy: The Lashkar-i-Tayyeba
1 4
Yatun Sastramidjaja
Islamic Revival and Youth in Indonesia
1 5
Jorgen S. Nielsen









Muslim Student Activism: Americanizing
Islam or Islamicizing America?
1 9
M E D I A
Ahmad Kamel
Al-Jazeera: An Insider's View
2 0
Naomi Sakr
Testing Time for Al-Jazeera
2 1
N eşe I h t i y a r
Televangelism and the Case of Y aş a rN u r i
Ö z t ü r k
2 2
Ziba Mir-Hosseini
Iran's Runaway Girls Challenge the Old Rules
2 3
Ermete Mariani
H a d i t h On-Line: Writing Islamic Tradition
2 4
H I S T O R I C A L  A P P R O A C H E S
Diego Abenante
Cultivation and Conversion in Multan
2 5
Hussein Ahmed
1 9t h-Century Islamic Revival in Wallo,
E t h i o p i a
2 6
Cyrus Schayegh
Science and the Iranian Middle Class
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E D U C A T I O N
Allen J. Frank




Self-Positioning and Islamic Instruction in
G e r m a n y
2 9
Yasien Mohamed
Islamic Education in South Africa
3 0
Bayram Balci
Fethullah G ü l e n's Missionary Schools
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Women's Reputation and Harassment in
J o r d a n
3 4
Joseph Alagha
Hizbullah, Iran and the Intifada
3 5
M I G R A T I O N
Serigne Mansour Tall
Mouride Migration and Financing
3 6
R E S E A R C H
Farhad Daftary
Ismaili Studies: Antecedents and Modern
D e v e l o p m e n t s
3 7
M A T E R I A L  C UL T U R E
Shiraz Allibhai 
ArchNet: Islamic Architecture on the Web
3 9
Exhibition 
Afghanistan: Tree of Life and Kalashnikov
3 9
* This issue of the ISIM Newsletter does not
contain its usual Academic Meetings and
the Art and Culture Agenda. These two
sections can be found on the ISIM web site
together with the digital version of this
i s s u e .
C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and
conducts interdisciplinary
research on contemporary social
and intellectual trends and
movements in Muslim societies
and communities. 




Convener: Dr Matthijs van den Bos
URL: h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s
Date: 28 February–1 March 2002
Venue: ISIM, Leiden
Third Family Law Workshop:
F a m i l y Law, Human Rights,
a n d Political Activism
In cooperation with the Working Group
Islam and Modernity (AKMI) and the
School for Oriental and African Studies
( S O A S ) .
Date: 21–25 March 2002
Venue: Ifni, Morocco
Lecture Series: Islam, Authority
a n d L e a d e r s h i p
A series of lectures and debates
organized in cooperation with Felix
Meritis,  Amsterdam.
Date: April–June 2002
Venue: A m s t e r d a m
Workshop: Current Research in
t h e Anthropology of Islamic Law
Convener: Prof. Léon Buskens and
P r o f . M. K. Masud
Date: 19-20 April
Venue: L e i d e n
For more information on these and other ISIM
E v e n t s :
ISIM Secretariat
Tel.: +31 71 5277905 / Fax: +31 71 5277906
E-mail: i s i m @ l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
URL: http://www.isim.nl/isim/activities/ 
ISIM Publications
The ISIM has recently produced the third publication of its ISIM Papers series:
– S h a r ica, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia,
by John Bowen.
Earlier ISIM Publications include:
– Islam and the Electoral Principal in the Middle East (ISIM Paper 1),
by James Piscatori;
– Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt (ISIM Paper 2),
by Talal Asad;
– Muslim Jurists' Quest for the Normative Basis of Sharica (ISIM Inaugural Lecture),
by Muhammad Khalid Masud.
Forthcoming publications include:
– Piety and Persuasion in the Modern Islamic World (ISIM Paper 4),
by Barbara Metcalf;
– Six Voices from the Margins: The Modern Muslim Intellectual as the Liminal Figure of Today
(Interviews), by Farish Noor.
These publications are available at the ISIM and can be ordered through the ISIM secretariat.
